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author | Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> | 2019-11-13 13:05:44 +0300 |
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committer | Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> | 2019-11-14 07:37:59 +0300 |
commit | af2e8c68b9c5403f77096969c516f742f5bb29e0 (patch) | |
tree | 57edfd525c9dc14dac4921dff158a611be3f4a9f /arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | |
parent | 39e72bf96f5847ba87cc5bd7a3ce0fed813dc9ad (diff) | |
download | linux-af2e8c68b9c5403f77096969c516f742f5bb29e0.tar.xz |
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
On some systems that are vulnerable to Spectre v2, it is up to
software to flush the link stack (return address stack), in order to
protect against Spectre-RSB.
When exiting from a guest we do some house keeping and then
potentially exit to C code which is several stack frames deep in the
host kernel. We will then execute a series of returns without
preceeding calls, opening up the possiblity that the guest could have
poisoned the link stack, and direct speculative execution of the host
to a gadget of some sort.
To prevent this we add a flush of the link stack on exit from a guest.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 30 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S index faebcbb8c4db..0496e66aaa56 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ */ #include <asm/ppc_asm.h> +#include <asm/code-patching-asm.h> #include <asm/kvm_asm.h> #include <asm/reg.h> #include <asm/mmu.h> @@ -1487,6 +1488,13 @@ guest_exit_cont: /* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */ 1: #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_XICS */ + /* + * Possibly flush the link stack here, before we do a blr in + * guest_exit_short_path. + */ +1: nop + patch_site 1b patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack + /* If we came in through the P9 short path, go back out to C now */ lwz r0, STACK_SLOT_SHORT_PATH(r1) cmpwi r0, 0 @@ -1963,6 +1971,28 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300) mtlr r0 blr +.balign 32 +.global kvm_flush_link_stack +kvm_flush_link_stack: + /* Save LR into r0 */ + mflr r0 + + /* Flush the link stack. On Power8 it's up to 32 entries in size. */ + .rept 32 + bl .+4 + .endr + + /* And on Power9 it's up to 64. */ +BEGIN_FTR_SECTION + .rept 32 + bl .+4 + .endr +END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300) + + /* Restore LR */ + mtlr r0 + blr + kvmppc_guest_external: /* External interrupt, first check for host_ipi. If this is * set, we know the host wants us out so let's do it now |