<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security, branch v4.11.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.11.6</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.11.6'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-06-14T13:07:38+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffers</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T13:07:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-08T13:48:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7e4c3a6da3ad22260de198b3d13d31c12e635bbc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e4c3a6da3ad22260de198b3d13d31c12e635bbc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9ff56ac352446f55141aaef1553cee662b2e310 upstream.

Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt
stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped.  Fix this for
the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the
encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the
decryption padding.

Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y:
	keyctl new_session
	keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
	keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s)
	datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
	keyctl unlink $keyid
	keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s)
	datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
	[ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] &amp;&amp; echo "Success!"

Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T13:07:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-08T13:48:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8a28f221a057bed79c90b83efa7db3160de0f069'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a28f221a057bed79c90b83efa7db3160de0f069</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 63a0b0509e700717a59f049ec6e4e04e903c7fe2 upstream.

key_update() freed the key_preparsed_payload even if it was not
initialized first.  This would cause a crash if userspace called
keyctl_update() on a key with type like "asymmetric" that has a
-&gt;preparse() method but not an -&gt;update() method.  Possibly it could
even be triggered for other key types by racing with keyctl_setperm() to
make the KEY_NEED_WRITE check fail (the permission was already checked,
so normally it wouldn't fail there).

Reproducer with key type "asymmetric", given a valid cert.der:

keyctl new_session
keyid=$(keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s &lt; cert.der)
keyctl setperm $keyid 0x3f000000
keyctl update $keyid data

[  150.686666] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
[  150.687601] IP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[  150.688139] PGD 38a3d067
[  150.688141] PUD 3b3de067
[  150.688447] PMD 0
[  150.688745]
[  150.689160] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  150.689455] Modules linked in:
[  150.689769] CPU: 1 PID: 2478 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-xfstests-00187-ga9f6b6b8cd2f #742
[  150.690916] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
[  150.692199] task: ffff88003b30c480 task.stack: ffffc90000350000
[  150.692952] RIP: 0010:asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[  150.693556] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000353e58 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  150.694142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000004
[  150.694845] RDX: ffffffff81ee3920 RSI: ffff88003d4b0700 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  150.697569] RBP: ffffc90000353e60 R08: ffff88003d5d2140 R09: 0000000000000000
[  150.702483] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[  150.707393] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: ffff880038a4d2d8 R15: 000000000040411f
[  150.709720] FS:  00007fcbcee35700(0000) GS:ffff88003fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  150.711504] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  150.712733] CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 0000000039eab000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[  150.714487] Call Trace:
[  150.714975]  asymmetric_key_free_preparse+0x2f/0x40
[  150.715907]  key_update+0xf7/0x140
[  150.716560]  ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[  150.717319]  keyctl_update_key+0xb0/0xe0
[  150.718066]  SyS_keyctl+0x109/0x130
[  150.718663]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
[  150.719440] RIP: 0033:0x7fcbce75ff19
[  150.719926] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5d167088 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
[  150.720918] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000404d80 RCX: 00007fcbce75ff19
[  150.721874] RDX: 00007ffd5d16785e RSI: 000000002866cd36 RDI: 0000000000000002
[  150.722827] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000000002866cd36 R09: 00007ffd5d16785e
[  150.723781] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000404d80
[  150.724650] R13: 00007ffd5d16784d R14: 00007ffd5d167238 R15: 000000000040411f
[  150.725447] Code: 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 74 23 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb &lt;48&gt; 8b 3f e8 06 21 c5 ff 48 8b 7b 08 e8 fd 20 c5 ff 48 89 df e8
[  150.727489] RIP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 RSP: ffffc90000353e58
[  150.728117] CR2: 0000000000000001
[  150.728430] ---[ end trace f7f8fe1da2d5ae8d ]---

Fixes: 4d8c0250b841 ("KEYS: Call -&gt;free_preparse() even after -&gt;preparse() returns an error")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length</title>
<updated>2017-06-14T13:07:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-08T13:48:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5def69023aec63f6d2facb39fde6f4cdf9c12710'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5def69023aec63f6d2facb39fde6f4cdf9c12710</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5649645d725c73df4302428ee4e02c869248b4c5 upstream.

sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
-&gt;preparse(), -&gt;instantiate(), and/or -&gt;update() methods.  Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present.  Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE</title>
<updated>2017-05-25T13:46:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Glöckner</name>
<email>dg@emlix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T14:05:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=efa8cd1e2f0ba01ae9477ccf4abe9fd9f7f1d0a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:efa8cd1e2f0ba01ae9477ccf4abe9fd9f7f1d0a7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ac202e978e18f045006d75bd549612620c6ec3a upstream.

Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset
the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created,
is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed,
verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written
yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file
already existed.

With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to
open testfile:

$ rm -f testfile
$ ( echo test &gt;&amp;3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3&gt;testfile

A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital
signature demanded by the policy.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner &lt;dg@emlix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings</title>
<updated>2017-04-18T14:31:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-18T14:31:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.

Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:

	#include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		for (;;)
			keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
	}

Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.

Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to prevent user access</title>
<updated>2017-04-18T14:31:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-18T14:31:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c1644fe041ebaf6519f6809146a77c3ead9193af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c1644fe041ebaf6519f6809146a77c3ead9193af</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes CVE-2017-6951.

Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it
doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel
needs.  Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash.

Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected
up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user().

Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older
ones, certainly those prior to:

	commit c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
	Author: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
	Date:   Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100
	KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse

which went in before 3.18-rc1.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyrings</title>
<updated>2017-04-18T14:31:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-18T14:31:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ee8f844e3c5a73b999edf733df1c529d6503ec2f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ee8f844e3c5a73b999edf733df1c529d6503ec2f</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes CVE-2016-9604.

Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing.  However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING.  Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.

This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added.  This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.

This also affects kexec and IMA.

This can be tested by (as root):

	keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
	keyctl add user a a @s
	keyctl list @s

which on my test box gives me:

	2 keys in keyring:
	180010936: ---lswrv     0     0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
	801382539: --alswrv     0     0 user: a


Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2017-03-03T18:16:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-03T18:16:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1827adb11ad26b2290dc9fe2aaf54976b2439865'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1827adb11ad26b2290dc9fe2aaf54976b2439865</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar:
 "The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the
  &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to
  have a cleaner header structure.

  After these changes the new &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;'s typical preprocessed
  size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K
  lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs.

  Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I
  eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream
  SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus
  all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew.

  I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs,
  and did a bisectability test at a number of random points.

  I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some
  build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly
  limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries
  available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations"

* 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits)
  sched/headers: Clean up &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove the &lt;linux/topology.h&gt; include from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the &lt;linux/wait.h&gt; include from &lt;linux/hrtimer.h&gt;
  sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the &lt;linux/pm.h&gt; header inclusion from &lt;asm/apic.h&gt;
  sched/headers, timers: Remove the &lt;linux/sysctl.h&gt; include from &lt;linux/timer.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/magic.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched/task_stack.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched/init.h&gt;
  sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack()
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/rculist.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/signal.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/rwsem.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched/hotplug.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched/debug.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched/nohz.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched/stat.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove the &lt;linux/gfp.h&gt; include from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  sched/headers: Remove &lt;linux/rtmutex.h&gt; from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to remove the &lt;linux/magic.h&gt; include from &lt;linux/sched/task_stack.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-05T15:03:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=50d34394cee68dd12c5e01fff073d1167700bfce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50d34394cee68dd12c5e01fff073d1167700bfce</id>
<content type='text'>
Update files that depend on the magic.h inclusion.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to use &lt;linux/rcuupdate.h&gt; instead of &lt;linux/rculist.h&gt; in &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-04T00:27:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b2d091031075ac9a1598e3cc3a29c28f02e64c0d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b2d091031075ac9a1598e3cc3a29c28f02e64c0d</id>
<content type='text'>
We don't actually need the full rculist.h header in sched.h anymore,
we will be able to include the smaller rcupdate.h header instead.

But first update code that relied on the implicit header inclusion.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
