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authorAlexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>2017-12-15 04:55:14 +0300
committerDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>2017-12-17 22:34:36 +0300
commit60b58afc96c9df71871df2dbad42037757ceef26 (patch)
tree5651c4845120fc28c9712f53f31962adfd4abe73 /arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
parent1ea47e01ad6ea0fe99697c54c2413d81dd21fe32 (diff)
downloadlinux-60b58afc96c9df71871df2dbad42037757ceef26.tar.xz
bpf: fix net.core.bpf_jit_enable race
global bpf_jit_enable variable is tested multiple times in JITs, blinding and verifier core. The malicious root can try to toggle it while loading the programs. This race condition was accounted for and there should be no issues, but it's safer to avoid this race condition. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
index c199990e12b6..4425189bb24c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
+++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
/* If BPF JIT was not enabled then we must fall back to
* the interpreter.
*/
- if (!bpf_jit_enable)
+ if (!prog->jit_requested)
return orig_prog;
/* If constant blinding was enabled and we failed during blinding