Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull STIBP fallout fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "The performance destruction department finally got it's act together
  and came up with a cure for the STIPB regression:

   - Provide a command line option to control the spectre v2 user space
     mitigations. Default is either seccomp or prctl (if seccomp is
     disabled in Kconfig). prctl allows mitigation opt-in, seccomp
     enables the migitation for sandboxed processes.

   - Rework the code to handle the conditional STIBP/IBPB control and
     remove the now unused ptrace_may_access_sched() optimization
     attempt

   - Disable STIBP automatically when SMT is disabled

   - Optimize the switch_to() logic to avoid MSR writes and invocations
     of __switch_to_xtra().

   - Make the asynchronous speculation TIF updates synchronous to
     prevent stale mitigation state.

  As a general cleanup this also makes retpoline directly depend on
  compiler support and removes the 'minimal retpoline' option which just
  pretended to provide some form of security while providing none"

* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
  x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
  x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
  x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
  x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
  x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
  x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
  ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
  x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
  x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
  x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
  x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
  x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
  x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
  x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
  x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
  x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
  x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state
  x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
  sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key
  ...

26 files changed, 780 insertions, 282 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 5d6ba930d4f4..aefd358a5ca3 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4199,9 +4199,13 @@
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+			The default operation protects the kernel from
+			user space attacks.
 
-			on   - unconditionally enable
-			off  - unconditionally disable
+			on   - unconditionally enable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=on
+			off  - unconditionally disable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=off
 			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
 			       vulnerable
 
@@ -4211,6 +4215,12 @@
 			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
 			compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
+			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+			against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+			the user space protections.
+
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
@@ -4220,6 +4230,48 @@
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
 
+	spectre_v2_user=
+			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		        user space tasks
+
+			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+				  per thread.  The mitigation control state
+				  is inherited on fork.
+
+			prctl,ibpb
+				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different user
+				  space processes.
+
+			seccomp
+				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+				  threads will enable the mitigation unless
+				  they explicitly opt out.
+
+			seccomp,ibpb
+				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different
+				  user space processes.
+
+			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+			Default mitigation:
+			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
 	spec_store_bypass_disable=
 			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
 			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
index 32f3d55c54b7..c4dbe6f7cdae 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -92,3 +92,12 @@ Speculation misfeature controls
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+
+- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes
+                        (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes)
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 9d734f3c8234..8689e794a43c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -444,10 +444,6 @@ config RETPOLINE
 	  branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
 	  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
 
-	  Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler
-	  code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path,
-	  it is not entirely pointless.
-
 config INTEL_RDT
 	bool "Intel Resource Director Technology support"
 	depends on X86 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
@@ -1004,13 +1000,7 @@ config NR_CPUS
 	  to the kernel image.
 
 config SCHED_SMT
-	bool "SMT (Hyperthreading) scheduler support"
-	depends on SMP
-	---help---
-	  SMT scheduler support improves the CPU scheduler's decision making
-	  when dealing with Intel Pentium 4 chips with HyperThreading at a
-	  cost of slightly increased overhead in some places. If unsure say
-	  N here.
+	def_bool y if SMP
 
 config SCHED_MC
 	def_bool y
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 88398fdf8129..f5d7f4134524 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -220,9 +220,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
 
 # Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
 ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
-  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE
+ifeq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
+  $(error You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler, please update your compiler.)
 endif
+  KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
 endif
 
 archscripts: scripts_basic
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 80f4a4f38c79..c8f73efb4ece 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -41,9 +41,10 @@
 
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT		1	   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 80dc14422495..032b6009baab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
 
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
@@ -162,11 +164,12 @@
 	_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t"					\
 	".popsection\n\t"
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 
 /*
- * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
- * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
+ * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
+ * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
  */
 # define CALL_NOSPEC						\
 	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE				\
@@ -181,7 +184,7 @@
 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
 
-#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 /*
  * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
  * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
@@ -211,6 +214,7 @@
 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
 
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
+#endif
 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
@@ -219,13 +223,19 @@
 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
-	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
-	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
 	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
 	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
 };
 
+/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
+enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
+};
+
 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
 enum ssb_mitigation {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
@@ -303,6 +313,10 @@ do {									\
 	preempt_enable();						\
 } while (0)
 
