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author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-04-24 21:32:05 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-04-24 21:32:05 +0300 |
commit | b6742cab0d79708d54774ce615c8c96ad71ce40b (patch) | |
tree | 5f64306347f47ef4b657f43a661a71bb907c0b4d | |
parent | 3d05a06d313d602f7cd589d5d8d45bd04902adcb (diff) | |
parent | 4b1fb9352f351faa067a914907d58a6fe38ac048 (diff) | |
download | linux-b6742cab0d79708d54774ce615c8c96ad71ce40b.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'macsec-fixes'
Sabrina Dubroca says:
====================
macsec: a few fixes
Some small fixes for the macsec driver:
- possible NULL pointer dereferences
- netlink dumps fixes: RTNL locking, consistent dumps
- a reference counting bug
- wrong name for uapi constant
- a few memory leaks
Patches 1 to 5 are the same as in v1, patches 6 to 9 are new.
Patch 6 fixes the memleak that Lance spotted in v1.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/macsec.c | 65 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h | 4 |
2 files changed, 44 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c index 84d3e5ca8817..c6385617bfb2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macsec.c +++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c @@ -880,12 +880,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, macsec_skb_cb(skb)->valid = false; skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!skb) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); req = aead_request_alloc(rx_sa->key.tfm, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!req) { kfree_skb(skb); - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } hdr = (struct macsec_eth_header *)skb->data; @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!skb) { aead_request_free(req); - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } } else { /* integrity only: all headers + data authenticated */ @@ -921,14 +921,14 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, dev_hold(dev); ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(req); if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(ret); } else if (ret != 0) { /* decryption/authentication failed * 10.6 if validateFrames is disabled, deliver anyway */ if (ret != -EBADMSG) { kfree_skb(skb); - skb = NULL; + skb = ERR_PTR(ret); } } else { macsec_skb_cb(skb)->valid = true; @@ -1146,8 +1146,10 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) secy->validate_frames != MACSEC_VALIDATE_DISABLED) skb = macsec_decrypt(skb, dev, rx_sa, sci, secy); - if (!skb) { - macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa); + if (IS_ERR(skb)) { + /* the decrypt callback needs the reference */ + if (PTR_ERR(skb) != -EINPROGRESS) + macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa); rcu_read_unlock(); *pskb = NULL; return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED; @@ -1161,7 +1163,8 @@ deliver: macsec_extra_len(macsec_skb_cb(skb)->has_sci)); macsec_reset_skb(skb, secy->netdev); - macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa); + if (rx_sa) + macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa); count_rx(dev, skb->len); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1622,8 +1625,9 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) } rx_sa = kmalloc(sizeof(*rx_sa), GFP_KERNEL); - if (init_rx_sa(rx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]), secy->key_len, - secy->icv_len)) { + if (!rx_sa || init_rx_sa(rx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]), + secy->key_len, secy->icv_len)) { + kfree(rx_sa); rtnl_unlock(); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -1768,6 +1772,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) tx_sa = kmalloc(sizeof(*tx_sa), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tx_sa || init_tx_sa(tx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]), secy->key_len, secy->icv_len)) { + kfree(tx_sa); rtnl_unlock(); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -2227,7 +2232,8 @@ static int nla_put_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct sk_buff *skb) return 1; if (nla_put_sci(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCI, secy->sci) || - nla_put_u64(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_CIPHER_SUITE, DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID) || + nla_put_u64(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_CIPHER_SUITE, + MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID) || nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ICV_LEN, secy->icv_len) || nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_OPER, secy->operational) || nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_PROTECT, secy->protect_frames) || @@ -2268,7 +2274,7 @@ static int dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev, if (!hdr) return -EMSGSIZE; - rtnl_lock(); + genl_dump_check_consistent(cb, hdr, &macsec_fam); if (nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX, dev->ifindex)) goto nla_put_failure; @@ -2429,18 +2435,17 @@ static int dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev, nla_nest_end(skb, rxsc_list); - rtnl_unlock(); - genlmsg_end(skb, hdr); return 0; nla_put_failure: - rtnl_unlock(); genlmsg_cancel(skb, hdr); return -EMSGSIZE; } +static int macsec_generation = 1; /* protected by RTNL */ + static int macsec_dump_txsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) { struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); @@ -2450,6 +2455,10 @@ static int macsec_dump_txsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) dev_idx = cb->args[0]; d = 0; + rtnl_lock(); + + cb->seq = macsec_generation; + for_each_netdev(net, dev) { struct macsec_secy *secy; @@ -2467,6 +2476,7 @@ next: } done: + rtnl_unlock(); cb->args[0] = d; return skb->len; } @@ -2920,10 +2930,14 @@ static void macsec_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head) struct net_device *real_dev = macsec->real_dev; struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd = macsec_data_rtnl(real_dev); + macsec_generation++; + unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head); list_del_rcu(&macsec->secys); - if (list_empty(&rxd->secys)) + if (list_empty(&rxd->secys)) { netdev_rx_handler_unregister(real_dev); + kfree(rxd); + } macsec_del_dev(macsec); } @@ -2945,8 +2959,10 @@ static int register_macsec_dev(struct net_device *real_dev, err = netdev_rx_handler_register(real_dev, macsec_handle_frame, rxd); - if (err < 0) + if (err < 0) { + kfree(rxd); return err; + } } list_add_tail_rcu(&macsec->secys, &rxd->secys); @@ -3066,6 +3082,8 @@ static int macsec_newlink(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev, if (err < 0) goto del_dev; + macsec_generation++; + dev_hold(real_dev); return 0; @@ -3079,7 +3097,7 @@ unregister: static int macsec_validate_attr(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[]) { - u64 csid = DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID; + u64 csid = MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID; u8 icv_len = DEFAULT_ICV_LEN; int flag; bool es, scb, sci; @@ -3094,8 +3112,8 @@ static int macsec_validate_attr(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[]) icv_len = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN]); switch (csid) { - case DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID: - case DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALT: + case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID: + case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALT: if (icv_len < MACSEC_MIN_ICV_LEN || icv_len > MACSEC_MAX_ICV_LEN) return -EINVAL; @@ -3129,8 +3147,8 @@ static int macsec_validate_attr(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[]) nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION]) > MACSEC_VALIDATE_MAX) return -EINVAL; - if ((data[IFLA_MACSEC_PROTECT] && - nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_MACSEC_PROTECT])) && + if ((data[IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT] && + nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT])) && !data[IFLA_MACSEC_WINDOW]) return -EINVAL; @@ -3168,7 +3186,8 @@ static int macsec_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, if (nla_put_sci(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_SCI, secy->sci) || nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN, secy->icv_len) || - nla_put_u64(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE, DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID) || + nla_put_u64(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE, + MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID) || nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_ENCODING_SA, tx_sc->encoding_sa) || nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_ENCRYPT, tx_sc->encrypt) || nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_PROTECT, secy->protect_frames) || diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h index 26b0d1e3e3e7..4c58d9917aa4 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h @@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ #define MACSEC_MAX_KEY_LEN 128 -#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID 0x0080020001000001ULL -#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALT 0x0080C20001000001ULL +#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID 0x0080020001000001ULL +#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALT 0x0080C20001000001ULL #define MACSEC_MIN_ICV_LEN 8 #define MACSEC_MAX_ICV_LEN 32 |