Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!

1 files changed, 286 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ia64/fsys.txt b/Documentation/ia64/fsys.txt
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+-*-Mode: outline-*-
+
+		Light-weight System Calls for IA-64
+		-----------------------------------
+
+		        Started: 13-Jan-2003
+		    Last update: 27-Sep-2003
+
+	              David Mosberger-Tang
+		      <davidm@hpl.hp.com>
+
+Using the "epc" instruction effectively introduces a new mode of
+execution to the ia64 linux kernel.  We call this mode the
+"fsys-mode".  To recap, the normal states of execution are:
+
+  - kernel mode:
+	Both the register stack and the memory stack have been
+	switched over to kernel memory.  The user-level state is saved
+	in a pt-regs structure at the top of the kernel memory stack.
+
+  - user mode:
+	Both the register stack and the kernel stack are in
+	user memory.  The user-level state is contained in the
+	CPU registers.
+
+  - bank 0 interruption-handling mode:
+	This is the non-interruptible state which all
+	interruption-handlers start execution in.  The user-level
+	state remains in the CPU registers and some kernel state may
+	be stored in bank 0 of registers r16-r31.
+
+In contrast, fsys-mode has the following special properties:
+
+  - execution is at privilege level 0 (most-privileged)
+
+  - CPU registers may contain a mixture of user-level and kernel-level
+    state (it is the responsibility of the kernel to ensure that no
+    security-sensitive kernel-level state is leaked back to
+    user-level)
+
+  - execution is interruptible and preemptible (an fsys-mode handler
+    can disable interrupts and avoid all other interruption-sources
+    to avoid preemption)
+
+  - neither the memory-stack nor the register-stack can be trusted while
+    in fsys-mode (they point to the user-level stacks, which may
+    be invalid, or completely bogus addresses)
+
+In summary, fsys-mode is much more similar to running in user-mode
+than it is to running in kernel-mode.  Of course, given that the
+privilege level is at level 0, this means that fsys-mode requires some
+care (see below).
+
+
+* How to tell fsys-mode
+
+Linux operates in fsys-mode when (a) the privilege level is 0 (most
+privileged) and (b) the stacks have NOT been switched to kernel memory
+yet.  For convenience, the header file <asm-ia64/ptrace.h> provides
+three macros:
+
+	user_mode(regs)
+	user_stack(task,regs)
+	fsys_mode(task,regs)
+
+The "regs" argument is a pointer to a pt_regs structure.  The "task"
+argument is a pointer to the task structure to which the "regs"
+pointer belongs to.  user_mode() returns TRUE if the CPU state pointed
+to by "regs" was executing in user mode (privilege level 3).
+user_stack() returns TRUE if the state pointed to by "regs" was
+executing on the user-level stack(s).  Finally, fsys_mode() returns
+TRUE if the CPU state pointed to by "regs" was executing in fsys-mode.
+The fsys_mode() macro is equivalent to the expression:
+
+	!user_mode(regs) && user_stack(task,regs)
+
+* How to write an fsyscall handler
+
+The file arch/ia64/kernel/fsys.S contains a table of fsyscall-handlers
+(fsyscall_table).  This table contains one entry for each system call.
+By default, a system call is handled by fsys_fallback_syscall().  This
+routine takes care of entering (full) kernel mode and calling the
+normal Linux system call handler.  For performance-critical system
+calls, it is possible to write a hand-tuned fsyscall_handler.  For
+example, fsys.S contains fsys_getpid(), which is a hand-tuned version
+of the getpid() system call.
+
+The entry and exit-state of an fsyscall handler is as follows:
+
+** Machine state on entry to fsyscall handler:
+
+ - r10	  = 0
+ - r11	  = saved ar.pfs (a user-level value)
+ - r15	  = system call number
+ - r16	  = "current" task pointer (in normal kernel-mode, this is in r13)
+ - r32-r39 = system call arguments
+ - b6	  = return address (a user-level value)
+ - ar.pfs = previous frame-state (a user-level value)
+ - PSR.be = cleared to zero (i.e., little-endian byte order is in effect)
+ - all other registers may contain values passed in from user-mode
+
+** Required machine state on exit to fsyscall handler:
+
+ - r11	  = saved ar.pfs (as passed into the fsyscall handler)
+ - r15	  = system call number (as passed into the fsyscall handler)
+ - r32-r39 = system call arguments (as passed into the fsyscall handler)
+ - b6	  = return address (as passed into the fsyscall handler)
+ - ar.pfs = previous frame-state (as passed into the fsyscall handler)
+
+Fsyscall handlers can execute with very little overhead, but with that
+speed comes a set of restrictions:
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers MUST check for any pending work in the flags
+   member of the thread-info structure and if any of the
+   TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags are set, the handler needs to fall back on
+   doing a full system call (by calling fsys_fallback_syscall).