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
index ae7c2c5cd7f0..5393babc0598 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -53,12 +53,24 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
+static inline u64 stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SPEC_IB) >> (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
+}
+
 static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
 {
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 	return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long stibp_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
+	return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) << (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT);
+}
+
 static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
 {
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
@@ -70,11 +82,7 @@ extern void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void);
 static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
 #endif
 
-extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif);
-
-static inline void speculative_store_bypass_update_current(void)
-{
-	speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
-}
+extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif);
+extern void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
index 36bd243843d6..7cf1a270d891 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to_asm(struct task_struct *prev,
 
 __visible struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
 					  struct task_struct *next);
-struct tss_struct;
-void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
-		      struct tss_struct *tss);
 
 /* This runs runs on the previous thread's stack. */
 static inline void prepare_switch_to(struct task_struct *next)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 2ff2a30a264f..82b73b75d67c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -79,10 +79,12 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING		2	/* signal pending */
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	3	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* reenable singlestep on user return*/
-#define TIF_SSBD			5	/* Reduced data speculation */
+#define TIF_SSBD		5	/* Speculative store bypass disable */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU		6	/* syscall emulation active */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
+#define TIF_SPEC_IB		9	/* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */
+#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE	10	/* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */
 #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY	11	/* notify kernel of userspace return */
 #define TIF_UPROBE		12	/* breakpointed or singlestepping */
 #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING	13	/* pending live patching update */
@@ -110,6 +112,8 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
+#define _TIF_SPEC_IB		(1 << TIF_SPEC_IB)
+#define _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE	(1 << TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE)
 #define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY	(1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
 #define _TIF_UPROBE		(1 << TIF_UPROBE)
 #define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING	(1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
@@ -145,8 +149,18 @@ struct thread_info {
 	 _TIF_FSCHECK)
 
 /* flags to check in __switch_to() */
-#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW							\
-	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
+#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE						\
+	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|		\
+	 _TIF_SSBD | _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE)
+
+/*
+ * Avoid calls to __switch_to_xtra() on UP as STIBP is not evaluated.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+# define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW	(_TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE | _TIF_SPEC_IB)
+#else
+# define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW	(_TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE)
+#endif
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index d760611cfc35..f4204bf377fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -169,10 +169,14 @@ struct tlb_state {
 
 #define LOADED_MM_SWITCHING ((struct mm_struct *)1)
 
+	/* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */
+	union {
+		struct mm_struct	*last_user_mm;
+		unsigned long		last_user_mm_ibpb;
+	};
+
 	u16 loaded_mm_asid;
 	u16 next_asid;
-	/* last user mm's ctx id */
-	u64 last_ctx_id;
 
 	/*
 	 * We can be in one of several states:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index c37e66e493bf..500278f5308e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
 
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -53,6 +54,13 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
 u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
+/* Control conditional STIPB in switch_to() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
+/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -123,31 +131,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 #endif
 }
 
-/* The kernel command line selection */
-enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
-	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
-	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
-	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
-	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
-	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
-	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
-};
-
-static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
-	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL]		= "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD]	= "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC]		= "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD]		= "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
-};
-
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
-
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
-	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
@@ -169,6 +152,10 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 		    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
 			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
 
+		/* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
+		if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+			hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
 		if (hostval != guestval) {
 			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
@@ -202,7 +189,7 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 		tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
 				 ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
 
-		speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
+		speculation_ctrl_update(tif);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
@@ -217,6 +204,15 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+
 #ifdef RETPOLINE
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 
@@ -238,67 +234,217 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
 static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
 #endif
 
-static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
 {
-	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
-		pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+	int len = strlen(opt);
+
+	return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
 }
 
-static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+/* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+};
+
+enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
+};
+
+static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE]		= "User space: Vulnerable",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT]	= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL]		= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP]	= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+	const char			*option;
+	enum spectre_v2_user_cmd	cmd;
+	bool				secure;
+} v2_user_options[] __initdata = {
+	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,		false },
+	{ "off",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,		false },
+	{ "on",			SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,		true  },
+	{ "prctl",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,		false },
+	{ "prctl,ibpb",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,		false },
+	{ "seccomp",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,		false },
+	{ "seccomp,ibpb",	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,	false },
+};
+
+static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
-		pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+		pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
 }
 
