diff options
author | Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> | 2023-04-04 17:03:24 +0300 |
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committer | Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> | 2023-04-04 17:04:30 +0300 |
commit | 692d42d411b7db6a76382537fccbee3a12a2bcdb (patch) | |
tree | 24770529cf173188bc5d2d0d9331c0ac723b631e /Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst | |
parent | c52159b5be7894540acdc7a35791c0b57097fa4c (diff) | |
parent | 13a0d1ae7ee6b438f5537711a8c60cba00554943 (diff) | |
download | linux-692d42d411b7db6a76382537fccbee3a12a2bcdb.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'iommufd/for-rc' into for-next
The following selftest patch requires both the bug fixes and the
improvements of the selftest framework.
* iommufd/for-rc:
iommufd: Do not corrupt the pfn list when doing batch carry
iommufd: Fix unpinning of pages when an access is present
iommufd: Check for uptr overflow
Linux 6.3-rc5
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst | 96 |
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst b/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82e29837d589 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +.. _securitybugs: + +Security bugs +============= + +Linux kernel developers take security very seriously. As such, we'd +like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and +disclosed as quickly as possible. Please report security bugs to the +Linux kernel security team. + +Contact +------- + +The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at +<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers +who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix. +If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as +that can speed up the process considerably. It is possible that the +security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to +understand and fix the security vulnerability. + +As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it +will be to diagnose and fix. Please review the procedure outlined in +'Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst' if you are unclear about what +information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not +be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been +made public. + +Please send plain text emails without attachments where possible. +It is much harder to have a context-quoted discussion about a complex +issue if all the details are hidden away in attachments. Think of it like a +:doc:`regular patch submission <../process/submitting-patches>` +(even if you don't have a patch yet): describe the problem and impact, list +reproduction steps, and follow it with a proposed fix, all in plain text. + +Disclosure and embargoed information +------------------------------------ + +The security list is not a disclosure channel. For that, see Coordination +below. + +Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts. Fixes +for publicly known bugs are released immediately. + +Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs +as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of +the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start +of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days +if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time. The +only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate +the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release +coordination. + +While embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in +order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside +the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the +reporter. This includes but is not limited to the original bug report +and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the +identity of the reporter. + +In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed. All other +information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions +of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been +lifted, in perpetuity. + +Coordination +------------ + +Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege +escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private +<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors +are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the +upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and +will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update +publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate, +the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can +include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix +the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki: +<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists> + +CVE assignment +-------------- + +The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them +for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and +may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier +assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private +linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known +before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit +message if the reporter agrees. + +Non-disclosure agreements +------------------------- + +The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable +to enter any non-disclosure agreements. |