<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v6.1.60</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.60</id>
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<updated>2023-10-19T21:08:50+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage</title>
<updated>2023-10-19T21:08:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sumit Garg</name>
<email>sumit.garg@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-06T05:18:01+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3746b878efdef99e8f018ca3fefe0a72529874ce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 01bbafc63b65689cb179ca537971286bc27f3b74 upstream.

Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and
__exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led
to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.

However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init()
and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or
security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead.

Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately
the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its
future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not.

Reported-and-tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg &lt;sumit.garg@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: rework CONFIG_IMA dependency block</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:00:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-27T07:22:14+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:23acd1784eb5299e89c13616d42bb3090ddb0ccd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91e326563ee34509c35267808a4b1b3ea3db62a8 ]

Changing the direct dependencies of IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING and
IMA_LOAD_X509 caused them to no longer depend on IMA, but a
a configuration without IMA results in link failures:

arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: security/integrity/iint.o: in function `integrity_load_keys':
iint.c:(.init.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `ima_load_x509'

aarch64-linux-ld: security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.o: in function `asymmetric_verify':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.text+0x104): undefined reference to `ima_blacklist_keyring'

Adding explicit dependencies on IMA would fix this, but a more reliable
way to do this is to enclose the entire Kconfig file in an 'if IMA' block.
This also allows removing the existing direct dependencies.

Fixes: be210c6d3597f ("ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:00:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksandr Tymoshenko</name>
<email>ovt@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-21T06:45:05+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f23c35f0686c40078f6cd77b8899f9c87020775c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit be210c6d3597faf330cb9af33b9f1591d7b2a983 ]

The removal of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING made IMA_LOAD_X509
and IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING unavailable because the latter
two depend on the former. Since IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING was
deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING use it
as a dependency for the two Kconfigs affected by the
deprecation.

Fixes: 5087fd9e80e5 ("ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko &lt;ovt@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: Retrieve transmuting information in smack_inode_getsecurity()</title>
<updated>2023-10-06T12:56:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-08T17:02:33+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a09446ac0414801bf2b3945b9bdf3ef59389710e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3a3d8fce31a49363cc31880dce5e3b0617c9c38b ]

Enhance smack_inode_getsecurity() to retrieve the value for
SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the inode security blob, similarly to SMACK64.

This helps to display accurate values in the situation where the security
labels come from mount options and not from xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: Record transmuting in smk_transmuted</title>
<updated>2023-10-06T12:56:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-08T17:02:34+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cbb16d0f4996a9b697de824b94a2a7287148e9d3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2c085f3a8f23c9b444e8b99d93c15d7ce870fc4e ]

smack_dentry_create_files_as() determines whether transmuting should occur
based on the label of the parent directory the new inode will be added to,
and not the label of the directory where it is created.

This helps for example to do transmuting on overlayfs, since the latter
first creates the inode in the working directory, and then moves it to the
correct destination.

However, despite smack_dentry_create_files_as() provides the correct label,
smack_inode_init_security() does not know from passed information whether
or not transmuting occurred. Without this information,
smack_inode_init_security() cannot set SMK_INODE_CHANGED in smk_flags,
which will result in the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr not being set in
smack_d_instantiate().

Thus, add the smk_transmuted field to the task_smack structure, and set it
in smack_dentry_create_files_as() to smk_task if transmuting occurred. If
smk_task is equal to smk_transmuted in smack_inode_init_security(), act as
if transmuting was successful but without taking the label from the parent
directory (the inode label was already set correctly from the current
credentials in smack_inode_alloc_security()).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix handling of empty opts in selinux_fs_context_submount()</title>
<updated>2023-09-23T09:11:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-11T14:23:58+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:978b86fbdb2acf69a3630931f0c4f07a30734f2f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ccf1dab96be4caed7c5235b1cfdb606ac161b996 upstream.

selinux_set_mnt_opts() relies on the fact that the mount options pointer
is always NULL when all options are unset (specifically in its
!selinux_initialized() branch. However, the new
selinux_fs_context_submount() hook breaks this rule by allocating a new
structure even if no options are set. That causes any submount created
before a SELinux policy is loaded to be rejected in
selinux_set_mnt_opts().

Fix this by making selinux_fs_context_submount() leave fc-&gt;security
set to NULL when there are no options to be copied from the reference
superblock.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: Adam Williamson &lt;awilliam@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2236345
Fixes: d80a8f1b58c2 ("vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-06T05:52:39+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d41ceafe3d24b76aaa43cfab999335dbb24140af</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3ad49d37cf5759c3b8b68d02e3563f633d9c1aee ]

There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent
negatives.  I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we
may as well be safe.

Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-11T16:44:47+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9b372d2fdc4496d44931b194af0a2b4da7531729</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5087fd9e80e539d2163accd045b73da64de7de95 ]

Time to remove "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING".

Fixes: f4dc37785e9b ("integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring") # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-08T11:34:20+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ed134f284b4ed85a70d5f760ed0686e3cd555f9b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d80a8f1b58c2bc8d7c6bfb65401ea4f7ec8cddc2 ]

When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters
aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called,
leading to failure to match existing superblocks.

This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when
fscache is enabled:

    NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)

Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc-&gt;security for submount
creation.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5
Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.")
Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode")
Tested-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operations</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Göttsche</name>
<email>cgzones@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-11T12:32:52+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:896e9e57784cc48b9869d0574bd2c2be6cc1eaa8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d7f105edbb3b2be5ffa4d833abbf9b6965e9ce7 ]

If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via
`capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message.
Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author
granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them.

Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is
actually privileged.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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