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authorBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>2020-04-22 19:11:30 +0300
committerBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>2020-05-15 12:48:01 +0300
commita9a3ed1eff3601b63aea4fb462d8b3b92c7c1e7e (patch)
treeb9709e8468b304106f42e7ccf42273877400bd92
parent2ef96a5bb12be62ef75b5828c0aab838ebb29cb8 (diff)
downloadlinux-a9a3ed1eff3601b63aea4fb462d8b3b92c7c1e7e.tar.xz
x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try
... or the odyssey of trying to disable the stack protector for the function which generates the stack canary value. The whole story started with Sergei reporting a boot crash with a kernel built with gcc-10: Kernel panic — not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5—00235—gfffb08b37df9 #139 Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M—D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013 Call Trace: dump_stack panic ? start_secondary __stack_chk_fail start_secondary secondary_startup_64 -—-[ end Kernel panic — not syncing: stack—protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary This happens because gcc-10 tail-call optimizes the last function call in start_secondary() - cpu_startup_entry() - and thus emits a stack canary check which fails because the canary value changes after the boot_init_stack_canary() call. To fix that, the initial attempt was to mark the one function which generates the stack canary with: __attribute__((optimize("-fno-stack-protector"))) ... start_secondary(void *unused) however, using the optimize attribute doesn't work cumulatively as the attribute does not add to but rather replaces previously supplied optimization options - roughly all -fxxx options. The key one among them being -fno-omit-frame-pointer and thus leading to not present frame pointer - frame pointer which the kernel needs. The next attempt to prevent compilers from tail-call optimizing the last function call cpu_startup_entry(), shy of carving out start_secondary() into a separate compilation unit and building it with -fno-stack-protector, was to add an empty asm(""). This current solution was short and sweet, and reportedly, is supported by both compilers but we didn't get very far this time: future (LTO?) optimization passes could potentially eliminate this, which leads us to the third attempt: having an actual memory barrier there which the compiler cannot ignore or move around etc. That should hold for a long time, but hey we said that about the other two solutions too so... Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200314164451.346497-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/compiler.h6
-rw-r--r--init/main.c2
5 files changed, 23 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
index 91e29b6a86a5..9804a7957f4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
@@ -55,8 +55,13 @@
/*
* Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
*
- * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return,
+ * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return
* and it must always be inlined.
+ *
+ * In addition, it should be called from a compilation unit for which
+ * stack protector is disabled. Alternatively, the caller should not end
+ * with a function call which gets tail-call optimized as that would
+ * lead to checking a modified canary value.
*/
static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 8c89e4d9ad28..2f24c334a938 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -266,6 +266,14 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void *unused)
wmb();
cpu_startup_entry(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE);
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent tail call to cpu_startup_entry() because the stack protector
+ * guard has been changed a couple of function calls up, in
+ * boot_init_stack_canary() and must not be checked before tail calling
+ * another function.
+ */
+ prevent_tail_call_optimization();
}
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
index 8fb8a50a28b4..f2adb63b2d7c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void cpu_bringup_and_idle(void)
cpu_bringup();
boot_init_stack_canary();
cpu_startup_entry(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE);
+ prevent_tail_call_optimization();
}
void xen_smp_intr_free_pv(unsigned int cpu)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index 034b0a644efc..448c91bf543b 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -356,4 +356,10 @@ static inline void *offset_to_ptr(const int *off)
/* &a[0] degrades to a pointer: a different type from an array */
#define __must_be_array(a) BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(__same_type((a), &(a)[0]))
+/*
+ * This is needed in functions which generate the stack canary, see
+ * arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c::start_secondary() for an example.
+ */
+#define prevent_tail_call_optimization() mb()
+
#endif /* __LINUX_COMPILER_H */
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 1a5da2c2660c..ad3812b5ae65 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -1036,6 +1036,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
/* Do the rest non-__init'ed, we're now alive */
arch_call_rest_init();
+
+ prevent_tail_call_optimization();
}
/* Call all constructor functions linked into the kernel. */