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authorMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2018-07-13 21:06:02 +0300
committerJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>2018-07-16 22:31:57 +0300
commitc77b8cdf745d91eca138e7bfa430dc6640b604a0 (patch)
treef1cc1edc3cecbff32a4450d252b551f5260ee9e1
parentef96837b0de4af47732e2a8ebf5c18e8a885ded6 (diff)
downloadlinux-c77b8cdf745d91eca138e7bfa430dc6640b604a0.tar.xz
module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
-rw-r--r--kernel/module.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c23
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/loadpin.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c15
4 files changed, 32 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index f475f30eed8c..a7615d661910 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2876,7 +2876,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
return -ENOEXEC;
- err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE);
+ err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE);
if (err)
return err;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index e467664965e7..ef349a761609 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -429,16 +429,6 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
*/
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
- bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
-
- if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
- if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
- pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
- return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
- }
- return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -479,9 +469,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
return 0;
}
- if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
- return 0;
-
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
return 0;
@@ -510,6 +497,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
*/
int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
{
+ bool sig_enforce;
+
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
return 0;
@@ -525,6 +514,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
+ break;
+ case LOADING_MODULE:
+ sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+
+ if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) {
+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 5fa191252c8f..0716af28808a 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -173,9 +173,15 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
return 0;
}
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+ return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
};
void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2b5ee5fbd652..a8bf324130f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4073,6 +4073,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
return rc;
}
+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (id) {
+ case LOADING_MODULE:
+ rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -6972,6 +6986,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),