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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-02-26 20:16:04 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-03-04 21:08:28 +0300 |
commit | 00c42373d3970b354948ba3b24a34501b1a2505f (patch) | |
tree | 5f3361f5d7a8e39d4f3b3e3835fdb4fbcab02ed8 /arch/h8300 | |
parent | 1c163f4c7b3f621efff9b28a47abb36f7378d783 (diff) | |
download | linux-00c42373d3970b354948ba3b24a34501b1a2505f.tar.xz |
x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address dereferences
This adds a warning (once) for any kernel dereference that has a user
exception handler, but accesses a non-canonical address. It basically
is a simpler - and more limited - version of commit 9da3f2b74054
("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses") that
got reverted.
Note that unlike that original commit, this only causes a warning,
because there are real situations where we currently can do this
(notably speculative argument fetching for uprobes etc). Also, unlike
that original commit, this _only_ triggers for #GP accesses, so the
cases of valid kernel pointers that cross into a non-mapped page aren't
affected.
The intent of this is two-fold:
- the uprobe/tracing accesses really do need to be more careful. In
particular, from a portability standpoint it's just wrong to think
that "a pointer is a pointer", and use the same logic for any random
pointer value you find on the stack. It may _work_ on x86-64, but it
doesn't necessarily work on other architectures (where the same
pointer value can be either a kernel pointer _or_ a user pointer, and
you really need to be much more careful in how you try to access it)
The warning can hopefully end up being a reminder that just any
random pointer access won't do.
- Kees in particular wanted a way to actually report invalid uses of
wild pointers to user space accessors, instead of just silently
failing them. Automated fuzzers want a way to get reports if the
kernel ever uses invalid values that the fuzzer fed it.
The non-canonical address range is a fair chunk of the address space,
and with this you can teach syzkaller to feed in invalid pointer
values and find cases where we do not properly validate user
addresses (possibly due to bad uses of "set_fs()").
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/h8300')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions