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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/selinux, branch v6.12.91</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.12.91</id>
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<updated>2026-05-14T13:29:20+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/disable</title>
<updated>2026-05-14T13:29:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-05T12:49:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7719fda876b6a9c8c4bcbdd5ae054eb4086363bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7719fda876b6a9c8c4bcbdd5ae054eb4086363bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 19cfa0099024bb9cd40f6d950caa7f47ff8e77f6 upstream.

Commit f22f9aaf6c3d ("selinux: remove the runtime disable
functionality") removed the underlying SELinux runtime disable
functionality but left everything else intact and started logging an
error message to warn any residual users.

Prune it to just log an error message once and to return count
(i.e. all bytes written successfully) to avoid breaking
userspace. This also fixes a local DoS from logspam.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: shrink critical section in sel_write_load()</title>
<updated>2026-05-14T13:29:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-30T18:36:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6509d775d86e9ac4d9f831c7fb05c011f6a4c11d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6509d775d86e9ac4d9f831c7fb05c011f6a4c11d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 868f31e4061eca8c3cd607d79d954d5e54f204aa upstream.

Currently sel_write_load() takes the policy mutex earlier than
necessary. Move the taking of the mutex later. This avoids
holding it unnecessarily across the vmalloc() and copy_from_user()
of the policy data.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it</title>
<updated>2026-05-14T13:29:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Windsor</name>
<email>dwindsor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-26T23:23:49+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3bdbb95cf2c0786d68cd54d375f2e361b7fd667e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e5a8eed7821e7a43a31b4c1b3675a91be6bc6f6 upstream.

Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL -&gt;name, silently
dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Windsor &lt;dwindsor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: change security_compute_sid to return the ssid or tsid on match</title>
<updated>2025-07-10T14:05:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-10T19:48:27+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:acf9ab15ec978188b8ebc1f14b0c281d11d52ed9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fde46f60f6c5138ee422087addbc5bf5b4968bf1 ]

If the end result of a security_compute_sid() computation matches the
ssid or tsid, return that SID rather than looking it up again. This
avoids the problem of multiple initial SIDs that map to the same
context.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Guido Trentalancia &lt;guido@trentalancia.com&gt;
Fixes: ae254858ce07 ("selinux: introduce an initial SID for early boot processes")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Guido Trentalancia &lt;guido@trentalancia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix selinux_xfrm_alloc_user() to set correct ctx_len</title>
<updated>2025-06-27T10:11:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-13T19:37:05+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:870dd7e7840cd9cd7147cfb67034d01c338f8292</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 86c8db86af43f52f682e53a0f2f0828683be1e52 upstream.

We should count the terminating NUL byte as part of the ctx_len.
Otherwise, UBSAN logs a warning:
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in security/selinux/xfrm.c:99:14
  index 60 is out of range for type 'char [*]'

The allocation itself is correct so there is no actual out of bounds
indexing, just a warning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ6tA5+LxsGfOJokzdPeRomBHjKLBVR6zbrg+_w3ZZbM3A@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: ignore unknown extended permissions</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:33:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thiébaud Weksteen</name>
<email>tweek@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-05T01:09:19+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:efefe36c03a73bb81c0720ce397659a5051b73fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 900f83cf376bdaf798b6f5dcb2eae0c822e908b6 upstream.

When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead
of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be
added without interfering with older kernels.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen &lt;tweek@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next</title>
<updated>2024-09-24T21:54:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-24T21:54:26+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fa8380a06bd0523e51f826520aac1beb8c585521</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull bpf 'struct fd' updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
 "This includes struct_fd BPF changes from Al and Andrii"

* tag 'bpf-next-6.12-struct-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next:
  bpf: convert bpf_token_create() to CLASS(fd, ...)
  security,bpf: constify struct path in bpf_token_create() LSM hook
  bpf: more trivial fdget() conversions
  bpf: trivial conversions for fdget()
  bpf: switch maps to CLASS(fd, ...)
  bpf: factor out fetching bpf_map from FD and adding it to used_maps list
  bpf: switch fdget_raw() uses to CLASS(fd_raw, ...)
  bpf: convert __bpf_prog_get() to CLASS(fd, ...)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240923' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-09-24T17:18:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-24T17:18:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5c36498d06b9b00393c2f35edbf16b28194375fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5c36498d06b9b00393c2f35edbf16b28194375fa</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull LSM fixes from Paul Moore:

 - Add a missing security_mmap_file() check to the remap_file_pages()
   syscall

 - Properly reference the SELinux and Smack LSM blobs in the
   security_watch_key() LSM hook

 - Fix a random IPE selftest crash caused by a missing list terminator
   in the test

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240923' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  ipe: Add missing terminator to list of unit tests
  selinux,smack: properly reference the LSM blob in security_watch_key()
  mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux,smack: properly reference the LSM blob in security_watch_key()</title>
<updated>2024-09-19T20:37:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-19T15:37:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8a23c9e1ba4642b60420e8caa75859883a509c24'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8a23c9e1ba4642b60420e8caa75859883a509c24</id>
<content type='text'>
Unfortunately when we migrated the lifecycle management of the key LSM
blob to the LSM framework we forgot to convert the security_watch_key()
callbacks for SELinux and Smack.  This patch corrects this by making use
of the selinux_key() and smack_key() helper functions respectively.

This patch also removes some input checking in the Smack callback as it
is no longer needed.

Fixes: 5f8d28f6d7d5 ("lsm: infrastructure management of the key security blob")
Reported-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+044fdf24e96093584232@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2024-09-16T16:19:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-16T16:19:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a430d95c5efa2b545d26a094eb5f624e36732af0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a430d95c5efa2b545d26a094eb5f624e36732af0</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:

 - Move the LSM framework to static calls

   This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static
   calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is
   due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the
   static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future
   date.

 - Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM

   This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is
   plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain
   from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind
   IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict
   execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected
   storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that
   IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and
   fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags
   from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious
   maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been
   widely posted over several years.

   Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development
   over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE
   maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll
   start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys,
   etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you
   directly during the next merge window.

 - Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework

   Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to
   various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security"
   or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by
   individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself.

   Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs,
   minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency
   across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs.
   Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has
   been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical
   standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux
   provides a XFRM LSM implementation.

 - Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN

   The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of
   problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the
   associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could
   be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of
   these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the
   same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only
   does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code
   block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition.

 - Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook

   Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook
   associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when
   it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS
   folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get
   creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state.
   Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that
   is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually
   released due to RCU.

   Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an
   action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so
   we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is
   called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free
   callback.

 - Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns

   The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success,
   negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small
   handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused
   confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to
   properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to
   convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern.

 - Various cleanups and improvements

   A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the
   IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some
   minor style fixups.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits)
  security: Update file_set_fowner documentation
  fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
  lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function
  lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
  ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c
  lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
  lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time
  kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
  init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls.
  MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer
  documentation: add IPE documentation
  ipe: kunit test for parser
  scripts: add boot policy generation program
  ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
  fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
  lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
  ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
  dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
  ipe: add permissive toggle
  ...
</content>
</entry>
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