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author | Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> | 2021-08-27 10:03:42 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2021-09-17 06:05:11 +0300 |
commit | 898387e40cf538b7d1605e05d456699fe418a77f (patch) | |
tree | 884acdd98a51a7a0a4714ca1079234be7daaeebc /arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | |
parent | 741691c44606b1903e674d12f3e4a4b68ade69ad (diff) | |
download | linux-898387e40cf538b7d1605e05d456699fe418a77f.tar.xz |
crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - avoid by-ref argument for ce_aes_ccm_auth_data
With the SIMD code path removed, we can clean up the CCM auth-only path
a bit further, by passing the 'macp' input buffer pointer by value,
rather than by reference, and taking the output value from the
function's return value.
This way, the compiler is no longer forced to allocate macp on the
stack. This is not expected to make any difference in practice, it just
makes for slightly cleaner code.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 19 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c index d973655fab7e..c4f14415f5f0 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx) return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4; } -asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes, - u32 *macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds); +asmlinkage u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes, + u32 macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds); asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[], @@ -94,13 +94,6 @@ static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen) return 0; } -static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[], - u32 abytes, u32 *macp) -{ - ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc, - num_rounds(key)); -} - static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) { struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); @@ -120,7 +113,8 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) ltag.len = 6; } - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, &macp); + macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, (u8 *)<ag, ltag.len, macp, + ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx)); scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src); do { @@ -133,13 +127,14 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[]) } n = min_t(u32, n, SZ_4K); /* yield NEON at least every 4k */ p = scatterwalk_map(&walk); - ccm_update_mac(ctx, mac, p, n, &macp); + + macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, p, n, macp, ctx->key_enc, + num_rounds(ctx)); if (len / SZ_4K > (len - n) / SZ_4K) { kernel_neon_end(); kernel_neon_begin(); } - len -= n; scatterwalk_unmap(p); |