kernel/linux.git/sound/soc/sof, branch v6.12.97

ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Validate size in snd_sof_update_control

2026-07-24T14:11:28+00:00

commit 390aa4c9339bb0ec0bc8d554e830faf93ca9d49e upstream. In snd_sof_update_control(), firmware-provided cdata->num_elems is checked against local_cdata->data->size but never against the actual allocation size. If local_cdata->data->size was previously set to an inconsistent value, the memcpy could write past the allocated buffer. Add a bounds check to ensure num_elems fits within the available space in the ipc_control_data allocation before copying. Fixes: 10f461d79c2d ("ASoC: SOF: Add IPC3 topology control ops") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-5-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Fix heap overflow in bytes_ext put/get

2026-07-24T14:11:28+00:00

commit fd46668d538993218eea19c6925c868ac0f2630c upstream. The ipc_control_data buffer is allocated as kzalloc(max_size), where max_size covers the entire struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data including its flexible array payload. However, the bounds checks in bytes_ext_put and _bytes_ext_get compared user data lengths against max_size directly, ignoring that cdata->data sits at an offset of sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes into the allocation. This allowed writing up to sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes past the end of the heap buffer from unprivileged userspace via the ALSA TLV kcontrol interface, and similarly allowed over-reading adjacent heap data on the get path. Fix all bounds checks to subtract sizeof(*cdata) from max_size so they reflect the actual space available at the cdata->data offset. Also fix the error-path restore in bytes_ext_put which wrote to cdata->data instead of cdata, causing the same overflow. Fixes: 67ec2a091630 ("ASoC: SOF: Add bytes_ext control IPC ops for IPC3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-7-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing

2026-07-24T14:11:25+00:00

commit 8468dd79cfb2ffbdeaf7c353f63d64941cb8ba05 upstream. sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available. Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size. The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below. Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/CANiDSCsjR5NHqu_Ui5cOqWdJgFqmYsQ9WR8O7m0WOhngaYXFpw@mail.gmail.com/t/#m9b3be379221e79327cc13fd71009287368ef4f23 Fixes: 215e5fe75881 ("ASoC: SOF: topology: reject invalid vendor array size in token parser") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260603-sof-topology-array-size-signed-v1-1-84f97879a4ef@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Fix TOCTOU in bytes_put and bytes_get

2026-07-24T14:11:25+00:00

commit 1f97760417b5faa60e9642fd0ed61eb17d0b1b39 upstream. In sof_ipc3_bytes_put(), the size used for the memcpy is derived from the old data->size already in the buffer, not the incoming new data's size field. If the new data has a different size, the copy length is wrong: it may truncate valid data or copy stale bytes. Similarly, sof_ipc3_bytes_get() checks data->size against max_size without accounting for the sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) offset of the flex array within the allocation. Fix bytes_put to validate and use the incoming data's sof_abi_hdr.size from ucontrol before copying. Fix bytes_get to subtract sizeof(*cdata) from the bounds check to match the actual available space. Fixes: 544ac8858f24 ("ASoC: SOF: Add bytes_get/put control IPC ops for IPC3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-6-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Use overflow checks in control_update size calc

2026-07-24T14:11:25+00:00

commit 8791977d7289f6e9d2b014f60a5455f053a7bc04 upstream. In sof_ipc3_control_update(), the expected_size calculation uses firmware-provided cdata->num_elems in arithmetic that could overflow on 32-bit platforms, wrapping to a small value. This would allow the cdata->rhdr.hdr.size comparison to pass with mismatched sizes, potentially leading to out-of-bounds access in snd_sof_update_control. Use check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() to detect and reject overflowed size calculations. Fixes: 10f461d79c2d ("ASoC: SOF: Add IPC3 topology control ops") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-4-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Fix TOCTOU in sof_ipc4_bytes_put

2026-07-24T14:11:25+00:00

commit 3ad673e7139cf214afd24321a829aad6575f4163 upstream. In sof_ipc4_bytes_put(), the copy size is derived from the old data->size in the buffer rather than the incoming new data's size field from ucontrol. If the new data has a different size, the copy uses the wrong length: it may truncate valid data or copy stale bytes. Fix by validating and using the incoming data's sof_abi_hdr.size from ucontrol before copying. Fixes: a062c8899fed ("ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Add support for bytes control get and put") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-2-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: SOF: compress: return the configured codec from get_params

2026-05-23T11:04:34+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2c4fdd055f92a2fc8602dcd88bcea08c374b7e8b ] The SOF compressed offload path accepts codec parameters in sof_compr_set_params() and forwards them to firmware as extended data in the SOF IPC stream params message. However, sof_compr_get_params() still returns success without filling the snd_codec structure. Since the compress core allocates that structure zeroed and copies it back to userspace on success, SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_PARAMS returns an all-zero codec description even after the stream has been configured successfully. The stale TODO in this callback conflates get_params() with capability discovery. Supported codec enumeration belongs in get_caps() and get_codec_caps(). get_params() should report the current codec settings. Cache the codec accepted by sof_compr_set_params() in the per-stream SOF compress state and return it from sof_compr_get_params(). Fixes: 6324cf901e14 ("ASoC: SOF: compr: Add compress ops implementation") Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260325-sof-compr-get-params-v1-1-0758815f13c7@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda: Place check before dereference

2026-05-23T11:04:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6cbc8360f51a3df2ea16a786b262b9fe44d4c68c ] The struct hext_stream is dereferenced before it is checked for NULL. Although it can never be NULL due to a check prior to hda_dsp_iccmax_stream_hw_params() being called, this change clears any confusion regarding hext_stream possibly being NULL. Check hext_stream for NULL and then assign its members. Detected by Smatch: sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-stream.c:488 hda_dsp_iccmax_stream_hw_params() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'hext_stream' (see line 486) Fixes: aca961f196e5d ("ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda: Add helper function to program ICCMAX stream") Signed-off-by: Ethan Tidmore Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324173830.17563-1-ethantidmore06@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ASoC: SOF: ipc3: Use standard dev_dbg API

2026-05-23T11:04:26+00:00

[ Upstream commit 55c39835ee0ef94593a78f6ea808138d476f3b81 ] Use standard dev_dbg API because it gives better debugging information and allows dynamic control of prints. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baluta Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240926090252.106040-1-daniel.baluta@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Stable-dep-of: 07c774dd64ba ("ASoC: soc-compress: use function to clear symmetric params") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ASoC: SOF: Don't allow pointer operations on unconfigured streams

2026-05-14T13:29:17+00:00

commit c5b6285aae050ff1c3ea824ca3d88ac4be1e69c8 upstream. When reporting the pointer for a compressed stream we report the current I/O frame position by dividing the position by the number of channels multiplied by the number of container bytes. These values default to 0 and are only configured as part of setting the stream parameters so this allows a divide by zero to be configured. Validate that they are non zero, returning an error if not Fixes: c1a731c71359 ("ASoC: SOF: compress: Add support for computing timestamps") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326-asoc-compress-tstamp-params-v1-1-3dc735b3d599@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman