<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v6.10.7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.10.7</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.10.7'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:41+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add the processing of the failure of avc_add_xperms_decision()</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhen Lei</name>
<email>thunder.leizhen@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-07T09:00:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3f21150c15570b865570f7afde4936d9505ef813'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f21150c15570b865570f7afde4936d9505ef813</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6dd1e4c045afa6a4ba5d46f044c83bd357c593c2 upstream.

When avc_add_xperms_decision() fails, the information recorded by the new
avc node is incomplete. In this case, the new avc node should be released
instead of replacing the old avc node.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix potential counting error in avc_add_xperms_decision()</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhen Lei</name>
<email>thunder.leizhen@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-06T06:51:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e812b8c210a7e2b91bdd5cabdc303c1ff778c7ba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e812b8c210a7e2b91bdd5cabdc303c1ff778c7ba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 379d9af3f3da2da1bbfa67baf1820c72a080d1f1 upstream.

The count increases only when a node is successfully added to
the linked list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-17T11:28:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9e3b266afcfe4294e84496f50f006f029d3100db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e3b266afcfe4294e84496f50f006f029d3100db</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0e28bf61a5f9ab30be3f3b4eafb8d097e39446bb upstream.

Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in
the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply
convert this field to hex and send it to userspace.

With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK)
in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload.
BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob
field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text.
Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead
of the encrypted BEK to userspace.

This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and
then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases
are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key
blob and then just use it without exporting it again.

Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated
buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking
the key via uninitialized memory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Gstir</name>
<email>david@sigma-star.at</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-17T11:28:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=652563a7294b59f36419db1445d141d82f9286e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:652563a7294b59f36419db1445d141d82f9286e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6486cad00a8b7f8585983408c152bbe33dda529b upstream.

The DCP trusted key type uses the wrong helper function to store
the blob's payload length which can lead to the wrong byte order
being used in case this would ever run on big endian architectures.

Fix by using correct helper function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys")
Suggested-by: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202405240610.fj53EK0q-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: David Gstir &lt;david@sigma-star.at&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap()</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-08T15:57:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=23aabbc68ab8da2f7959d784d19357c56ecaabbf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:23aabbc68ab8da2f7959d784d19357c56ecaabbf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 05a3d6e9307250a5911d75308e4363466794ab21 upstream.

Unfortunately it appears that vma_is_initial_heap() is currently broken
for applications that do not currently have any heap allocated, e.g.
brk == start_brk.  The breakage is such that it will cause SELinux to
check for the process/execheap permission on memory regions that cross
brk/start_brk even when there is no heap.

The proper fix would be to correct vma_is_initial_heap(), but as there
are multiple callers I am hesitant to unilaterally modify the helper
out of concern that I would end up breaking some other subsystem.  The
mm developers have been made aware of the situation and hopefully they
will have a fix at some point in the future, but we need a fix soon so
we are simply going to revert our use of vma_is_initial_heap() in favor
of our old logic/code which works as expected, even in the face of a
zero size heap.  We can return to using vma_is_initial_heap() at some
point in the future when it is fixed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marc Reisner &lt;reisner.marc@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZrPmoLKJEf1wiFmM@marcreisner.com
Fixes: 68df1baf158f ("selinux: use vma_is_initial_stack() and vma_is_initial_heap()")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux,smack: remove the capability checks in the removexattr hooks</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:01:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-03T21:00:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bc8ccc1f1e079aac885e4d62efaa63159bf2b7c8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bc8ccc1f1e079aac885e4d62efaa63159bf2b7c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dd44477e7fa15ba3b100dfc67bf7cf083f3dccf6 upstream.

Commit 61df7b828204 ("lsm: fixup the inode xattr capability handling")
moved the responsibility of doing the inode xattr capability checking
out of the individual LSMs and into the LSM framework itself.
Unfortunately, while the original commit added the capability checks
to both the setxattr and removexattr code in the LSM framework, it
only removed the setxattr capability checks from the individual LSMs,
leaving duplicated removexattr capability checks in both the SELinux
and Smack code.

This patch removes the duplicated code from SELinux and Smack.

Fixes: 61df7b828204 ("lsm: fixup the inode xattr capability handling")
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: unpack transition table if dfa is not present</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:01:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Georgia Garcia</name>
<email>georgia.garcia@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-10T12:51:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7b2384f7ebbf6d8eb7bb276dafd4a3dc2f78131f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7b2384f7ebbf6d8eb7bb276dafd4a3dc2f78131f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e0ff0cff1f6cdce0aa596aac04129893201c4162 ]

Due to a bug in earlier userspaces, a transition table may be present
even when the dfa is not. Commit 7572fea31e3e
("apparmor: convert fperm lookup to use accept as an index") made the
verification check more rigourous regressing old userspaces with
the bug. For compatibility reasons allow the orphaned transition table
during unpack and discard.

