Merge tag 'v6.6-rc2' into locking/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 75 insertions, 113 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7422db409770..66bfabae8814 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_WX
 	select ARCH_HAS_ZONE_DMA_SET if EXPERT
 	select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
+	select ARCH_MHP_MEMMAP_ON_MEMORY_ENABLE
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_ACPI_PDC		if ACPI
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO
@@ -128,7 +129,8 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_WANT_GENERAL_HUGETLB
 	select ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE
 	select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN
-	select ARCH_WANT_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAP	if X86_64
+	select ARCH_WANT_OPTIMIZE_DAX_VMEMMAP	if X86_64
+	select ARCH_WANT_OPTIMIZE_HUGETLB_VMEMMAP	if X86_64
 	select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP		if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH
 	select BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT
@@ -1308,44 +1310,8 @@ config X86_REBOOTFIXUPS
 	  Say N otherwise.
 
 config MICROCODE
-	bool "CPU microcode loading support"
-	default y
+	def_bool y
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD || CPU_SUP_INTEL
-	help
-	  If you say Y here, you will be able to update the microcode on
-	  Intel and AMD processors. The Intel support is for the IA32 family,
-	  e.g. Pentium Pro, Pentium II, Pentium III, Pentium 4, Xeon etc. The
-	  AMD support is for families 0x10 and later. You will obviously need
-	  the actual microcode binary data itself which is not shipped with
-	  the Linux kernel.
-
-	  The preferred method to load microcode from a detached initrd is described
-	  in Documentation/arch/x86/microcode.rst. For that you need to enable
-	  CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD in order for the loader to be able to scan the
-	  initrd for microcode blobs.
-
-	  In addition, you can build the microcode into the kernel. For that you
-	  need to add the vendor-supplied microcode to the CONFIG_EXTRA_FIRMWARE
-	  config option.
-
-config MICROCODE_INTEL
-	bool "Intel microcode loading support"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && MICROCODE
-	default MICROCODE
-	help
-	  This options enables microcode patch loading support for Intel
-	  processors.
-
-	  For the current Intel microcode data package go to
-	  <https://downloadcenter.intel.com> and search for
-	  'Linux Processor Microcode Data File'.
-
-config MICROCODE_AMD
-	bool "AMD microcode loading support"
-	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && MICROCODE
-	help
-	  If you select this option, microcode patch loading support for AMD
-	  processors will be enabled.
 
 config MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
 	bool "Late microcode loading (DANGEROUS)"
@@ -1849,6 +1815,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
 		  (CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \
 		  $(as-instr,endbr64)
 
+config X86_CET
+	def_bool n
+	help
+	  CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT)
+
 config X86_KERNEL_IBT
 	prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
 	def_bool y
@@ -1856,6 +1827,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT
 	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
 	depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
 	select OBJTOOL
+	select X86_CET
 	help
 	  Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a
 	  hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
@@ -1949,12 +1921,31 @@ config X86_SGX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+	bool "X86 userspace shadow stack"
+	depends on AS_WRUSS
+	depends on X86_64
+	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	select X86_CET
+	help
+	  Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+	  return address corruption.  This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+	  Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+	  get protection "for free".
+
+	  CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
+
+	  See Documentation/arch/x86/shstk.rst for more information.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
 	select UCS2_STRING
 	select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
 	select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+	select EFI_RUNTIME_MAP if KEXEC_CORE
 	help
 	  This enables the kernel to use EFI runtime services that are
 	  available (such as the EFI variable services).
@@ -2030,7 +2021,6 @@ config EFI_MAX_FAKE_MEM
 config EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
 	bool "Export EFI runtime maps to sysfs" if EXPERT
 	depends on EFI
-	default KEXEC_CORE
 	help
 	  Export EFI runtime memory regions to /sys/firmware/efi/runtime-map.
 	  That memory map is required by the 2nd kernel to set up EFI virtual
@@ -2040,88 +2030,37 @@ config EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
 
 source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
 
-config KEXEC
-	bool "kexec system call"
-	select KEXEC_CORE
-	help
-	  kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your
-	  current kernel, and to start another kernel.  It is like a reboot
-	  but it is independent of the system firmware.   And like a reboot
-	  you can start any kernel with it, not just Linux.
-
-	  The name comes from the similarity to the exec system call.
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
+	def_bool y
 
-	  It is an ongoing process to be certain the hardware in a machine
-	  is properly shutdown, so do not be surprised if this code does not
-	  initially work for you.  As of this writing the exact hardware
-	  interface is strongly in flux, so no good recommendation can be
-	  made.
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE
+	def_bool X86_64 && CRYPTO && CRYPTO_SHA256
 
-config KEXEC_FILE
-	bool "kexec file based system call"
-	select KEXEC_CORE
+config ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC_FILE
+	def_bool y
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE
 	select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA
-	depends on X86_64
-	depends on CRYPTO=y
-	depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y
-	help
-	  This is new version of kexec system call. This system call is
-	  file based and takes file descriptors as system call argument
-	  for kernel and initramfs as opposed to list of segments as
-	  accepted by previous system call.
 
-config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
 
-config KEXEC_SIG
-	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE
-	help
-
-	  This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid
-	  signature of the kernel image.  The image can still be loaded without
-	  a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if
-	  there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid.
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_SIG
+	def_bool y
 
-	  In addition to this option, you need to enable signature
-	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
-	  loaded in order for this to work.
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
+	def_bool y
 
-config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
-	bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_SIG
-	help
-	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
-	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
+	def_bool y
 
-config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support"
-	depends on KEXEC_SIG
-	depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
-	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-	help
-	  Enable bzImage signature verification support.
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_JUMP
+	def_bool y
 
-config CRASH_DUMP
-	bool "kernel crash dumps"
-	depends on X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM)
-	help
-	  Generate crash dump after being started by kexec.
-	  This should be normally only set in special crash dump kernels
-	  which are loaded in the main kernel with kexec-tools into
-	  a specially reserved region and then later executed after
-	  a crash by kdump/kexec. The crash dump kernel must be compiled
-	  to a memory address not used by the main kernel or BIOS using
-	  PHYSICAL_START, or it must be built as a relocatable image
-	  (CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y).
-	  For more details see Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP
+	def_bool X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM)
 
-config KEXEC_JUMP
-	bool "kexec jump"
-	depends on KEXEC && HIBERNATION
-	help
-	  Jump between original kernel and kexeced kernel and invoke
-	  code in physical address mode via KEXEC
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_HOTPLUG
+	def_bool y
 
 config PHYSICAL_START
 	hex "Physical address where the kernel is loaded" if (EXPERT || CRASH_DUMP)
@@ -2593,6 +2532,13 @@ config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
 	  This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
 	  performance.
 
+config CPU_SRSO
+	bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
+
 config SLS
 	bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
 	depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
@@ -2603,15 +2549,31 @@ config SLS
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
+config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default n
+	help
+	  Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+	  unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
+	  vector registers.
+
+	  This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
+	  command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
+	  AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
+	  the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will
+	  break with this option set.
+
+	  Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect.
+
+	  If in doubt, say N.
+
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
 	def_bool y
 	depends on ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
 
-config ARCH_MHP_MEMMAP_ON_MEMORY_ENABLE
-	def_bool y
-
 menu "Power management and ACPI options"
 
 config ARCH_HIBERNATION_HEADER