<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v4.14.196</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.196</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.196'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-08-21T07:48:11+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T07:48:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-23T15:23:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=75f8b5a67b62b40d6308f3f2998de2cfa264f212'/>
<id>urn:sha1:75f8b5a67b62b40d6308f3f2998de2cfa264f212</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 42a2df3e829f3c5562090391b33714b2e2e5ad4a ]

We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.

Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T07:48:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-23T15:22:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=12917b448aa665cfa032f37925a10ae5f43bee35'/>
<id>urn:sha1:12917b448aa665cfa032f37925a10ae5f43bee35</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a6bd4f6d9b07452b0b19842044a6c3ea384b0b88 ]

This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8d1 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in
vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule".

Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f7112e6c9abf ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T07:48:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-08T20:15:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a963ddc8fffada154a87ca407fdfc850618ba49b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a963ddc8fffada154a87ca407fdfc850618ba49b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit beb4ee6770a89646659e6a2178538d2b13e2654e upstream.

smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with
no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple
tasks can share the same credentials structure.

Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify
the task's credentials.

Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self":

	#include &lt;fcntl.h&gt;
	#include &lt;pthread.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

	static void *thrproc(void *arg)
	{
		int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY);
		for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3);
	}

	int main()
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&amp;t, NULL, thrproc, NULL);
		thrproc(NULL);
	}

Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptraceme check</title>
<updated>2020-06-30T19:37:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-29T01:49:26+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ecf8e185a29ab1d71ad5a4f22ddc84bdce6cb5ed</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ca3fde5214e1d24f78269b337d3f22afd6bf445e ]

begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.

Until now, the ptraceme access check (which runs with tasklist_lock held)
violated this rule.

Fixes: b2d09ae449ced ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;rong.a.chen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix double free</title>
<updated>2020-06-25T13:41:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
<email>trix@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-10T21:57:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=808db35a0acf5381691a96439c86f05a2c72ebe8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:808db35a0acf5381691a96439c86f05a2c72ebe8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream.

Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors.

security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
                        kfree(bnames[i]);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(bvalues);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables
and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks</title>
<updated>2020-06-25T13:41:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-06T01:12:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8906aa8e570562f289b8e42657121225f15f7453'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8906aa8e570562f289b8e42657121225f15f7453</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dd2569fbb053719f7df7ef8fdbb45cf47156a701 ]

Fix two issues with introspecting the task mode.

1. If a task is attached to a unconfined profile that is not the
   ns-&gt;unconfined profile then. Mode the mode is always reported
   as -

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         1287 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (-)                           1892 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

   instead of the correct value of (unconfined) as shown below

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         2483 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (unconfined)                  3591 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

2. if a task is confined by a stack of profiles that are unconfined
   the output of label mode is again the incorrect value of (-) like
   above, instead of (unconfined). This is because the visibile
   profile count increment is skipped by the special casing of
   unconfined.

Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()</title>
<updated>2020-06-20T08:25:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-14T08:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8464622583fc9728bffeaa7f0b21f57d39e56308'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8464622583fc9728bffeaa7f0b21f57d39e56308</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f upstream.

Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().

Fixes: 50b977481fce9 ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules</title>
<updated>2020-06-20T08:25:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-03T15:08:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1ff06c639f0a77331dce112c337a1223c26ab8d2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ff06c639f0a77331dce112c337a1223c26ab8d2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 067a436b1b0aafa593344fddd711a755a58afb3b upstream.

This patch prevents the following oops:

[   10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000
[...]
[   10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80
[...]
[   10.798576] Call Trace:
[   10.798993]  ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0
[   10.799753]  ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   10.800484]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0
[   10.801592]  ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0
[   10.802313]  ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0
[   10.803167]  ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70
[   10.804004]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80
[   10.804800]  do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0

It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and
ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy()
but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning
the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This
wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end
of ima_init_policy().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Fixes: 07f6a79415d7d ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation</title>
<updated>2020-06-20T08:25:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzysztof Struczynski</name>
<email>krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T07:30:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=340b97cc943f41057e14757328636f8e7ba3ebca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:340b97cc943f41057e14757328636f8e7ba3ebca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1129d31b55d509f15e72dc68e4b5c3a4d7b4da8d upstream.

Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte
is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable.

Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to
using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus
calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots.
Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf</title>
<updated>2020-06-20T08:25:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-09T23:35:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=61f8b8965c11df8f0eedce895f8eeb6eb7c1538f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61f8b8965c11df8f0eedce895f8eeb6eb7c1538f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 84e99e58e8d1e26f04c097f4266e431a33987f36 upstream.

Add barrier to soob. Return -EOVERFLOW if the buffer
is exceeded.

Suggested-by: Hillf Danton &lt;hdanton@sina.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+bfdd4a2f07be52351350@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