Fixes: 7572fea31e3e ("apparmor: convert fperm lookup to use accept as an index")
Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:01:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiao Liang</name>
<email>shaw.leon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-02T00:48:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=46c17ead5b7389e22e7dc9903fd0ba865d05bda2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:46c17ead5b7389e22e7dc9903fd0ba865d05bda2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fce09ea314505a52f2436397608fa0a5d0934fb1 ]

The panic below is observed when receiving ICMP packets with secmark set
while an ICMP raw socket is being created. SK_CTX(sk)-&gt;label is updated
in apparmor_socket_post_create(), but the packet is delivered to the
socket before that, causing the null pointer dereference.
Drop the packet if label context is not set.

    BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000004c
    #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    PGD 0 P4D 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
    CPU: 0 PID: 407 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.4.12-arch1-1 #1 3e6fa2753a2d75925c34ecb78e22e85a65d083df
    Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/28/2020
    RIP: 0010:aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40
    Code: 00 00 48 89 ef e8 d5 25 0c 00 e9 66 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 f0 &lt;8b&gt; 77 4c 39 c6 7e 1f 48 63 d0 48 8d 14 d7 eb 0b 83 c0 01 48 83 c2
    RSP: 0018:ffffa92940003b08 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000e
    RDX: ffffa92940003be8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffff8b57471e7800 R08: ffff8b574c642400 R09: 0000000000000002
    R10: ffffffffbd820eeb R11: ffffffffbeb7ff00 R12: ffff8b574c642400
    R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007fb092ea7640(0000) GS:ffff8b577bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 000000000000004c CR3: 00000001020f2005 CR4: 00000000007706f0
    PKRU: 55555554
    Call Trace:
     &lt;IRQ&gt;
     ? __die+0x23/0x70
     ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
     ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180
     ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
     ? aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40
     apparmor_secmark_check+0xec/0x330
     security_sock_rcv_skb+0x35/0x50
     sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x250
     sock_queue_rcv_skb_reason+0x20/0x60
     raw_rcv+0x13c/0x210
     raw_local_deliver+0x1f3/0x250
     ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4f/0x2f0
     ip_local_deliver_finish+0x76/0xa0
     __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x89/0xa0
     netif_receive_skb+0x119/0x170
     ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3d/0x140
     vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+0xb23/0x1010 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a]
     vmxnet3_poll_rx_only+0x36/0xb0 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a]
     __napi_poll+0x28/0x1b0
     net_rx_action+0x2a4/0x380
     __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c8
     __irq_exit_rcu+0xbb/0xf0
     common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0
     &lt;/IRQ&gt;
     &lt;TASK&gt;
     asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40
    RIP: 0010:apparmor_socket_post_create+0xb/0x200
    Code: 08 48 85 ff 75 a1 eb b1 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 &lt;55&gt; 48 89 fd 53 45 85 c0 0f 84 b2 00 00 00 48 8b 1d 80 56 3f 02 48
    RSP: 0018:ffffa92940ce7e50 EFLAGS: 00000286
    RAX: ffffffffbc756440 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff8b574eaab740
    RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: ffff8b57444cec70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003
    R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff8b574eaab740 R15: ffffffffbd8e4748
     ? __pfx_apparmor_socket_post_create+0x10/0x10
     security_socket_post_create+0x4b/0x80
     __sock_create+0x176/0x1f0
     __sys_socket+0x89/0x100
     __x64_sys_socket+0x17/0x20
     do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
     ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
     ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
     ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang &lt;shaw.leon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>task_work: s/task_work_cancel()/task_work_cancel_func()/</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:00:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Frederic Weisbecker</name>
<email>frederic@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-21T09:15:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=012e110c7dc708f71eb718ad2e6ae77e19cf4769'/>
<id>urn:sha1:012e110c7dc708f71eb718ad2e6ae77e19cf4769</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 68cbd415dd4b9c5b9df69f0f091879e56bf5907a upstream.

A proper task_work_cancel() API that actually cancels a callback and not
*any* callback pointing to a given function is going to be needed for
perf events event freeing. Do the appropriate rename to prepare for
that.

Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240621091601.18227-2-frederic@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: use kvfree_sensitive to free data-&gt;data</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:00:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fedor Pchelkin</name>
<email>pchelkin@ispras.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-01T14:24:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fde89bb85457a5ad3b87739bf481a74972f236b0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fde89bb85457a5ad3b87739bf481a74972f236b0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2bc73505a5cd2a18a7a542022722f136c19e3b87 upstream.

Inside unpack_profile() data-&gt;data is allocated using kvmemdup() so it
should be freed with the corresponding kvfree_sensitive().

Also add missing data-&gt;data release for rhashtable insertion failure path
in unpack_profile().

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: e025be0f26d5 ("apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin &lt;pchelkin@ispras.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