-static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
+static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 {
-	return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret, i;
+
+	switch (v2_cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
+				  arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
+		if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
+			spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,
+						v2_user_options[i].secure);
+			return v2_user_options[i].cmd;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
 }
 
-static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+static void __init
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 {
-	int len = strlen(opt);
+	enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+	bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
+	enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
 
-	return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
+	    cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+		smt_possible = false;
+
+	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
+		goto set_mode;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+		else
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+
+		switch (cmd) {
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+			static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+			break;
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+			static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
+			static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
+			"always-on" : "conditional");
+	}
+
+	/* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIPB required */
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIPB
+	 * mode.
+	 */
+	if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+set_mode:
+	spectre_v2_user = mode;
+	/* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */
+	if (smt_possible)
+		pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
 }
 
+static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC]		= "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD]		= "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+};
+
 static const struct {
 	const char *option;
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 	bool secure;
-} mitigation_options[] = {
-	{ "off",               SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,              false },
-	{ "on",                SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,             true },
-	{ "retpoline",         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,         false },
-	{ "retpoline,amd",     SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,     false },
-	{ "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
-	{ "auto",              SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,              false },
+} mitigation_options[] __initdata = {
+	{ "off",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,		  false },
+	{ "on",			SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,		  true  },
+	{ "retpoline",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,	  false },
+	{ "retpoline,amd",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,	  false },
+	{ "retpoline,generic",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,		  false },
 };
 
+static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+		pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 {
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
-	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
-	else {
-		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 
-		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
-			if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
-				continue;
-			cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
-			break;
-		}
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 
-		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
-			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
-			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
-		}
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
+		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
+			continue;
+		cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+		pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
 	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
@@ -316,54 +462,11 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
-	if (mitigation_options[i].secure)
-		spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option);
-	else
-		spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option);
-
+	spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
+			   mitigation_options[i].secure);
 	return cmd;
 }
 
-static bool stibp_needed(void)
-{
-	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
-		return false;
-
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-		return false;
-
-	return true;
-}
-
-static void update_stibp_msr(void *info)
-{
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-}
-
-void arch_smt_update(void)
-{
-	u64 mask;
-
-	if (!stibp_needed())
-		return;
-
-	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
-	mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
-		mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-	else
-		mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
-	if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) {
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n",
-				cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ?
-				"Enabling" : "Disabling");
-		x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
-		on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
-	}
-	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
-}
-
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -417,14 +520,12 @@ retpoline_auto:
 			pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
 			goto retpoline_generic;
 		}
-		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
-					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD;
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
 	} else {
 	retpoline_generic:
-		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
-					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
 	}
 
@@ -443,12 +544,6 @@ specv2_set_mode:
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 
-	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
 	 * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
@@ -465,10 +560,67 @@ specv2_set_mode:
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}
 
+	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
+	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+
 	/* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
 	arch_smt_update();
 }
 
+static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
+{
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+}
+
+/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
+static void update_stibp_strict(void)
+{
+	u64 mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+	if (mask == x86_spec_ctrl_base)
+		return;
+
+	pr_info("Update user space SMT mitigation: STIBP %s\n",
+		mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off");
+	x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
+	on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */
+static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
+{
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+}
+
+void arch_smt_update(void)
+{
+	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+		update_stibp_strict();
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+		update_indir_branch_cond();
+		break;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+}
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
 
@@ -483,7 +635,7 @@ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
 };
 
-static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
+static const char * const ssb_strings[] = {
 	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
 	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
 	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
@@ -493,7 +645,7 @@ static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
 static const struct {
 	const char *option;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
-} ssb_mitigation_options[] = {
+} ssb_mitigation_options[]  __initdata = {
 	{ "auto",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO },    /* Platform decides */
 	{ "on",		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },      /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
 	{ "off",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE },    /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
@@ -604,10 +756,25 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Speculation prctl: " fmt
 
-static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	bool update;
+	/* Force the update of the real TIF bits */
+	set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE);
 
