kernel/linux.git/security, branch v5.4.198

efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs

2022-06-14T16:11:44+00:00

commit 155ca952c7ca19aa32ecfb7373a32bbc2e1ec6eb upstream. On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the following logs: [Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0 (Removed some logs from here) Call Trace: page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0 ? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80 ? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80 ? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60 kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110 __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190 bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0 exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 (Removed some logs from here) ? __efi_call+0x28/0x30 ? switch_mm+0x20/0x30 ? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0 ? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0 ? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 ? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0 ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 ---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]--- efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled! integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get mokx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000 So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use

2022-06-06T06:33:48+00:00

commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 upstream. KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is triggered. Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism (although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking any action. For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen. CVE: CVE-2022-21499 Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Fix incorrect type in assignment of ipv6 port for audit

2022-04-15T12:18:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit a5cd1ab7ab679d252a6d2f483eee7d45ebf2040c ] Remove inappropriate use of ntohs() and assign the port value directly. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

selinux: use correct type for context length

2022-04-15T12:18:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit b97df7c098c531010e445da88d02b7bf7bf59ef6 ] security_sid_to_context() expects a pointer to an u32 as the address where to store the length of the computed context. Reported by sparse: security/selinux/xfrm.c:359:39: warning: incorrect type in arg 4 (different signedness) security/selinux/xfrm.c:359:39: expected unsigned int [usertype] *scontext_len security/selinux/xfrm.c:359:39: got int * Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche [PM: wrapped commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param

2022-04-15T12:18:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit ecff30575b5ad0eda149aadad247b7f75411fd47 ] The usual LSM hook "bail on fail" scheme doesn't work for cases where a security module may return an error code indicating that it does not recognize an input. In this particular case Smack sees a mount option that it recognizes, and returns 0. A call to a BPF hook follows, which returns -ENOPARAM, which confuses the caller because Smack has processed its data. The SELinux hook incorrectly returns 1 on success. There was a time when this was correct, however the current expectation is that it return 0 on success. This is repaired. Reported-by: syzbot+d1e3b1d92d25abf97943@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

TOMOYO: fix __setup handlers return values

2022-04-15T12:18:13+00:00

[ Upstream commit 39844b7e3084baecef52d1498b5fa81afa2cefa9 ] __setup() handlers should return 1 if the parameter is handled. Returning 0 causes the entire string to be added to init's environment strings (limited to 32 strings), unnecessarily polluting it. Using the documented strings "TOMOYO_loader=string1" and "TOMOYO_trigger=string2" causes an Unknown parameter message: Unknown kernel command line parameters "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 TOMOYO_loader=string1 \ TOMOYO_trigger=string2", will be passed to user space. and these strings are added to init's environment string space: Run /sbin/init as init process with arguments: /sbin/init with environment: HOME=/ TERM=linux BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 TOMOYO_loader=string1 TOMOYO_trigger=string2 With this change, these __setup handlers act as expected, and init's environment is not polluted with these strings. Fixes: 0e4ae0e0dec63 ("TOMOYO: Make several options configurable.") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Cc: James Morris Cc: Kentaro Takeda Cc: tomoyo-dev-en@lists.osdn.me Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: fix length validation in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()

2022-04-15T12:17:58+00:00

commit c51abd96837f600d8fd940b6ab8e2da578575504 upstream. In many cases, keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() is validating the user buffer lengths against the wrong algorithm properties. Fix it to check against the correct properties. Probably this wasn't noticed before because for all asymmetric keys of the "public_key" subtype, max_data_size == max_sig_size == max_enc_size == max_dec_size. However, this isn't necessarily true for the "asym_tpm" subtype (it should be, but it's not strictly validated). Of course, future key types could have different values as well. Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: Do not print policy rule with inactive LSM labels

2022-02-16T11:52:47+00:00

commit 89677197ae709eb1ab3646952c44f6a171c9e74c upstream. Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and rule == NULL. Fixes: 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Cc: # v5.6+ Acked-by: Christian Brauner [zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: Allow template selection with ima_template[_fmt]= after ima_hash=

2022-02-16T11:52:47+00:00

commit bb8e52e4906f148c2faf6656b5106cf7233e9301 upstream. Commit c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template variable to avoid multiple template selection. Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored. Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash= are not ignored. Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called. Reported-by: Guo Zihua Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: Remove ima_policy file before directory

2022-02-16T11:52:47+00:00

commit f7333b9572d0559e00352a926c92f29f061b4569 upstream. The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Cc: Acked-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman