diff options
| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-01-03 21:25:15 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-01-06 03:52:53 +0400 |
| commit | b7e724d303b684655e4ca3dabd5a6840ad19012d (patch) | |
| tree | 5474d8d49d61ade4c5e306a0485a835587237bf4 | |
| parent | 6a9de49115d5ff9871d953af1a5c8249e1585731 (diff) | |
| download | linux-b7e724d303b684655e4ca3dabd5a6840ad19012d.tar.xz | |
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
security_capable takes ns, cred, cap. But the LSM capable() hook takes
cred, ns, cap. The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap.
Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone.
Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right
place!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 2 |
4 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 7bcf12adced7..a4457ab61342 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, u8 *data = (u8*) buf; /* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */ - if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) { + if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) { size = dev->cfg_size; } else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) { size = 128; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 4921163b2752..ee969ff40a26 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); @@ -1863,8 +1863,8 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, - const struct cred *cred, int cap) +static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 283c529f8b1c..d98392719adb 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) BUG(); } - if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) { + if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 9ae68c64455e..b9e57f4fc44a 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); |