<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v4.19.172</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.172</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.172'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-01-19T17:22:37+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>dump_common_audit_data(): fix racy accesses to -&gt;d_name</title>
<updated>2021-01-19T17:22:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-05T19:43:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fda4bb55c45bd9fdf490c39c3e567f0cea931e54'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fda4bb55c45bd9fdf490c39c3e567f0cea931e54</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d36a1dd9f77ae1e72da48f4123ed35627848507d upstream.

We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent
dentry getting renamed right under us.  And it's possible for
old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here.

Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Remove __init annotation from ima_pcrread()</title>
<updated>2021-01-19T17:22:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-07T21:00:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=de581e41716795ce93506f3e5b0200048aa4439c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:de581e41716795ce93506f3e5b0200048aa4439c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b8c704d913b0fe490af370631a4200e26334ec0 upstream.

Commit 6cc7c266e5b4 ("ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in
ima_eventdigest_init()") added a call to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() so that
the digest can be recalculated for the boot_aggregate measurement entry if
the 'd' template field has been requested. For the 'd' field, only SHA1 and
MD5 digests are accepted.

Given that ima_eventdigest_init() does not have the __init annotation, all
functions called should not have it. This patch removes __init from
ima_pcrread().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:  6cc7c266e5b4 ("ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:26:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-26T10:34:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=709ed96f6ef2b040a0ea9274b4d67ce61a095eb3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:709ed96f6ef2b040a0ea9274b4d67ce61a095eb3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 207cdd565dfc95a0a5185263a567817b7ebf5467 upstream.

Commit a408e4a86b36b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the
original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the
existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which
is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges
to open a new one.

Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to
do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes
the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file
when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8ec0 ima: Set file-&gt;f_mode
Fixes: 2fe5d6def1672 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:25:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-03T16:49:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=87294e61dafc7be280188581191722eac8b87932'/>
<id>urn:sha1:87294e61dafc7be280188581191722eac8b87932</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 200ea5a2292dc444a818b096ae6a32ba3caa51b9 ]

A previous fix, commit 83370b31a915 ("selinux: fix error initialization
in inode_doinit_with_dentry()"), changed how failures were handled
before a SELinux policy was loaded.  Unfortunately that patch was
potentially problematic for two reasons: it set the isec-&gt;initialized
state without holding a lock, and it didn't set the inode's SELinux
label to the "default" for the particular filesystem.  The later can
be a problem if/when a later attempt to revalidate the inode fails
and SELinux reverts to the existing inode label.

This patch should restore the default inode labeling that existed
before the original fix, without affecting the LABEL_INVALID marking
such that revalidation will still be attempted in the future.

Fixes: 83370b31a915 ("selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()")
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()</title>
<updated>2020-12-30T10:25:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tianyue Ren</name>
<email>rentianyue@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-09T01:36:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=bd7223dda090c9246b290a0b901c112d6484466a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd7223dda090c9246b290a0b901c112d6484466a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 83370b31a915493231e5b9addc72e4bef69f8d31 ]

Mark the inode security label as invalid if we cannot find
a dentry so that we will retry later rather than marking it
initialized with the unlabeled SID.

Fixes: 9287aed2ad1f ("selinux: Convert isec-&gt;lock into a spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Tianyue Ren &lt;rentianyue@kylinos.cn&gt;
[PM: minor comment tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:18:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chen Zhou</name>
<email>chenzhou10@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-12T13:53:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=46977ef987a743133b2a66208464c898d7a03e3c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:46977ef987a743133b2a66208464c898d7a03e3c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c350f8bea271782e2733419bd2ab9bf4ec2051ef upstream.

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case
instead of 0 in function sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(), as done elsewhere
in this function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 409dcf31538a ("selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou &lt;chenzhou10@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Check size of security.evm before using it</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T09:23:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=05f703b07727c0eb81f487143b583d5f8561d900'/>
<id>urn:sha1:05f703b07727c0eb81f487143b583d5f8561d900</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 455b6c9112eff8d249e32ba165742085678a80a4 upstream.

This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:54:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T09:23:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c470dc530c9ee6ef4b22fed19c77e20c745564e1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c470dc530c9ee6ef4b22fed19c77e20c745564e1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60386b854008adc951c470067f90a2d85b5d520f upstream.

Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T11:14:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Averin</name>
<email>vvs@virtuozzo.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-01T07:47:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=64e0f9e159fe6b592e0fe26cfc1ce03f79d2a9db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:64e0f9e159fe6b592e0fe26cfc1ce03f79d2a9db</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8d269a8e2a8f0bca89022f4ec98de460acb90365 ]

If seq_file .next function does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.

$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats # usual output
lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees
817223 810034 7189 7189 6992 7037
1934894 1926896 7998 7998 7632 7683
1322812 1317176 5636 5636 5456 5507
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
189 bytes copied, 5,1564e-05 s, 3,7 MB/s

$# read after lseek to midle of last line
$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=180 skip=1
dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset
056 9115   &lt;&lt;&lt;&lt; end of last line
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115  &lt;&lt;&lt; whole last line once again
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
45 bytes copied, 8,7221e-05 s, 516 kB/s

$# read after lseek beyond  end of of file
$ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=1000 skip=1
dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset
1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115  &lt;&lt;&lt;&lt; generates whole last line
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
36 bytes copied, 9,0934e-05 s, 396 kB/s

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283

Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin &lt;vvs@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded</title>
<updated>2020-10-01T11:14:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonathan Lebon</name>
<email>jlebon@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-12T13:30:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1904f6dfcbbd78e6f4858945c441838367469902'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1904f6dfcbbd78e6f4858945c441838367469902</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 ]

Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the
`security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being
loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible
to have newly created files with the correct label before actually
loading the policy.

This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is
loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such
instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One
then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently
races with other processes trying to access those same files.

Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root
filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports
this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]).
One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g.
laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former,
labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter
scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when
populating the new filesystem.

This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized;
   instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be
   attempted at a later time

Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously
discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't
accepted.

[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html

Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky &lt;kamensky@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky &lt;kamensky@cisco.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon &lt;jlebon@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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