kernel/linux.git/tools/testing/selftests/proc/Makefile, branch v6.6.131

proc: test how it holds up with mapping'less process

2022-10-12T01:51:11+00:00

Create process without mappings and check /proc/*/maps /proc/*/numa_maps /proc/*/smaps /proc/*/smaps_rollup They must be empty (excluding vsyscall page) or full of zeroes. Retroactively this test should've caught embarassing /proc/*/smaps_rollup oops: [17752.703567] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [17752.703580] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [17752.703583] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [17752.703587] PGD 0 P4D 0 [17752.703593] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [17752.703598] CPU: 0 PID: 60649 Comm: cat Tainted: G W 5.19.9-100.fc35.x86_64 #1 [17752.703603] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./X99 Extreme6/3.1, BIOS P3.30 08/05/2016 [17752.703607] RIP: 0010:show_smaps_rollup+0x159/0x2e0 Note 1: ProtectionKey field in /proc/*/smaps is optional, so check most of its contents, not everything. Note 2: due to the nature of this test, child process hardly can signal its readiness (after unmapping everything!) to parent. I feel like "sleep(1)" is justified. If you know how to do it without sleep please tell me. Note 3: /proc/*/statm is not tested but can be. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yz3liL6Dn+n2SD8Q@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton

procfs: do not list TID 0 in /proc//task

2021-11-09T18:02:48+00:00

If a task exits concurrently, task_pid_nr_ns may return 0. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style tweaks] [adobriyan@gmail.com: test that /proc/*/task doesn't contain "0"] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YV88AnVzHxPafQ9o@localhost.localdomain Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8735pn5dx7.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com Signed-off-by: Florian Weimer Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Kees Cook Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

selftests: proc: test subset=pid

2021-05-07T02:24:11+00:00

Test that /proc instance mounted with mount -t proc -o subset=pid contains only ".", "..", "self", "thread-self" and pid directories. Note: Currently "subset=pid" doesn't return "." and ".." via readdir. This must be a bug. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YFYZZ7WGaZlsnChS@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Acked-by: Alexey Gladkov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: use human-readable values for hidepid

2020-04-22T15:51:22+00:00

The hidepid parameter values are becoming more and more and it becomes difficult to remember what each new magic number means. Backward compatibility is preserved since it is possible to specify numerical value for the hidepid parameter. This does not break the fsconfig since it is not possible to specify a numerical value through it. All numeric values are converted to a string. The type FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY cannot be used to indicate a numerical value. Selftest has been added to verify this behavior. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace

2020-04-22T15:51:21+00:00

This patch allows to have multiple procfs instances inside the same pid namespace. The aim here is lightweight sandboxes, and to allow that we have to modernize procfs internals. 1) The main aim of this work is to have on embedded systems one supervisor for apps. Right now we have some lightweight sandbox support, however if we create pid namespacess we have to manages all the processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of apps each one inside its own mount namespace without being able to notice each other. We only want to use mount namespaces, and we want procfs to behave more like a real mount point. 2) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run. The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate to all other procfs mounts. This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(), clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on /proc// to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with pids that the user can ptrace or not. By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict /proc// but more importantly this will give desktop users a generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes and which users can not. Side notes: * This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls that operate on pids, however /proc// is a Linux ABI using filesystem syscalls. With this change LSMs should be able to analyze open/read/write/close... In the new patch set version I removed the 'newinstance' option as suggested by Eric W. Biederman. Selftest has been added to verify new behavior. Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman

proc: test /proc/sysvipc vs setns(CLONE_NEWIPC)

2019-07-17T02:23:21+00:00

I thought that /proc/sysvipc has the same bug as /proc/net commit 1fde6f21d90f8ba5da3cb9c54ca991ed72696c43 proc: fix /proc/net/* after setns(2) However, it doesn't! /proc/sysvipc files do get_ipc_ns(current->nsproxy->ipc_ns); in their open() hook and avoid the problem. Keep the test, maybe /proc/sysvipc will become broken someday :-\ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190706180146.GA21015@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig

2019-05-21T08:50:46+00:00

Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

proc: test /proc/*/maps, smaps, smaps_rollup, statm

2019-03-06T05:07:22+00:00

Start testing VM related fiels found in per-process files. Do it by jiting small executable which brings its address space to precisely known state, then comparing /proc/*/maps, smaps, smaps_rollup, and statm files to expected values. Currently only x86_64 is supported. [adobriyan@gmail.com: exit correctly in /proc/*/maps test] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190206073659.GB15311@avx2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190203165806.GA14568@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: fix /proc/net/* after setns(2)

2019-02-01T23:46:22+00:00

/proc entries under /proc/net/* can't be cached into dcache because setns(2) can change current net namespace. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: avoid vim miscolorization] [adobriyan@gmail.com: write test, add dummy ->d_revalidate hook: necessary if /proc/net/* is pinned at setns time] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190108192350.GA12034@avx2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190107162336.GA9239@avx2 Fixes: 1da4d377f943fe4194ffb9fb9c26cc58fad4dd24 ("proc: revalidate misc dentries") Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Reported-by: Mateusz Stępień Reported-by: Ahmad Fatoum Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

proc: test /proc/thread-self symlink

2018-08-22T17:52:45+00:00

Same story: I have WIP patch to make it faster, so better have a test as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627195209.GC18113@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds