kernel/linux.git/security, branch v6.1.140

landlock: Add the errata interface

2025-04-25T08:44:02+00:00

commit 15383a0d63dbcd63dc7e8d9ec1bf3a0f7ebf64ac upstream. Some fixes may require user space to check if they are applied on the running kernel before using a specific feature. For instance, this applies when a restriction was previously too restrictive and is now getting relaxed (e.g. for compatibility reasons). However, non-visible changes for legitimate use (e.g. security fixes) do not require an erratum. Because fixes are backported down to a specific Landlock ABI, we need a way to avoid cherry-pick conflicts. The solution is to only update a file related to the lower ABI impacted by this issue. All the ABI files are then used to create a bitmask of fixes. The new errata interface is similar to the one used to get the supported Landlock ABI version, but it returns a bitmask instead because the order of fixes may not match the order of versions, and not all fixes may apply to all versions. The actual errata will come with dedicated commits. The description is not actually used in the code but serves as documentation. Create the landlock_abi_version symbol and use its value to check errata consistency. Update test_base's create_ruleset_checks_ordering tests and add errata tests. This commit is backportable down to the first version of Landlock. Fixes: 3532b0b4352c ("landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features") Cc: Günther Noack Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-3-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

smack: dont compile ipv6 code unless ipv6 is configured

2025-04-10T12:33:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit bfcf4004bcbce2cb674b4e8dbd31ce0891766bac ] I want to be sure that ipv6-specific code is not compiled in kernel binaries if ipv6 is not configured. [1] was getting rid of "unused variable" warning, but, with that, it also mandated compilation of a handful ipv6- specific functions in ipv4-only kernel configurations: smk_ipv6_localhost, smack_ipv6host_label, smk_ipv6_check. Their compiled bodies are likely to be removed by compiler from the resulting binary, but, to be on the safe side, I remove them from the compiler view. [1] Fixes: 00720f0e7f28 ("smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tomoyo: don't emit warning in tomoyo_write_control()

2025-02-21T12:49:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3df7546fc03b8f004eee0b9e3256369f7d096685 ] syzbot is reporting too large allocation warning at tomoyo_write_control(), for one can write a very very long line without new line character. To fix this warning, I use __GFP_NOWARN rather than checking for KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, for practically a valid line should be always shorter than 32KB where the "too small to fail" memory-allocation rule applies. One might try to write a valid line that is longer than 32KB, but such request will likely fail with -ENOMEM. Therefore, I feel that separately returning -EINVAL when a line is longer than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE is redundant. There is no need to distinguish over-32KB and over-KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. Reported-by: syzbot+7536f77535e5210a5c76@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7536f77535e5210a5c76 Reported-by: Leo Stone Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241216021459.178759-2-leocstone@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

safesetid: check size of policy writes

2025-02-21T12:49:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit f09ff307c7299392f1c88f763299e24bc99811c7 ] syzbot attempts to write a buffer with a large size to a sysfs entry with writes handled by handle_policy_update(), triggering a warning in kmalloc. Check the size specified for write buffers before allocating. Reported-by: syzbot+4eb7a741b3216020043a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4eb7a741b3216020043a Signed-off-by: Leo Stone [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

landlock: Handle weird files

2025-02-21T12:49:04+00:00

[ Upstream commit 49440290a0935f428a1e43a5ac8dc275a647ff80 ] A corrupted filesystem (e.g. bcachefs) might return weird files. Instead of throwing a warning and allowing access to such file, treat them as regular files. Cc: Dave Chinner Cc: Kent Overstreet Cc: Paul Moore Reported-by: syzbot+34b68f850391452207df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000a65b35061cffca61@google.com Reported-by: syzbot+360866a59e3c80510a62@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/67379b3f.050a0220.85a0.0001.GAE@google.com Reported-by: Ubisectech Sirius Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c426821d-8380-46c4-a494-7008bbd7dd13.bugreport@ubisectech.com Fixes: cb2c7d1a1776 ("landlock: Support filesystem access-control") Reviewed-by: Günther Noack Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110153918.241810-1-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

selinux: ignore unknown extended permissions

2025-01-09T12:29:56+00:00

commit 900f83cf376bdaf798b6f5dcb2eae0c822e908b6 upstream. When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be added without interfering with older kernels. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: test: Fix memory leak for aa_unpack_strdup()

