Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
 "These are x86-specific, but I carried these since they're also
  seccomp-specific.

  This flips the defaults for spec_store_bypass_disable and
  spectre_v2_user from "seccomp" to "prctl", as enough time has passed
  to allow system owners to have updated the defensive stances of their
  various workloads, and it's long overdue to unpessimize seccomp
  threads.

  Extensive rationale and details are in Andrea's main patch.

  Summary:

   - set spec_store_bypass_disable & spectre_v2_user to prctl (Andrea Arcangeli)"

* tag 'seccomp-v5.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  x86: deduplicate the spectre_v2_user documentation
  x86: change default to spec_store_bypass_disable=prctl spectre_v2_user=prctl

3 files changed, 10 insertions, 60 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index e05e581af5cf..ab7d402c1677 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -490,9 +490,8 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will
    also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack
-   on x86.  All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch
-   speculation restricted by default.  Administrators can change
-   that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files.
+   on x86.  Administrators can change that behavior via the kernel
+   command line and sysfs control files.
    See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
 
    Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have
@@ -594,61 +593,14 @@ kernel command line.
 		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 		spectre_v2=auto.
 
-For user space mitigation:
-
-        spectre_v2_user=
-
-		[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
-		(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
-		user space tasks
-
-		on
-			Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
-			enforced by spectre_v2=on
-
-		off
-			Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
-			enforced by spectre_v2=off
-
-		prctl
-			Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
-			but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
-			per thread. The mitigation control state
-			is inherited on fork.
-
-		prctl,ibpb
-			Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
-			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
-			always when switching between different user
-			space processes.
-
-		seccomp
-			Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
-			threads will enable the mitigation unless
-			they explicitly opt out.
-
-		seccomp,ibpb
-			Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
-			controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
-			always when switching between different
-			user space processes.
-
-		auto
-			Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
-			the available CPU features and vulnerability.
-
-		Default mitigation:
-		If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
-
-		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
-		spectre_v2_user=auto.
-
 		In general the kernel by default selects
 		reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To
 		disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
+For spectre_v2_user see :doc:`/admin-guide/kernel-parameters`.
+
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
 
@@ -674,9 +626,8 @@ Mitigation selection guide
    off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run
    (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
    This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target
-   buffer.  All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect
-   branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be
-   changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See
+   buffer.  This behavior can be changed via the kernel command line
+   and sysfs control files. See
    :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`.
 
 3. High security mode
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index eb9a73ad91a0..fb76a64a2168 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5303,8 +5303,7 @@
 			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
 				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.
 
-			Default mitigation:
-			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+			Default mitigation: "prctl"
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2_user=auto.
@@ -5348,7 +5347,7 @@
 				  will disable SSB unless they explicitly opt out.
 
 			Default mitigations:
-			X86:	If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+			X86:	"prctl"
 
 			On powerpc the options are:
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 31e2412b3f17..1c1f218a701d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -758,11 +758,11 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
 		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
 		break;
-	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
@@ -1162,7 +1162,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 		return mode;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
-	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
 		/*
 		 * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
@@ -1176,6 +1175,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
 		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
 		break;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
 		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
 		break;