<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v6.10.9</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.10.9</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.10.9'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2024-09-08T05:56:35+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>smack: tcp: ipv4, fix incorrect labeling</title>
<updated>2024-09-08T05:56:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-05T22:41:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d3703fa94116fed91f64c7d1c7d284fb4369070f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d3703fa94116fed91f64c7d1c7d284fb4369070f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2fe209d0ad2e2729f7e22b9b31a86cc3ff0db550 ]

Currently, Smack mirrors the label of incoming tcp/ipv4 connections:
when a label 'foo' connects to a label 'bar' with tcp/ipv4,
'foo' always gets 'foo' in returned ipv4 packets. So,
1) returned packets are incorrectly labeled ('foo' instead of 'bar')
2) 'bar' can write to 'foo' without being authorized to write.

Here is a scenario how to see this:

* Take two machines, let's call them C and S,
   with active Smack in the default state
   (no settings, no rules, no labeled hosts, only builtin labels)

* At S, add Smack rule 'foo bar w'
   (labels 'foo' and 'bar' are instantiated at S at this moment)

* At S, at label 'bar', launch a program
   that listens for incoming tcp/ipv4 connections

* From C, at label 'foo', connect to the listener at S.
   (label 'foo' is instantiated at C at this moment)
   Connection succeedes and works.

* Send some data in both directions.
* Collect network traffic of this connection.

All packets in both directions are labeled with the CIPSO
of the label 'foo'. Hence, label 'bar' writes to 'foo' without
being authorized, and even without ever being known at C.

If anybody cares: exactly the same happens with DCCP.

This behavior 1st manifested in release 2.6.29.4 (see Fixes below)
and it looks unintentional. At least, no explanation was provided.

I changed returned packes label into the 'bar',
to bring it into line with the Smack documentation claims.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev &lt;andreev@swemel.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix possible NULL pointer dereference</title>
<updated>2024-09-08T05:56:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leesoo Ahn</name>
<email>lsahn@ooseel.net</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-07T16:12:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c49bbe69ee152bd9c1c1f314c0f582e76c578f64'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c49bbe69ee152bd9c1c1f314c0f582e76c578f64</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3dd384108d53834002be5630132ad5c3f32166ad ]

profile-&gt;parent-&gt;dents[AAFS_PROF_DIR] could be NULL only if its parent is made
from __create_missing_ancestors(..) and 'ent-&gt;old' is NULL in
aa_replace_profiles(..).
In that case, it must return an error code and the code, -ENOENT represents
its state that the path of its parent is not existed yet.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
PGD 0 P4D 0
PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 4 PID: 3362 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.8.0-24-generic #24
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:aafs_create.constprop.0+0x7f/0x130
Code: 4c 63 e0 48 83 c4 18 4c 89 e0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 45 31 d2 c3 cc cc cc cc &lt;4d&gt; 8b 55 30 4d 8d ba a0 00 00 00 4c 89 55 c0 4c 89 ff e8 7a 6a ae
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b2c7c98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000041ed RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000b2c7cd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff82baac10
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007be9f22cf740(0000) GS:ffff88817bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000134b08000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
 ? __die+0x24/0x80
 ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0
 ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0xb2/0x140
 ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x1a5/0x2c0
 ? find_vma+0x34/0x60
 ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x30
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x6b0
 ? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
 ? aafs_create.constprop.0+0x7f/0x130
 ? aafs_create.constprop.0+0x51/0x130
 __aafs_profile_mkdir+0x3d6/0x480
 aa_replace_profiles+0x83f/0x1270
 policy_update+0xe3/0x180
 profile_load+0xbc/0x150
 ? rw_verify_area+0x47/0x140
 vfs_write+0x100/0x480
 ? __x64_sys_openat+0x55/0xa0
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x86/0x260
 ksys_write+0x73/0x100
 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
 x64_sys_call+0x7e/0x25c0
 do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x180
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0x80
RIP: 0033:0x7be9f211c574
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffd26f2b8c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d504415e200 RCX: 00007be9f211c574
RDX: 0000000000001fc1 RSI: 00005d504418bc80 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000001fc1 R08: 0000000000001fc1 R09: 0000000080000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00005d504418bc80
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ffd26f2b9b0 R15: 00007ffd26f2ba30
 &lt;/TASK&gt;
Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer qrtr snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device i2c_i801 snd_timer i2c_smbus qxl snd soundcore drm_ttm_helper lpc_ich ttm joydev input_leds serio_raw mac_hid binfmt_misc msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore nfnetlink dmi_sysfs qemu_fw_cfg ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid ahci libahci psmouse virtio_rng xhci_pci xhci_pci_renesas
CR2: 0000000000000030
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:aafs_create.constprop.0+0x7f/0x130
Code: 4c 63 e0 48 83 c4 18 4c 89 e0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 45 31 d2 c3 cc cc cc cc &lt;4d&gt; 8b 55 30 4d 8d ba a0 00 00 00 4c 89 55 c0 4c 89 ff e8 7a 6a ae
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b2c7c98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000041ed RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000b2c7cd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff82baac10
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007be9f22cf740(0000) GS:ffff88817bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000134b08000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Signed-off-by: Leesoo Ahn &lt;lsahn@ooseel.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix policy_unpack_test on big endian systems</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:30:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guenter Roeck</name>
<email>linux@roeck-us.net</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-08T15:50:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=dbec7640c80cbc59fe3a1d7f075ce364f93ea9d4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbec7640c80cbc59fe3a1d7f075ce364f93ea9d4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 98c0cc48e27e9d269a3e4db2acd72b486c88ec77 ]

policy_unpack_test fails on big endian systems because data byte order
is expected to be little endian but is generated in host byte order.
This results in test failures such as:

 # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:150
    Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
        array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
        (u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1
    not ok 3 policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_null_name
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: EXPECTATION FAILED at security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c:164
    Expected array_size == (u16)16, but
        array_size == 4096 (0x1000)
        (u16)16 == 16 (0x10)
    # policy_unpack_test_unpack_array_with_name: pass:0 fail:1 skip:0 total:1

Add the missing endianness conversions when generating test data.

Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack")
Cc: Brendan Higgins &lt;brendanhiggins@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;linux@roeck-us.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:30:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Scott Mayhew</name>
<email>smayhew@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-28T19:51:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f71ec019257ba4f7ab198bd948c5902a207bad96'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f71ec019257ba4f7ab198bd948c5902a207bad96</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7 upstream.

Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to
change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is
exported with root squashing enabled.

The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:

 *  This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it
 *  is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate
 *  permission checks.

nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and
nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks
that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.

Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(),
simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to
__vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked().  This
fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to
recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change
its security label.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Gresko &lt;marek.gresko@protonmail.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218809
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew &lt;smayhew@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add the processing of the failure of avc_add_xperms_decision()</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhen Lei</name>
<email>thunder.leizhen@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-07T09:00:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3f21150c15570b865570f7afde4936d9505ef813'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f21150c15570b865570f7afde4936d9505ef813</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6dd1e4c045afa6a4ba5d46f044c83bd357c593c2 upstream.

When avc_add_xperms_decision() fails, the information recorded by the new
avc node is incomplete. In this case, the new avc node should be released
instead of replacing the old avc node.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix potential counting error in avc_add_xperms_decision()</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhen Lei</name>
<email>thunder.leizhen@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-06T06:51:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e812b8c210a7e2b91bdd5cabdc303c1ff778c7ba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e812b8c210a7e2b91bdd5cabdc303c1ff778c7ba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 379d9af3f3da2da1bbfa67baf1820c72a080d1f1 upstream.

The count increases only when a node is successfully added to
the linked list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-17T11:28:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9e3b266afcfe4294e84496f50f006f029d3100db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e3b266afcfe4294e84496f50f006f029d3100db</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0e28bf61a5f9ab30be3f3b4eafb8d097e39446bb upstream.

Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in
the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply
convert this field to hex and send it to userspace.

With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK)
in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload.
BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob
field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text.
Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead
of the encrypted BEK to userspace.

This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and
then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases
are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key
blob and then just use it without exporting it again.

Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated
buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking
the key via uninitialized memory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-17T11:28:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=652563a7294b59f36419db1445d141d82f9286e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:652563a7294b59f36419db1445d141d82f9286e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6486cad00a8b7f8585983408c152bbe33dda529b upstream.

The DCP trusted key type uses the wrong helper function to store
the blob's payload length which can lead to the wrong byte order
being used in case this would ever run on big endian architectures.

Fix by using correct helper function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Suggested-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202405240610.fj53EK0q-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap()</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-08T15:57:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=23aabbc68ab8da2f7959d784d19357c56ecaabbf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:23aabbc68ab8da2f7959d784d19357c56ecaabbf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 05a3d6e9307250a5911d75308e4363466794ab21 upstream.

Unfortunately it appears that vma_is_initial_heap() is currently broken
for applications that do not currently have any heap allocated, e.g.
brk == start_brk.  The breakage is such that it will cause SELinux to
check for the process/execheap permission on memory regions that cross
brk/start_brk even when there is no heap.

The proper fix would be to correct vma_is_initial_heap(), but as there
are multiple callers I am hesitant to unilaterally modify the helper
out of concern that I would end up breaking some other subsystem.  The
mm developers have been made aware of the situation and hopefully they
will have a fix at some point in the future, but we need a fix soon so
we are simply going to revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap() in favor
of our old logic/code which works as expected, even in the face of a
zero size heap.  We can return to using vma_is_initial_heap() at some
point in the future when it is fixed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marc Reisner &lt;reisner.marc@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZrPmoLKJEf1wiFmM@marcreisner.com
Fixes: 68df1baf158f ("selinux: use vma_is_initial_stack() and vma_is_initial_heap()")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux,smack: remove the capability checks in the removexattr hooks</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:01:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-03T21:00:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bc8ccc1f1e079aac885e4d62efaa63159bf2b7c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bc8ccc1f1e079aac885e4d62efaa63159bf2b7c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dd44477e7fa15ba3b100dfc67bf7cf083f3dccf6 upstream.

Commit 61df7b828204 ("lsm: fixup the inode xattr capability handling")
moved the responsibility of doing the inode xattr capability checking
out of the individual LSMs and into the LSM framework itself.
Unfortunately, while the original commit added the capability checks
to both the setxattr and removexattr code in the LSM framework, it
only removed the setxattr capability checks from the individual LSMs,
leaving duplicated removexattr capability checks in both the SELinux
and Smack code.

This patch removes the duplicated code from SELinux and Smack.

Fixes: 61df7b828204 ("lsm: fixup the inode xattr capability handling")
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
