diff options
author | Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> | 2017-01-27 19:23:01 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2017-03-13 14:01:24 +0300 |
commit | 3dd0c8d06511c7c61c62305fcf431ca28884d263 (patch) | |
tree | 53dd75846d5bc3ac098bd9fdd08c94ae804c22a2 | |
parent | 1ac202e978e18f045006d75bd549612620c6ec3a (diff) | |
download | linux-3dd0c8d06511c7c61c62305fcf431ca28884d263.tar.xz |
ima: provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules.
For now we have only "=" operator for fowner/uid/euid rules. This
patch provide two more operators - ">" and "<" in order to make
fowner/uid/euid rules more flexible.
Examples of usage.
Appraise all files owned by special and system users (SYS_UID_MAX 999):
appraise fowner<1000
Don't appraise files owned by normal users (UID_MIN 1000):
dont_appraise fowner>999
Appraise all files owned by users with UID 1000-1010:
dont_appraise fowner>1010
appraise fowner>999
Changelog v3:
- Removed code duplication in ima_parse_rule().
- Fix ima_policy_show() - (Mimi)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed default policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 |
1 files changed, 87 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e8498a3f4887..3ab1067db624 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { u8 fsuuid[16]; kuid_t uid; kuid_t fowner; + bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */ + bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */ int pcr; struct { void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ @@ -103,7 +105,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, - .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, + .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; @@ -114,9 +117,11 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, - .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID}, + .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, - .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID}, + .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .uid_op = &uid_eq, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, @@ -139,10 +144,11 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, #endif #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT - {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER}, + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq, + .flags = IMA_FOWNER}, #else /* force signature */ - {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fowner_op = &uid_eq, .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, #endif }; @@ -240,19 +246,20 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) && memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid))) return false; - if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid)) return false; if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) { if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) { - if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid) - && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid) - && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) + if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid) + && !rule->uid_op(cred->suid, rule->uid) + && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid)) return false; - } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)) + } else if (!rule->uid_op(cred->euid, rule->uid)) return false; } - if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid)) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && + !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner)) return false; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; @@ -486,7 +493,9 @@ enum { Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, - Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, + Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq, + Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt, + Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr }; @@ -507,9 +516,15 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"}, - {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, - {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"}, - {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, + {Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"}, + {Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"}, + {Opt_fowner_eq, "fowner=%s"}, + {Opt_uid_gt, "uid>%s"}, + {Opt_euid_gt, "euid>%s"}, + {Opt_fowner_gt, "fowner>%s"}, + {Opt_uid_lt, "uid<%s"}, + {Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"}, + {Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"}, {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, @@ -541,24 +556,37 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, return result; } -static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) +static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value, + bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t)) { - audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key); + if (rule_operator == &uid_gt) + audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key); + else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt) + audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value); audit_log_format(ab, " "); } +static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) +{ + ima_log_string_op(ab, key, value, NULL); +} static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; char *from; char *p; + bool uid_token; int result = 0; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); entry->uid = INVALID_UID; entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; + entry->uid_op = &uid_eq; + entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq; entry->action = UNKNOWN; while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) { substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; @@ -694,11 +722,21 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (!result) entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID; break; - case Opt_uid: - ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); - case Opt_euid: - if (token == Opt_euid) - ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from); + case Opt_uid_gt: + case Opt_euid_gt: + entry->uid_op = &uid_gt; + case Opt_uid_lt: + case Opt_euid_lt: + if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt)) + entry->uid_op = &uid_lt; + case Opt_uid_eq: + case Opt_euid_eq: + uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) || + (token == Opt_uid_gt) || + (token == Opt_uid_lt); + + ima_log_string_op(ab, uid_token ? "uid" : "euid", + args[0].from, entry->uid_op); if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -713,12 +751,18 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) (uid_t)lnum != lnum) result = -EINVAL; else - entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid) + entry->flags |= uid_token ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID; } break; - case Opt_fowner: - ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from); + case Opt_fowner_gt: + entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt; + case Opt_fowner_lt: + if (token == Opt_fowner_lt) + entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt; + case Opt_fowner_eq: + ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from, + entry->fowner_op); if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -1049,19 +1093,34 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid), tbuf); + if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_gt), tbuf); + else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_lt), tbuf); + else + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid_eq), tbuf); seq_puts(m, " "); } if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid), tbuf); + if (entry->uid_op == &uid_gt) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_gt), tbuf); + else if (entry->uid_op == &uid_lt) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_lt), tbuf); + else + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid_eq), tbuf); seq_puts(m, " "); } if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner)); - seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner), tbuf); + if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_gt) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_gt), tbuf); + else if (entry->fowner_op == &uid_lt) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_lt), tbuf); + else + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner_eq), tbuf); seq_puts(m, " "); } |