+	/*
+	 * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current
+	 * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU
+	 * mitigation until it is scheduled next.
+	 *
+	 * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's
+	 * always the current task.
+	 */
+	if (tsk == current)
+		speculation_ctrl_update_current();
+}
+
+static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
 	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
 	    ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
 		return -ENXIO;
@@ -618,28 +785,56 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ERANGE;
 	}
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	/*
-	 * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
-	 * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
-	 */
-	if (task == current && update)
-		speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
-
+static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	switch (ctrl) {
+	case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+		if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
+		 * mode.
+		 */
+		if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT)
+			return -EPERM;
+		task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		/*
+		 * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
+		 * mitigation is force disabled.
+		 */
+		if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+			return -EPERM;
+		if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT)
+			return 0;
+		task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
+		if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
+			task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -649,6 +844,8 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
 	switch (which) {
 	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 		return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+	case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+		return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
 	default:
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
@@ -659,6 +856,8 @@ void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
 		ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+	if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
+		ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -681,11 +880,35 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
 	}
 }
 
+static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+		return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+		if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+		if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+	default:
+		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+	}
+}
+
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 {
 	switch (which) {
 	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 		return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+	case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+		return ib_prctl_get(task);
 	default:
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
@@ -823,7 +1046,7 @@ early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
 #define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
-static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
+static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]		= "auto",
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]		= "vulnerable",
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]		= "conditional cache flushes",
@@ -839,13 +1062,14 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 
 	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
 	    (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
-	     cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
+	     sched_smt_active())) {
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 			       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+	}
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
-		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 #else
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
@@ -854,11 +1078,39 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 }
 #endif
 
+static char *stibp_state(void)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+		return "";
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+		return ", STIBP: disabled";
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+		return ", STIBP: forced";
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+		if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+			return ", STIBP: conditional";
+	}
+	return "";
+}
+
+static char *ibpb_state(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+			return ", IBPB: always-on";
+		if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb))
+			return ", IBPB: conditional";
+		return ", IBPB: disabled";
+	}
+	return "";
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
@@ -876,13 +1128,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
-		ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
-			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+			       ibpb_state(),
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
-			       (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
+			       stibp_state(),
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
 			       spectre_v2_module_string());
-		return ret;
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index c93fcfdf1673..7d31192296a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@
 #include <asm/prctl.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 
+#include "process.h"
+
 /*
  * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
  * no more per-task TSS's. The TSS size is kept cacheline-aligned
@@ -252,11 +254,12 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
 		enable_cpuid();
 }
 
-static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss,
-				    struct thread_struct *prev,
+static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct thread_struct *prev,
 				    struct thread_struct *next,
 				    unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn)
 {
+	struct tss_struct *tss = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw);
+
 	if (tifn & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) {
 		/*
 		 * Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap.
@@ -395,32 +398,85 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn));
 }
 
-static __always_inline void intel_set_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+/*
+ * Update the MSRs managing speculation control, during context switch.
+ *
+ * tifp: Previous task's thread flags
+ * tifn: Next task's thread flags
+ */
+static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
+						      unsigned long tifn)
 {
-	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+	unsigned long tif_diff = tifp ^ tifn;
+	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+	bool updmsr = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation
+	 * method. Note that if SSBD mitigation is disabled or permanentely
+	 * enabled this branch can't be taken because nothing can set
+	 * TIF_SSBD.
+	 */
+	if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD) {
+		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) {
+			amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
+		} else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
+			amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
+		} else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+			   static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+			msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+			updmsr  = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is enabled,
+	 * otherwise avoid the MSR write.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
+	    static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) {
+		updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SPEC_IB);
+		msr |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+	}
 
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+	if (updmsr)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
 }
 
-static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
+static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
-		amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
-	else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
-		amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
-	else
-		intel_set_ssb_state(tifn);
+	if (test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE)) {
+		if (task_spec_ssb_disable(tsk))
+			set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD);
+		else
+			clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD);
+
+		if (task_spec_ib_disable(tsk))
+			set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_IB);
+		else
+			clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_IB);
+	}
+	/* Return the updated threadinfo flags*/
+	return task_thread_info(tsk)->flags;
 }
 
-void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif)
+void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif)
 {
+	/* Forced update. Make sure all relevant TIF flags are different */
 	preempt_disable();
-	__speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
+	__speculation_ctrl_update(~tif, tif);
 	preempt_enable();
 }
 
-void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
-		      struct tss_struct *tss)
+/* Called from seccomp/prctl update */
+void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	speculation_ctrl_update(speculation_ctrl_update_tif(current));
+	preempt_enable();
+}
+
+void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
 {
 	struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
 	unsigned long tifp, tifn;
@@ -430,7 +486,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
 
 	tifn = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags);
 	tifp = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags);
-	switch_to_bitmap(tss, prev, next, tifp, tifn);
+	switch_to_bitmap(prev, next, tifp, tifn);
 
 	propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p);
 
@@ -451,8 +507,15 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
 	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOCPUID)
 		set_cpuid_faulting(!!(tifn & _TIF_NOCPUID));
 
-	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
-		__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
+	if (likely(!((tifp | tifn) & _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE))) {
+		__speculation_ctrl_update(tifp, tifn);
+	} else {
+		speculation_ctrl_update_tif(prev_p);
+		tifn = speculation_ctrl_update_tif(next_p);
+
+		/* Enforce MSR update to ensure consistent state */
+		__speculation_ctrl_update(~tifn, tifn);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.h b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..898e97cf6629
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+//
+// Code shared between 32 and 64 bit
+
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+
+void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p);
+
+/*
+ * This needs to be inline to optimize for the common case where no extra
+ * work needs to be done.
+ */
+static inline void switch_to_extra(struct task_struct *prev,
+				   struct task_struct *next)
+{
+	unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags;
+	unsigned long prev_tif = task_thread_info(prev)->flags;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
+		/*
+		 * Avoid __switch_to_xtra() invocation when conditional
+		 * STIPB is disabled and the only different bit is
+		 * TIF_SPEC_IB. For CONFIG_SMP=n TIF_SPEC_IB is not
+		 * in the TIF_WORK_CTXSW masks.
+		 */
+		if (!static_branch_likely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) {
+			prev_tif &= ~_TIF_SPEC_IB;
+			next_tif &= ~_TIF_SPEC_IB;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * __switch_to_xtra() handles debug registers, i/o bitmaps,
+	 * speculation mitigations etc.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(next_tif & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT ||
+		     prev_tif & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV))
+		__switch_to_xtra(prev, next);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
index 5046a3c9dec2..d3e593eb189f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@
 #include <asm/intel_rdt_sched.h>
 #include <asm/proto.h>
 
+#include "process.h"
+
 void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, enum show_regs_mode mode)
 {
 	unsigned long cr0 = 0L, cr2 = 0L, cr3 = 0L, cr4 = 0L;
@@ -232,7 +234,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
 	struct fpu *prev_fpu = &prev->fpu;
 	struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->fpu;
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
-	struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
 
 	/* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */
 
@@ -264,12 +265,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
 	if (get_kernel_rpl() && unlikely(prev->iopl != next->iopl))
 		set_iopl_mask(next->iopl);
 
-	/*
-	 * Now maybe handle debug registers and/or IO bitmaps
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV ||
-		     task_thread_info(next_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT))
-		__switch_to_xtra(prev_p, next_p, tss);
+	switch_to_extra(prev_p, next_p);
 
 	/*
 	 * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 0e0b4288a4b2..bbfbf017065c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
 #include <asm/unistd_32_ia32.h>
 #endif
 
+#include "process.h"
+
 /* Prints also some state that isn't saved in the pt_regs */
 void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, enum show_regs_mode mode)
 {
@@ -553,7 +555,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
 	struct fpu *prev_fpu = &prev->fpu;
 	struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->fpu;
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
-	struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY) &&
 		     this_cpu_read(irq_count) != -1);
@@ -617,12 +618,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p)
 	/* Reload sp0. */
 	update_task_stack(next_p);
 
-	/*
-	 * Now maybe reload the debug registers and handle I/O bitmaps
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT ||
-		     task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV))
-		__switch_to_xtra(prev_p, next_p, tss);
+	switch_to_extra(prev_p, next_p);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index bddd6b3cee1d..03b6b4c2238d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
-#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -31,6 +30,12 @@
  */
 
 /*
+ * Use bit 0 to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is
+ * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_ibpb.
+ */
+#define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB	0x1UL
+
+/*
  * We get here when we do something requiring a TLB invalidation
  * but could not go invalidate all of the contexts.  We do the
  * necessary invalidation by clearing out the 'ctx_id' which
@@ -181,17 +186,87 @@ static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	}
 }
 
