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author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-05-19 04:13:42 +0300 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-06-16 10:45:15 +0300 |
commit | f31eb7298ba4fc6fb39119330367a44905da8c57 (patch) | |
tree | d3f28b0e5891d675662a0b6eca22e2bcf3289cc1 /.get_maintainer.ignore | |
parent | 1caeb5022449ed7ef169b05bc9c5e7d884b72de2 (diff) | |
download | linux-f31eb7298ba4fc6fb39119330367a44905da8c57.tar.xz |
usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
commit a0d6ec88090d7b1b008429c44532a388e29bb1bd upstream.
pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to '.get_maintainer.ignore')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions