<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v4.19.27</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.27</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.27'/>
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<updated>2019-02-27T09:09:00+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_len</title>
<updated>2019-02-27T09:09:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-22T15:36:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8b4b1d7cc4d0d1cd9f45cf57e42def40c0b6c1f8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b4b1d7cc4d0d1cd9f45cf57e42def40c0b6c1f8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ede0fa98a900e657d1fcd80b50920efc896c1a4c upstream.

syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key-&gt;desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.

The problem is that we rely on -&gt;desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.

Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.

The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed.  If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.

    #include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
    #include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

    int main(void)
    {
            int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);

            keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
            setreuid(5000, 5000);
            request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
    }

Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly</title>
<updated>2019-02-27T09:08:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-14T16:20:01+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f812bec554d0e17e587d89d8da8e240a2d41c62d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a08bf91ce28ed3ae7b6fef35d843fef8dc8c2cd9 upstream.

If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys.  Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls.  But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).

Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.

Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: fix access permissions for keyring</title>
<updated>2019-02-12T18:47:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zoran Markovic</name>
<email>zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-17T23:25:44+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:54e71cb050546456728b3557f47738093be1b6a1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5b841bfab695e3b8ae793172a9ff7990f99cc3e2 ]

Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the
following operations:
 - KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ)
 - KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE)
 - KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE)
 - KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE)
A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in
smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between
subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise.

Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW.
Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and
MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid
contents.

Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic &lt;zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: always allow mounting submounts</title>
<updated>2019-01-26T08:32:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-16T13:12:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=34ea589d97d798e6035c3d7d9ad7b512cdcb2be4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:34ea589d97d798e6035c3d7d9ad7b512cdcb2be4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2cbdcb882f97a45f7475c67ac6257bbc16277dfe ]

If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow
mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as
part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs
under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as
needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such
automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which
is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it
doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the
mount permission check should be skipped for them.

Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted
directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials.

In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via
vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places:
 - AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells
 - CIFS, when automounting "referrals"
 - NFS, when automounting subtrees
 - debugfs, when automounting tracefs

In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and
it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be
the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already
skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in:
 - sget_userns() in fs/super.c:
	if (!(flags &amp; (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) &amp;&amp;
	    !(type-&gt;fs_flags &amp; FS_USERNS_MOUNT) &amp;&amp;
	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
 - sget() in fs/super.c:
        /* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */
        if (!(flags &amp; (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) &amp;&amp; !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);

Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using
NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite.

Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy</title>
<updated>2019-01-22T20:40:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-09T15:55:10+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5a79e71e0bc85045606a34641170c560362d8c84</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream.

levdatum-&gt;level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it.  Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.

Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on free</title>
<updated>2019-01-22T20:40:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.morris@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-16T23:41:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a19aedf1a77c2e426c9810aece80646283cc2808'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a19aedf1a77c2e426c9810aece80646283cc2808</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream.

From: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;

Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying
to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization
that could result in this.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestry</title>
<updated>2019-01-22T20:40:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-16T18:31:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b955a2c75675102b8270fd06c6c2730913994ce7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b955a2c75675102b8270fd06c6c2730913994ce7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9474f4e7cd71a633fa1ef93b7daefd44bbdfd482 upstream.

It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which
case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check
for death first before doing the walk.

Reported-by: syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2d514487faf1 ("security: Yama LSM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: policydb - fix byte order and alignment issues</title>
<updated>2019-01-13T08:51:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-23T07:02:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b37fdd94103684869a295c0d3740ac0043c13a1e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b37fdd94103684869a295c0d3740ac0043c13a1e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5df275cd4cf51c86d49009f1397132f284ba515e upstream.

Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks.
The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy
with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by
running (on e.g. ppc64):

cat &gt;my_module.cil &lt;&lt;EOF
(type test_ibendport_t)
(roletype object_r test_ibendport_t)
(ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0))))
EOF
semodule -i my_module.cil

Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to
use a correctly aligned buffer.

Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32)
should be used instead.

Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this
patch applied.

Cc: Daniel Jurgens &lt;danielj@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Eli Cohen &lt;eli@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Doug Ledford &lt;dledford@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.13+
Fixes: a806f7a1616f ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add support for RTM_NEWCHAIN, RTM_DELCHAIN, and RTM_GETCHAIN</title>
<updated>2018-12-08T11:59:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-28T17:57:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4c202ade1e743fc21e54c441d7f790604989db07'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4c202ade1e743fc21e54c441d7f790604989db07</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 598e1a42e9626213565d3b22ea948ce78556512a upstream.

Commit 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
added new RTM_* definitions without properly updating SELinux, this
patch adds the necessary SELinux support.

While there was a BUILD_BUG_ON() in the SELinux code to protect from
exactly this case, it was bypassed in the broken commit.  In order to
hopefully prevent this from happening in the future, add additional
comments which provide some instructions on how to resolve the
BUILD_BUG_ON() failures.

Fixes: 32a4f5ecd738 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:37:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-07T16:42:58+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3962e78a9fcb881d3865eba7faf51536e062ccf8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4458bba09788e70e8fb39ad003f087cd9dfbd6ac upstream.

syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
