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| author | Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> | 2014-05-16 19:44:32 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> | 2014-05-16 19:44:32 +0400 |
| commit | 5a0fdfada3a2aa50d7b947a2e958bf00cbe0d830 (patch) | |
| tree | 69ae10dd39df9e8de4edd1049d4dafe1436dd37e /arch/arm64/include | |
| parent | cf5c95db57ffa02e430c3840c08d1ee0403849d4 (diff) | |
| download | linux-5a0fdfada3a2aa50d7b947a2e958bf00cbe0d830.tar.xz | |
Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 11 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h index e4c60d6e18b8..aa150ed99f22 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -86,13 +86,12 @@ extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val); #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN) #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN) #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN) -#define PAGE_EXECONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN) #define __P000 PAGE_NONE #define __P001 PAGE_READONLY #define __P010 PAGE_COPY #define __P011 PAGE_COPY -#define __P100 PAGE_EXECONLY +#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __P110 PAGE_COPY_EXEC #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_EXEC @@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val); #define __S001 PAGE_READONLY #define __S010 PAGE_SHARED #define __S011 PAGE_SHARED -#define __S100 PAGE_EXECONLY +#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC @@ -137,8 +136,8 @@ extern struct page *empty_zero_page; #define pte_write(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_WRITE)) #define pte_exec(pte) (!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN)) -#define pte_valid_ng(pte) \ - ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) +#define pte_valid_user(pte) \ + ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte) { @@ -192,7 +191,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval, unsigned long addr); static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) { - if (pte_valid_ng(pte)) { + if (pte_valid_user(pte)) { if (!pte_special(pte) && pte_exec(pte)) __sync_icache_dcache(pte, addr); if (pte_dirty(pte) && pte_write(pte)) |