kernel/linux.git/security, branch v6.1.168

xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU

2026-03-25T10:03:25+00:00

commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream. When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for which the current domU is acting as a device model. Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other guests). Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself might result in violating the secure boot functionality. This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option. This is part of XSA-482 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: fix invalid deref of rawdata when export_binary is unset

2026-03-04T12:20:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit df9ac55abd18628bd8cff687ea043660532a3654 ] If the export_binary parameter is disabled on runtime, profiles that were loaded before that will still have their rawdata stored in apparmorfs, with a symbolic link to the rawdata on the policy directory. When one of those profiles are replaced, the rawdata is set to NULL, but when trying to resolve the symbolic links to rawdata for that profile, it will try to dereference profile->rawdata->name when profile->rawdata is now NULL causing an oops. Fix it by checking if rawdata is set. [ 168.653080] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088 [ 168.657420] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 168.660619] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 168.663613] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 168.665450] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 168.667836] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1729 Comm: ls Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 168.672308] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 168.679327] RIP: 0010:rawdata_get_link_base.isra.0+0x23/0x330 [ 168.682768] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 48 89 55 d0 48 85 ff 0f 84 e3 01 00 00 <48> 83 3c 25 88 00 00 00 00 0f 84 d4 01 00 00 49 89 f6 49 89 cc e8 [ 168.689818] RSP: 0018:ffffcdcb8200fb80 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 168.690871] RAX: ffffffffaee74ec0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb0120158 [ 168.692251] RDX: ffffcdcb8200fbe0 RSI: ffff88c187c9fa80 RDI: ffff88c186c98a80 [ 168.693593] RBP: ffffcdcb8200fbc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 168.694941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88c186c98a80 [ 168.696289] R13: 00007fff005aaa20 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: ffff88c188f4fce0 [ 168.697637] FS: 0000790e81c58280(0000) GS:ffff88c20a957000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 168.699227] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 168.700349] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 000000012fd3e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 168.701696] Call Trace: [ 168.702325] [ 168.702995] rawdata_get_link_data+0x1c/0x30 [ 168.704145] vfs_readlink+0xd4/0x160 [ 168.705152] do_readlinkat+0x114/0x180 [ 168.706214] __x64_sys_readlink+0x1e/0x30 [ 168.708653] x64_sys_call+0x1d77/0x26b0 [ 168.709525] do_syscall_64+0x81/0x500 [ 168.710348] ? do_statx+0x72/0xb0 [ 168.711109] ? putname+0x3e/0x80 [ 168.711845] ? __x64_sys_statx+0xb7/0x100 [ 168.712711] ? x64_sys_call+0x10fc/0x26b0 [ 168.713577] ? do_syscall_64+0xbf/0x500 [ 168.714412] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d2/0x8d0 [ 168.715404] ? irqentry_exit+0xb2/0x740 [ 168.716359] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [ 168.717307] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 1180b4c757aab ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement") Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

apparmor: fix rlimit for posix cpu timers

2026-03-04T12:20:08+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6ca56813f4a589f536adceb42882855d91fb1125 ] Posix cpu timers requires an additional step beyond setting the rlimit. Refactor the code so its clear when what code is setting the limit and conditionally update the posix cpu timers when appropriate. Fixes: baa73d9e478ff ("posix-timers: Make them configurable") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

apparmor: fix NULL sock in aa_sock_file_perm

2026-03-04T12:20:08+00:00

[ Upstream commit 00b67657535dfea56e84d11492f5c0f61d0af297 ] Deal with the potential that sock and sock-sk can be NULL during socket setup or teardown. This could lead to an oops. The fix for NULL pointer dereference in __unix_needs_revalidation shows this is at least possible for af_unix sockets. While the fix for af_unix sockets applies for newer mediation this is still the fall back path for older af_unix mediation and other sockets, so ensure it is covered. Fixes: 56974a6fcfef6 ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

smack: /smack/doi: accept previously used values

2026-03-04T12:19:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit 33d589ed60ae433b483761987b85e0d24e54584e ] Writing to /smack/doi a value that has ever been written there in the past disables networking for non-ambient labels. E.g. # cat /smack/doi 3 # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (1) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (3) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED domain: DEFAULT (IPv4) protocol: CIPSO, DOI = 3 domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED # cat /smack/ambient _ # cat /proc/$$/attr/smack/current _ # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.964 ms # echo foo >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.956 ms unknown option 86 # echo 4 >/smack/doi # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 214.050395] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:678 remove rc = -2 !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 !!> ping: 10.1.95.12: Address family for hostname not supported # echo _ >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.617 ms This happens because Smack keeps decommissioned DOIs, fails to re-add them, and consequently refuses to add the “default” domain map: # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (2) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH DOI value : 4 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (2) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED !> (no ipv4 map for default domain here) domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED Fix by clearing decommissioned DOI definitions and serializing concurrent DOI updates with a new lock. Also: - allow /smack/doi to live unconfigured, since adding a map (netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add) may fail. CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN(0) indicates the unconfigured DOI - add new DOI before removing the old default map, so the old map remains if the add fails (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

smack: /smack/doi must be > 0

2026-03-04T12:19:36+00:00

[ Upstream commit 19c013e1551bf51e1493da1270841d60e4fd3f15 ] /smack/doi allows writing and keeping negative doi values. Correct values are 0 < doi <= (max 32-bit positive integer) (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd

2026-01-11T14:18:50+00:00

commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream. 'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode' but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob into with a cleanup helper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()

2026-01-11T14:18:28+00:00

[ Upstream commit 738c9738e690f5cea24a3ad6fd2d9a323cf614f6 ] In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match. Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9d ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

smack: fix bug: unprivileged task can create labels

2026-01-11T14:18:17+00:00

[ Upstream commit c147e13ea7fe9f118f8c9ba5e96cbd644b00d6b3 ] If an unprivileged task is allowed to relabel itself (/smack/relabel-self is not empty), it can freely create new labels by writing their names into own /proc/PID/attr/smack/current This occurs because do_setattr() imports the provided label in advance, before checking "relabel-self" list. This change ensures that the "relabel-self" list is checked before importing the label. Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time

2025-10-19T14:23:14+00:00

commit eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 upstream. To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). [For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.] Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman