drm: Prevent vblank counter bumps > 1 with active vblank clients. (v2)

commit 99b8e71597fadd6b2ac85e6e10f221f79dd9c1c1 upstream.

This fixes a regression introduced by the new drm_update_vblank_count()
implementation in Linux 4.4:

Restrict the bump of the software vblank counter in drm_update_vblank_count()
to a safe maximum value of +1 whenever there is the possibility that
concurrent readers of vblank timestamps could be active at the moment,
as the current implementation of the timestamp caching and updating is
not safe against concurrent readers for calls to store_vblank() with a
bump of anything but +1. A bump != 1 would very likely return corrupted
timestamps to userspace, because the same slot in the cache could
be concurrently written by store_vblank() and read by one of those
readers in a non-atomic fashion and without the read-retry logic
detecting this collision.

Concurrent readers can exist while drm_update_vblank_count() is called
from the drm_vblank_off() or drm_vblank_on() functions or other non-vblank-
irq callers. However, all those calls are happening with the vbl_lock
locked thereby preventing a drm_vblank_get(), so the vblank refcount
can't increase while drm_update_vblank_count() is executing. Therefore
a zero vblank refcount during execution of that function signals that
is safe for arbitrary counter bumps if called from outside vblank irq,
whereas a non-zero count is not safe.

Whenever the function is called from vblank irq, we have to assume concurrent
readers could show up any time during its execution, even if the refcount
is currently zero, as vblank irqs are usually only enabled due to the
presence of readers, and because when it is called from vblank irq it
can't hold the vbl_lock to protect it from sudden bumps in vblank refcount.
Therefore also restrict bumps to +1 when the function is called from vblank
irq.

Such bumps of more than +1 can happen at other times than reenabling
vblank irqs, e.g., when regular vblank interrupts get delayed by more
than 1 frame due to long held locks, long irq off periods, realtime
preemption on RT kernels, or system management interrupts.

A better solution would be to rewrite the timestamp caching to use
full seqlocks to allow concurrent writes and reads for arbitrary
vblank counter increments.

v2: Add code comment that this is essentially a hack and should
    be replaced by a full seqlock implementation for caching of
    timestamps.

Signed-off-by: Mario Kleiner <mario.kleiner.de@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Cc: michel@daenzer.net
Cc: vbabka@suse.cz
Cc: ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Cc: daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: alexander.deucher@amd.com
Cc: christian.koenig@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 43 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_irq.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_irq.c
index 1a18033c30db..92ad62f9a2ee 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_irq.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_irq.c
@@ -221,6 +221,49 @@ static void drm_update_vblank_count(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned int pipe,
 		diff = (flags & DRM_CALLED_FROM_VBLIRQ) != 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * FIMXE: Need to replace this hack with proper seqlocks.
+	 *
+	 * Restrict the bump of the software vblank counter to a safe maximum
+	 * value of +1 whenever there is the possibility that concurrent readers
+	 * of vblank timestamps could be active at the moment, as the current
+	 * implementation of the timestamp caching and updating is not safe
+	 * against concurrent readers for calls to store_vblank() with a bump
+	 * of anything but +1. A bump != 1 would very likely return corrupted
+	 * timestamps to userspace, because the same slot in the cache could
+	 * be concurrently written by store_vblank() and read by one of those
+	 * readers without the read-retry logic detecting the collision.
+	 *
+	 * Concurrent readers can exist when we are called from the
+	 * drm_vblank_off() or drm_vblank_on() functions and other non-vblank-
+	 * irq callers. However, all those calls to us are happening with the
+	 * vbl_lock locked to prevent drm_vblank_get(), so the vblank refcount
+	 * can't increase while we are executing. Therefore a zero refcount at
+	 * this point is safe for arbitrary counter bumps if we are called
+	 * outside vblank irq, a non-zero count is not 100% safe. Unfortunately
+	 * we must also accept a refcount of 1, as whenever we are called from
+	 * drm_vblank_get() -> drm_vblank_enable() the refcount will be 1 and
+	 * we must let that one pass through in order to not lose vblank counts
+	 * during vblank irq off - which would completely defeat the whole
+	 * point of this routine.
+	 *
+	 * Whenever we are called from vblank irq, we have to assume concurrent
+	 * readers exist or can show up any time during our execution, even if
+	 * the refcount is currently zero, as vblank irqs are usually only
+	 * enabled due to the presence of readers, and because when we are called
+	 * from vblank irq we can't hold the vbl_lock to protect us from sudden
+	 * bumps in vblank refcount. Therefore also restrict bumps to +1 when
+	 * called from vblank irq.
+	 */
+	if ((diff > 1) && (atomic_read(&vblank->refcount) > 1 ||
+	    (flags & DRM_CALLED_FROM_VBLIRQ))) {
+		DRM_DEBUG_VBL("clamping vblank bump to 1 on crtc %u: diffr=%u "
+			      "refcount %u, vblirq %u\n", pipe, diff,
+			      atomic_read(&vblank->refcount),
+			      (flags & DRM_CALLED_FROM_VBLIRQ) != 0);
+		diff = 1;
+	}
+
 	DRM_DEBUG_VBL("updating vblank count on crtc %u:"
 		      " current=%u, diff=%u, hw=%u hw_last=%u\n",
 		      pipe, vblank->count, diff, cur_vblank, vblank->last);