-static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id)
+static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(struct task_struct *next)
+{
+	unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags;
+	unsigned long ibpb = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB;
+
+	return (unsigned long)next->mm | ibpb;
+}
+
+static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
 {
+	if (!next || !next->mm)
+		return;
+
 	/*
-	 * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory
-	 * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to
-	 * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks.
-	 *
-	 * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO.
+	 * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm
+	 * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the
+	 * same process. Using the mm pointer instead of mm->context.ctx_id
+	 * opens a hypothetical hole vs. mm_struct reuse, which is more or
+	 * less impossible to control by an attacker. Aside of that it
+	 * would only affect the first schedule so the theoretically
+	 * exposed data is not really interesting.
 	 */
-	return (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id &&
-		ptrace_may_access_sched(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB));
+	if (static_branch_likely(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) {
+		unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
+
+		/*
+		 * This is a bit more complex than the always mode because
+		 * it has to handle two cases:
+		 *
+		 * 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker)
+		 *    which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task
+		 *    (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set.
+		 *
+		 * 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker)
+		 *    which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task
+		 *    (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set.
+		 *
+		 * This could be done by unconditionally issuing IBPB when
+		 * a task which has TIF_SPEC_IB set is either scheduled in
+		 * or out. Though that results in two flushes when:
+		 *
+		 * - the same user space task is scheduled out and later
+		 *   scheduled in again and only a kernel thread ran in
+		 *   between.
+		 *
+		 * - a user space task belonging to the same process is
+		 *   scheduled in after a kernel thread ran in between
+		 *
+		 * - a user space task belonging to the same process is
+		 *   scheduled in immediately.
+		 *
+		 * Optimize this with reasonably small overhead for the
+		 * above cases. Mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into the mm
+		 * pointer of the incoming task which is stored in
+		 * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb for comparison.
+		 */
+		next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(next);
+		prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb);
+
+		/*
+		 * Issue IBPB only if the mm's are different and one or
+		 * both have the IBPB bit set.
+		 */
+		if (next_mm != prev_mm &&
+		    (next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
+		this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, next_mm);
+	}
+
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) {
+		/*
+		 * Only flush when switching to a user space task with a
+		 * different context than the user space task which ran
+		 * last on this CPU.
+		 */
+		if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm) != next->mm) {
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+			this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm, next->mm);
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
@@ -292,22 +367,12 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 		new_asid = prev_asid;
 		need_flush = true;
 	} else {
-		u64 last_ctx_id = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id);
-
 		/*
 		 * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch
 		 * predictor when switching between processes. This stops
 		 * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
-		 *
-		 * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when
-		 * switching into a processes that can't be ptrace by the
-		 * current one (as in such case, attacker has much more
-		 * convenient way how to tamper with the next process than
-		 * branch buffer poisoning).
 		 */
-		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) &&
-				ibpb_needed(tsk, last_ctx_id))
-			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+		cond_ibpb(tsk);
 
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
 			/*
@@ -365,14 +430,6 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 		trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0);
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Record last user mm's context id, so we can avoid
-	 * flushing branch buffer with IBPB if we switch back
-	 * to the same user.
-	 */
-	if (next != &init_mm)
-		this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id);
-
 	/* Make sure we write CR3 before loaded_mm. */
 	barrier();
 
@@ -441,7 +498,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
 	write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0));
 
 	/* Reinitialize tlbstate. */
-	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
+	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, LAST_USER_MM_IBPB);
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0);
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
 	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 6c2ffed907f5..de20ede2c5c8 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -64,15 +64,12 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
 #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT	0x04
 #define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS	0x08
 #define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS	0x10
-#define PTRACE_MODE_SCHED	0x20
-#define PTRACE_MODE_IBPB	0x40
 
 /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */
 #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
 #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
 #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
 #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
-#define PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_IBPB)
 
 /**
  * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access
@@ -90,20 +87,6 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
  */
 extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
 
-/**
- * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access
- * a target task.
- * @task: target task
- * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials
- *
- * Returns true on success, false on denial.
- *
- * Similar to ptrace_may_access(). Only to be called from context switch
- * code. Does not call into audit and the regular LSM hooks due to locking
- * constraints.
- */
-extern bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
-
 static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
 {
 	return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index d6183a55e8eb..291a9bd5b97f 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1454,6 +1454,8 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void)
 #define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB			2	/* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
 #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE		3	/* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */
 #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE	4	/* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/
+#define PFA_SPEC_IB_DISABLE		5	/* Indirect branch speculation restricted */
+#define PFA_SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE	6	/* Indirect branch speculation permanently restricted */
 
