<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v4.19.302</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.302</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.302'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2023-12-08T07:43:26+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file</title>
<updated>2023-12-08T07:43:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-18T18:47:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=904f9c14654d3f326ae4c99a842fa5bae3e89a0d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:904f9c14654d3f326ae4c99a842fa5bae3e89a0d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 ]

Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.

Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata.  Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient.  In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel &lt;rrangel@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings</title>
<updated>2023-12-08T07:43:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-05T11:15:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=04e3ec9328b6cbdacc4391b328b2bb6c9e535158'/>
<id>urn:sha1:04e3ec9328b6cbdacc4391b328b2bb6c9e535158</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e044374a8a0a99e46f4e6d6751d3042b6d9cc12e ]

It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it
measures files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to
annotate the iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to
IMA + overlayfs, same as overlayfs annotates the inode mutex.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b42fe626038981fb7bfa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: Record transmuting in smk_transmuted</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T19:44:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-29T01:51:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3307dd6c104e83a2f9d4a703ae06c8a8d9c11467'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3307dd6c104e83a2f9d4a703ae06c8a8d9c11467</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2c085f3a8f23c9b444e8b99d93c15d7ce870fc4e upstream.

smack_dentry_create_files_as() determines whether transmuting should occur
based on the label of the parent directory the new inode will be added to,
and not the label of the directory where it is created.

This helps for example to do transmuting on overlayfs, since the latter
first creates the inode in the working directory, and then moves it to the
correct destination.

However, despite smack_dentry_create_files_as() provides the correct label,
smack_inode_init_security() does not know from passed information whether
or not transmuting occurred. Without this information,
smack_inode_init_security() cannot set SMK_INODE_CHANGED in smk_flags,
which will result in the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr not being set in
smack_d_instantiate().

Thus, add the smk_transmuted field to the task_smack structure, and set it
in smack_dentry_create_files_as() to smk_task if transmuting occurred. If
smk_task is equal to smk_transmuted in smack_inode_init_security(), act as
if transmuting was successful but without taking the label from the parent
directory (the inode label was already set correctly from the current
credentials in smack_inode_alloc_security()).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[4.19: adjusted for the lack of helper functions]
Fixes: d6d80cb57be4 ("Smack: Base support for overlayfs")
Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata &lt;kamatam@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: Retrieve transmuting information in smack_inode_getsecurity()</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T19:44:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-29T01:51:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=24416f2ac0604b1db19d956ffd07d0040c920de4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:24416f2ac0604b1db19d956ffd07d0040c920de4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3a3d8fce31a49363cc31880dce5e3b0617c9c38b upstream.

Enhance smack_inode_getsecurity() to retrieve the value for
SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the inode security blob, similarly to SMACK64.

This helps to display accurate values in the situation where the security
labels come from mount options and not from xattrs.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[4.19: adjusted for the lack of helper functions]
Fixes: d6d80cb57be4 ("Smack: Base support for overlayfs")
Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata &lt;kamatam@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack:- Use overlay inode label in smack_inode_copy_up()</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T19:44:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vishal Goel</name>
<email>vishal.goel@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-29T01:51:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=db01c2bf6b934c26ef204b087e776b21285edacd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:db01c2bf6b934c26ef204b087e776b21285edacd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 387ef964460f14fe1c1ea29aba70e22731ea7cf7 upstream.

Currently in "smack_inode_copy_up()" function, process label is
changed with the label on parent inode. Due to which,
process is assigned directory label and whatever file or directory
created by the process are also getting directory label
which is wrong label.

Changes has been done to use label of overlay inode instead
of parent inode.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel &lt;vishal.goel@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[4.19: adjusted for the lack of helper functions]
Fixes: d6d80cb57be4 ("Smack: Base support for overlayfs")
Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata &lt;kamatam@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()</title>
<updated>2023-09-23T08:48:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-06T05:52:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=825a12f03f19f4213feaac8bdd91841a11c43bd5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:825a12f03f19f4213feaac8bdd91841a11c43bd5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3ad49d37cf5759c3b8b68d02e3563f633d9c1aee ]

There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent
negatives.  I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we
may as well be safe.

Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operations</title>
<updated>2023-09-23T08:47:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Göttsche</name>
<email>cgzones@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-11T12:32:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=885330095b635b4cd4a6bb97ad628d7f009de6c7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:885330095b635b4cd4a6bb97ad628d7f009de6c7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d7f105edbb3b2be5ffa4d833abbf9b6965e9ce7 ]

If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via
`capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message.
Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author
granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them.

Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is
actually privileged.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: allow/fix UML builds</title>
<updated>2023-08-30T14:31:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-24T03:27:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=56804da32a6edef397e9d967b01e82a4b04a8e9d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:56804da32a6edef397e9d967b01e82a4b04a8e9d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 644f17412f5acf01a19af9d04a921937a2bc86c6 ]

UML supports HAS_IOMEM since 0bbadafdc49d (um: allow disabling
NO_IOMEM).

Current IMA build on UML fails on allmodconfig (with TCG_TPM=m):

ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.o: in function `ima_add_template_entry':
ima_queue.c:(.text+0x2d9): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_extend'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_init.o: in function `ima_init':
ima_init.c:(.init.text+0x43f): undefined reference to `tpm_default_chip'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.o: in function `ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm':
ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x1044): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'
ld: ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x10d8): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'

Modify the IMA Kconfig entry so that it selects TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
is set, regardless of the UML Kconfig setting.
This updates TCG_TPM from =m to =y and fixes the linker errors.

Fixes: f4a0391dfa91 ("ima: fix Kconfig dependencies")
Cc: Stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.14+
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Fabio Estevam &lt;festevam@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Anton Ivanov &lt;anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Fix possible multiple allocation in integrity_inode_get()</title>
<updated>2023-08-11T09:45:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tianjia Zhang</name>
<email>tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-01T06:42:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2a3ff660ccab67d3fde64ecd88caa73c883eb265'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2a3ff660ccab67d3fde64ecd88caa73c883eb265</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9df6a4870dc371136e90330cfbbc51464ee66993 upstream.

When integrity_inode_get() is querying and inserting the cache, there
is a conditional race in the concurrent environment.

The race condition is the result of not properly implementing
"double-checked locking". In this case, it first checks to see if the
iint cache record exists before taking the lock, but doesn't check
again after taking the integrity_iint_lock.

Fixes: bf2276d10ce5 ("ima: allocating iint improvements")
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang &lt;tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.10+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr()</title>
<updated>2023-08-11T09:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-06T10:40:36+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:63f27d49f235c34c543cab0d208c6998ebfd4cc8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b1de86d4248b273cb12c4cd7d20c08d459519f7d ]

Add the description for missing parameters of evm_inode_setattr() to
avoid the warning arising with W=n compile option.

Fixes: 817b54aa45db ("evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evm") # v3.2+
Fixes: c1632a0f1120 ("fs: port -&gt;setattr() to pass mnt_idmap") # v6.3+
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