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers MUST preserve incoming arguments (r32-r39, r11,
+   r15, b6, and ar.pfs) because they will be needed in case of a
+   system call restart.  Of course, all "preserved" registers also
+   must be preserved, in accordance to the normal calling conventions.
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers MUST check argument registers for containing a
+   NaT value before using them in any way that could trigger a
+   NaT-consumption fault.  If a system call argument is found to
+   contain a NaT value, an fsyscall-handler may return immediately
+   with r8=EINVAL, r10=-1.
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers MUST NOT use the "alloc" instruction or perform
+   any other operation that would trigger mandatory RSE
+   (register-stack engine) traffic.
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers MUST NOT write to any stacked registers because
+   it is not safe to assume that user-level called a handler with the
+   proper number of arguments.
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers need to be careful when accessing per-CPU variables:
+   unless proper safe-guards are taken (e.g., interruptions are avoided),
+   execution may be pre-empted and resumed on another CPU at any given
+   time.
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers must be careful not to leak sensitive kernel'
+   information back to user-level.  In particular, before returning to
+   user-level, care needs to be taken to clear any scratch registers
+   that could contain sensitive information (note that the current
+   task pointer is not considered sensitive: it's already exposed
+   through ar.k6).
+
+ o Fsyscall-handlers MUST NOT access user-memory without first
+   validating access-permission (this can be done typically via
+   probe.r.fault and/or probe.w.fault) and without guarding against
+   memory access exceptions (this can be done with the EX() macros
+   defined by asmmacro.h).
+
+The above restrictions may seem draconian, but remember that it's
+possible to trade off some of the restrictions by paying a slightly
+higher overhead.  For example, if an fsyscall-handler could benefit
+from the shadow register bank, it could temporarily disable PSR.i and
+PSR.ic, switch to bank 0 (bsw.0) and then use the shadow registers as
+needed.  In other words, following the above rules yields extremely
+fast system call execution (while fully preserving system call
+semantics), but there is also a lot of flexibility in handling more
+complicated cases.
+
+* Signal handling
+
+The delivery of (asynchronous) signals must be delayed until fsys-mode
+is exited.  This is acomplished with the help of the lower-privilege
+transfer trap: arch/ia64/kernel/process.c:do_notify_resume_user()
+checks whether the interrupted task was in fsys-mode and, if so, sets
+PSR.lp and returns immediately.  When fsys-mode is exited via the
+"br.ret" instruction that lowers the privilege level, a trap will
+occur.  The trap handler clears PSR.lp again and returns immediately.
+The kernel exit path then checks for and delivers any pending signals.
+
+* PSR Handling
+
+The "epc" instruction doesn't change the contents of PSR at all.  This
+is in contrast to a regular interruption, which clears almost all
+bits.  Because of that, some care needs to be taken to ensure things
+work as expected.  The following discussion describes how each PSR bit
+is handled.
+
+PSR.be	Cleared when entering fsys-mode.  A srlz.d instruction is used
+	to ensure the CPU is in little-endian mode before the first
+	load/store instruction is executed.  PSR.be is normally NOT
+	restored upon return from an fsys-mode handler.  In other
+	words, user-level code must not rely on PSR.be being preserved
+	across a system call.
+PSR.up	Unchanged.
+PSR.ac	Unchanged.
+PSR.mfl Unchanged.  Note: fsys-mode handlers must not write-registers!
+PSR.mfh	Unchanged.  Note: fsys-mode handlers must not write-registers!
+PSR.ic	Unchanged.  Note: fsys-mode handlers can clear the bit, if needed.
+PSR.i	Unchanged.  Note: fsys-mode handlers can clear the bit, if needed.
+PSR.pk	Unchanged.
+PSR.dt	Unchanged.
+PSR.dfl	Unchanged.  Note: fsys-mode handlers must not write-registers!
+PSR.dfh	Unchanged.  Note: fsys-mode handlers must not write-registers!
+PSR.sp	Unchanged.
+PSR.pp	Unchanged.
+PSR.di	Unchanged.
+PSR.si	Unchanged.
+PSR.db	Unchanged.  The kernel prevents user-level from setting a hardware
+	breakpoint that triggers at any privilege level other than 3 (user-mode).
+PSR.lp	Unchanged.
+PSR.tb	Lazy redirect.  If a taken-branch trap occurs while in
+	fsys-mode, the trap-handler modifies the saved machine state
+	such that execution resumes in the gate page at
+	syscall_via_break(), with privilege level 3.  Note: the
+	taken branch would occur on the branch invoking the
+	fsyscall-handler, at which point, by definition, a syscall
+	restart is still safe.  If the system call number is invalid,
+	the fsys-mode handler will return directly to user-level.  This
+	return will trigger a taken-branch trap, but since the trap is
+	taken _after_ restoring the privilege level, the CPU has already
+	left fsys-mode, so no special treatment is needed.
+PSR.rt	Unchanged.
+PSR.cpl	Cleared to 0.
+PSR.is	Unchanged (guaranteed to be 0 on entry to the gate page).
+PSR.mc	Unchanged.
+PSR.it	Unchanged (guaranteed to be 1).
+PSR.id	Unchanged.  Note: the ia64 linux kernel never sets this bit.
+PSR.da	Unchanged.  Note: the ia64 linux kernel never sets this bit.
+PSR.dd	Unchanged.  Note: the ia64 linux kernel never sets this bit.
+PSR.ss	Lazy redirect.  If set, "epc" will cause a Single Step Trap to
+	be taken.  The trap handler then modifies the saved machine
+	state such that execution resumes in the gate page at
+	syscall_via_break(), with privilege level 3.
+PSR.ri	Unchanged.
+PSR.ed	Unchanged.  Note: This bit could only have an effect if an fsys-mode
+	handler performed a speculative load that gets NaTted.  If so, this
+	would be the normal & expected behavior, so no special treatment is
+	needed.
+PSR.bn	Unchanged.  Note: fsys-mode handlers may clear the bit, if needed.
+	Doing so requires clearing PSR.i and PSR.ic as well.
+PSR.ia	Unchanged.  Note: the ia64 linux kernel never sets this bit.
+
+* Using fast system calls
+
+To use fast system calls, userspace applications need simply call
+__kernel_syscall_via_epc().  For example
+
+-- example fgettimeofday() call --
+-- fgettimeofday.S --
+
+#include <asm/asmmacro.h>
+
+GLOBAL_ENTRY(fgettimeofday)
+.prologue
+.save ar.pfs, r11
+mov r11 = ar.pfs
+.body 
+
+mov r2 = 0xa000000000020660;;  // gate address 
+			       // found by inspection of System.map for the 
+			       // __kernel_syscall_via_epc() function.  See
+			       // below for how to do this for real.
+
+mov b7 = r2
+mov r15 = 1087		       // gettimeofday syscall
+;;
+br.call.sptk.many b6 = b7
+;;
+
+.restore sp
+
+mov ar.pfs = r11
+br.ret.sptk.many rp;;	      // return to caller
+END(fgettimeofday)
+
+-- end fgettimeofday.S --
+
+In reality, getting the gate address is accomplished by two extra
+values passed via the ELF auxiliary vector (include/asm-ia64/elf.h)
+
+ o AT_SYSINFO : is the address of __kernel_syscall_via_epc()
+ o AT_SYSINFO_EHDR : is the address of the kernel gate ELF DSO
+
+The ELF DSO is a pre-linked library that is mapped in by the kernel at
+the gate page.  It is a proper ELF shared object so, with a dynamic
+loader that recognises the library, you should be able to make calls to
+the exported functions within it as with any other shared library.
+AT_SYSINFO points into the kernel DSO at the
+__kernel_syscall_via_epc() function for historical reasons (it was
+used before the kernel DSO) and as a convenience.