 #define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func)					\
 	static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p)		\
@@ -1485,6 +1487,13 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
 TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
 TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
 
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable)
+
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable)
+
 static inline void
 current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags)
 {
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/smt.h b/include/linux/sched/smt.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..59d3736c454c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/sched/smt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _LINUX_SCHED_SMT_H
+#define _LINUX_SCHED_SMT_H
+
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
+extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present;
+
+static __always_inline bool sched_smt_active(void)
+{
+	return static_branch_likely(&sched_smt_present);
+}
+#else
+static inline bool sched_smt_active(void) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+void arch_smt_update(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index c0d7ea0bf5b6..b17201edfa09 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL		53
 /* Speculation control variants */
 # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS		0
+# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH	1
 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
 # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED		0
 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL			(1UL << 0)
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 3c7f3b4c453c..91d5c38eb7e5 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/oom.h>
@@ -367,6 +368,12 @@ static void lockdep_release_cpus_lock(void)
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
+/*
+ * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug
+ * should override this.
+ */
+void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { }
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
 enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
@@ -1011,6 +1018,7 @@ out:
 	 * concurrent CPU hotplug via cpu_add_remove_lock.
 	 */
 	lockup_detector_cleanup();
+	arch_smt_update();
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1139,6 +1147,7 @@ static int _cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, int tasks_frozen, enum cpuhp_state target)
 	ret = cpuhp_up_callbacks(cpu, st, target);
 out:
 	cpus_write_unlock();
+	arch_smt_update();
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -2055,12 +2064,6 @@ static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu)
 	kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE);
 }
 
-/*
- * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug
- * should override this.
- */
-void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { };
-
 static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
 {
 	int cpu, ret = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 80b34dffdfb9..c2cee9db5204 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -261,9 +261,6 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
 
 static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
-		return false;
-
 	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
 		return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
 	else
@@ -331,16 +328,9 @@ ok:
 	     !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
 	    return -EPERM;
 
-	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
-		return 0;
 	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
 }
 
-bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
-{
-	return __ptrace_may_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_SCHED);
-}
-
 bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int err;
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 091e089063be..6fedf3a98581 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -5738,15 +5738,10 @@ int sched_cpu_activate(unsigned int cpu)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
 	/*
-	 * The sched_smt_present static key needs to be evaluated on every
-	 * hotplug event because at boot time SMT might be disabled when
-	 * the number of booted CPUs is limited.
-	 *
-	 * If then later a sibling gets hotplugged, then the key would stay
-	 * off and SMT scheduling would never be functional.
+	 * When going up, increment the number of cores with SMT present.
 	 */
-	if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(cpu)) > 1)
-		static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&sched_smt_present);
+	if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(cpu)) == 2)
+		static_branch_inc_cpuslocked(&sched_smt_present);
 #endif
 	set_cpu_active(cpu, true);
 
@@ -5790,6 +5785,14 @@ int sched_cpu_deactivate(unsigned int cpu)
 	 */
 	synchronize_rcu_mult(call_rcu, call_rcu_sched);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
+	/*
+	 * When going down, decrement the number of cores with SMT present.
+	 */
+	if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(cpu)) == 2)
+		static_branch_dec_cpuslocked(&sched_smt_present);
+#endif
+
 	if (!sched_smp_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
index 618577fc9aa8..4e524ab589c9 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/prio.h>
 #include <linux/sched/rt.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
 #include <linux/sched/stat.h>
 #include <linux/sched/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
@@ -936,9 +937,6 @@ static inline int cpu_of(struct rq *rq)
 
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
-
-extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present;
-
 extern void __update_idle_core(struct rq *rq);
 
 static inline void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq)
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.build b/scripts/Makefile.build
index a8e7ba9f73e8..6a6be9f440cf 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.build
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.build
@@ -236,10 +236,8 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL
 objtool_args += --no-unreachable
 endif
 ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
   objtool_args += --retpoline
 endif
-endif
 
 
 ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
index c0d7ea0bf5b6..b17201edfa09 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL		53
 /* Speculation control variants */
 # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS		0
+# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH	1
 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
 # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED		0
 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL			(1UL << 0)