2024-12-14T18:53:59+00:00

commit 7290f59231910ccba427d441a6e8b8c6f6112448 upstream. The string allocated by kmemdup() in aa_unpack_strdup() is not freed and cause following memory leaks, free them to fix it. unreferenced object 0xffffff80c6af8a50 (size 8): comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 225, jiffies 4294894407 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00 testing. backtrace (crc 5eab668b): [<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 [<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0 [<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60 [<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c [<000000008ecde918>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_null_name+0xf8/0x3ec [<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac [<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec [<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374 [<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 unreferenced object 0xffffff80c2a29090 (size 8): comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 227, jiffies 4294894409 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00 testing. backtrace (crc 5eab668b): [<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 [<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0 [<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60 [<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c [<0000000046a45c1a>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_name+0xd0/0x3c4 [<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac [<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec [<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374 [<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack") Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: fix 'Do simple duplicate message elimination'

2024-12-14T18:53:53+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9b897132424fe76bf6c61f22f9cf12af7f1d1e6a ] Multiple profiles shared 'ent->caps', so some logs missed. Fixes: 0ed3b28ab8bf ("AppArmor: mediation of non file objects") Signed-off-by: chao liu Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common

2024-11-22T14:37:31+00:00

commit 923168a0631bc42fffd55087b337b1b6c54dcff5 upstream. Function ima_eventdigest_init() calls ima_eventdigest_init_common() with HASH_ALGO__LAST which is then used to access the array hash_digest_size[] leading to buffer overrun. Have a conditional statement to handle this. Fixes: 9fab303a2cb3 ("ima: fix violation measurement list record") Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda Tested-by: Enrico Bravi (PhD at polito.it) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.19+ Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

security/keys: fix slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission

2024-11-14T12:15:11+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4a74da044ec9ec8679e6beccc4306b936b62873f ] KASAN reports an out of bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88813c3ab618 by task stress-ng/4362 CPU: 2 PID: 4362 Comm: stress-ng Not tainted 5.10.0-14930-gafbffd6c3ede #15 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:82 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:123 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:400 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:560 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:585 __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 [inline] uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline] key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54 search_nested_keyrings+0x90e/0xe90 security/keys/keyring.c:793 This issue was also reported by syzbot. It can be reproduced by following these steps(more details [1]): 1. Obtain more than 32 inputs that have similar hashes, which ends with the pattern '0xxxxxxxe6'. 2. Reboot and add the keys obtained in step 1. The reproducer demonstrates how this issue happened: 1. In the search_nested_keyrings function, when it iterates through the slots in a node(below tag ascend_to_node), if the slot pointer is meta and node->back_pointer != NULL(it means a root), it will proceed to descend_to_node. However, there is an exception. If node is the root, and one of the slots points to a shortcut, it will be treated as a keyring. 2. Whether the ptr is keyring decided by keyring_ptr_is_keyring function. However, KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE is 0x2UL, the same as ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK. 3. When 32 keys with the similar hashes are added to the tree, the ROOT has keys with hashes that are not similar (e.g. slot 0) and it splits NODE A without using a shortcut. When NODE A is filled with keys that all hashes are xxe6, the keys are similar, NODE A will split with a shortcut. Finally, it forms the tree as shown below, where slot 6 points to a shortcut. NODE A +------>+---+ ROOT | | 0 | xxe6 +---+ | +---+ xxxx | 0 | shortcut : : xxe6 +---+ | +---+ xxe6 : : | | | xxe6 +---+ | +---+ | 6 |---+ : : xxe6 +---+ +---+ xxe6 : : | f | xxe6 +---+ +---+ xxe6 | f | +---+ 4. As mentioned above, If a slot(slot 6) of the root points to a shortcut, it may be mistakenly transferred to a key*, leading to a read out-of-bounds read. To fix this issue, one should jump to descend_to_node if the ptr is a shortcut, regardless of whether the node is root or not. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/1cfa878e-8c7b-4570-8606-21daf5e13ce7@huaweicloud.com/ [jarkko: tweaked the commit message a bit to have an appropriate closes tag.] Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Reported-by: syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000cbb7860611f61147@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin