<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/tomoyo, branch v6.11.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.11.8</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.11.8'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2024-10-10T10:04:05+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname does not exist</title>
<updated>2024-10-10T10:04:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-25T13:30:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e798895feebdbaaba70210372144a693a8d214ca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e798895feebdbaaba70210372144a693a8d214ca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ada1986d07976d60bed5017aa38b7f7cf27883f7 upstream.

Alfred Agrell found that TOMOYO cannot handle execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH)
inside chroot environment where /dev and /proc are not mounted, for
commit 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call") missed
that TOMOYO tries to canonicalize argv[0] when the filename fed to the
executed program as argv[0] is supplied using potentially nonexistent
pathname.

Since "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;" already lost symlink information used for obtaining
that &lt;fd&gt;, it is too late to reconstruct symlink's pathname. Although
&lt;filename&gt; part of "/dev/fd/&lt;fd&gt;/&lt;filename&gt;" might not be canonicalized,
TOMOYO cannot use tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() when /dev or /proc is not
mounted. Therefore, fallback to tomoyo_realpath_from_path() when
tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() failed.

Reported-by: Alfred Agrell &lt;blubban@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1082001
Fixes: 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19+
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: update project links</title>
<updated>2024-06-03T13:43:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-03T13:43:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c6144a21169fe7d0d70f1a0dae6f6301e5918d30'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6144a21169fe7d0d70f1a0dae6f6301e5918d30</id>
<content type='text'>
TOMOYO project has moved to SourceForge.net .

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kbuild: use $(src) instead of $(srctree)/$(src) for source directory</title>
<updated>2024-05-09T19:34:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-04-27T14:55:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b1992c3772e69a6fd0e3fc81cd4d2820c8b6eca0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1992c3772e69a6fd0e3fc81cd4d2820c8b6eca0</id>
<content type='text'>
Kbuild conventionally uses $(obj)/ for generated files, and $(src)/ for
checked-in source files. It is merely a convention without any functional
difference. In fact, $(obj) and $(src) are exactly the same, as defined
in scripts/Makefile.build:

    src := $(obj)

When the kernel is built in a separate output directory, $(src) does
not accurately reflect the source directory location. While Kbuild
resolves this discrepancy by specifying VPATH=$(srctree) to search for
source files, it does not cover all cases. For example, when adding a
header search path for local headers, -I$(srctree)/$(src) is typically
passed to the compiler.

This introduces inconsistency between upstream and downstream Makefiles
because $(src) is used instead of $(srctree)/$(src) for the latter.

To address this inconsistency, this commit changes the semantics of
$(src) so that it always points to the directory in the source tree.

Going forward, the variables used in Makefiles will have the following
meanings:

  $(obj)     - directory in the object tree
  $(src)     - directory in the source tree  (changed by this commit)
  $(objtree) - the top of the kernel object tree
  $(srctree) - the top of the kernel source tree

Consequently, $(srctree)/$(src) in upstream Makefiles need to be replaced
with $(src).

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier &lt;nicolas@fjasle.eu&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: fix UAF write bug in tomoyo_write_control()</title>
<updated>2024-03-01T19:14:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-01T13:04:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2f03fc340cac9ea1dc63cbf8c93dd2eb0f227815'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f03fc340cac9ea1dc63cbf8c93dd2eb0f227815</id>
<content type='text'>
Since tomoyo_write_control() updates head-&gt;write_buf when write()
of long lines is requested, we need to fetch head-&gt;write_buf after
head-&gt;io_sem is held.  Otherwise, concurrent write() requests can
cause use-after-free-write and double-free problems.

Reported-by: Sam Sun &lt;samsun1006219@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNDspuGxYx5kym8Lvp--D36CMDUErg4rxfWFJuPbbji8g@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: bd03a3e4c9a9 ("TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support.")
Cc:  &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # Linux 3.1+
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: Check __FMODE_EXEC instead of in_execve for LSMs</title>
<updated>2024-01-24T19:38:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-24T19:22:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4759ff71f23e1a9cba001009abab68cde6dc327a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4759ff71f23e1a9cba001009abab68cde6dc327a</id>
<content type='text'>
After commit 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before
doing anything else"), current-&gt;in_execve was no longer in sync with the
open(). This broke AppArmor and TOMOYO which depend on this flag to
distinguish "open" operations from being "exec" operations.

Instead of moving around in_execve, switch to using __FMODE_EXEC, which
is where the "is this an exec?" intent is stored. Note that TOMOYO still
uses in_execve around cred handling.

Reported-by: Kevin Locke &lt;kevin@kevinlocke.name&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZbE4qn9_h14OqADK@kevinlocke.name
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Fixes: 978ffcbf00d8 ("execve: open the executable file before doing anything else")
Cc: Josh Triplett &lt;josh@joshtriplett.org&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Eric Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc:  &lt;linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc:  &lt;linux-mm@kvack.org&gt;
Cc:  &lt;apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc:  &lt;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook</title>
<updated>2023-12-24T20:48:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alfred Piccioni</name>
<email>alpic@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-19T09:09:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003</id>
<content type='text'>
Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).

However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.

This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".

This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.

Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni &lt;alpic@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static</title>
<updated>2023-11-13T03:54:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-10T17:09:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b1a867eeb8ab5e097178728b01cc504c6806acca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1a867eeb8ab5e097178728b01cc504c6806acca</id>
<content type='text'>
As the kernel test robot helpfully reminded us, all of the lsm_id
instances defined inside the various LSMs should be marked as static.
The one exception is Landlock which uses its lsm_id variable across
multiple source files with an extern declaration in a header file.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: Identify modules by more than name</title>
<updated>2023-11-13T03:54:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-12T20:56:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f3b8788cde61b02f1e6c202f8fac4360e6adbafc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f3b8788cde61b02f1e6c202f8fac4360e6adbafc</id>
<content type='text'>
Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module.  Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure.  Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().

The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.

The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.

LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.

Cc: linux-security-module &lt;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun &lt;mic@digikod.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committed_creds()</title>
<updated>2023-09-14T19:27:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Khadija Kamran</name>
<email>kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-23T08:16:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a721f7b8c3548e943e514a957f2a37f4763b9888'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a721f7b8c3548e943e514a957f2a37f4763b9888</id>
<content type='text'>
Three LSMs register the implementations for the 'bprm_committed_creds()'
hook: AppArmor, SELinux and tomoyo. Looking at the function
implementations we may observe that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing.

Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committed_creds() as
'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook.

Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran &lt;kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: remove unused function declaration</title>
<updated>2023-08-13T13:07:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>GONG, Ruiqi</name>
<email>gongruiqi1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-11T13:32:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=254a8ed6aab39c869d99da97f25035ed15756337'/>
<id>urn:sha1:254a8ed6aab39c869d99da97f25035ed15756337</id>
<content type='text'>
The last usage of tomoyo_check_flags() has been removed by commit
57c2590fb7fd ("TOMOYO: Update profile structure."). Clean up its
residual declaration.

Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi &lt;gongruiqi1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
