kernel/linux.git/security/selinux, branch v4.4.214

selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()

2019-08-06T16:28:28+00:00

commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream. Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in the error path. Cc: Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts

2019-05-16T17:45:03+00:00

commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream. In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The 'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS. While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic. Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy

2019-01-26T08:42:51+00:00

commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream. levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure sens_destroy handles that case correctly. Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches

2018-09-19T20:48:56+00:00

commit 476accbe2f6ef69caeebe99f52a286e12ac35aee upstream. There is a strange __GFP_NOMEMALLOC usage pattern in SELinux, specifically GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC which doesn't make much sense. GFP_ATOMIC on its own allows to access memory reserves while __GFP_NOMEMALLOC dictates we cannot use memory reserves. Replace this with the much more sane GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC code as we can tolerate memory allocation failures in that code. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko Acked-by: Mel Gorman Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity

2018-06-06T14:46:21+00:00

commit efe3de79e0b52ca281ef6691480c8c68c82a4657 upstream. Call trace: [] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428 [] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124 [] print_address_description+0x68/0x258 [] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0 [] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70 [] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0 [] memcpy+0x34/0x68 [] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160 [] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120 [] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8 [] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0 [] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr() on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string, it would result in a panic. To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context instead of the length passed by the userspace process. Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: do not check open permission on sockets

2018-04-13T17:50:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit ccb544781d34afdb73a9a73ae53035d824d193bf ] open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel (COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to the same permission bit in socket vs file classes. open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when operating on a socket. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: Remove redundant check for unknown labeling behavior

2018-04-08T09:51:58+00:00

commit 270e8573145a26de924e2dc644596332d400445b upstream. The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors' is not needed and will not be emitted [-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration] Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [natechancellor: inode_doinit_with_dentry still present] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: Remove unnecessary check of array base in selinux_set_mapping()

2018-04-08T09:51:57+00:00

commit 342e91578eb6909529bc7095964cd44b9c057c4e upstream. 'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array of u32 values. This fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array 'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion] while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) { Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Cc: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: check for address length in selinux_socket_bind()

2018-03-22T08:23:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit e2f586bd83177d22072b275edd4b8b872daba924 ] KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of uninitialized memory in selinux_socket_bind(): ================================================================== BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory inter: 0 CPU: 3 PID: 1074 Comm: packet2 Tainted: G B 4.8.0-rc6+ #1916 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 ffff8800882ffb08 ffffffff825759c8 ffff8800882ffa48 ffffffff818bf551 ffffffff85bab870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85bab550 0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000bb0009bb 0000000000000002 Call Trace: [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51 [] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1008 [] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424 [] selinux_socket_bind+0xf41/0x1080 security/selinux/hooks.c:4288 [] security_socket_bind+0x1ec/0x240 security/security.c:1240 [] SYSC_bind+0x358/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1366 [] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356 [] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292 [] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:? chained origin: 00000000ba6009bb [] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67 [< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322 [< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337 [] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:530 [] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380 [] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356 [] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356 [] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292 [] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:? origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000b8c00900) ================================================================== (the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists upstream) , when I run the following program as root: ======================================================= #include #include #include int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { struct sockaddr addr; int size = 0; if (argc > 1) { size = atoi(argv[1]); } memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); int fd = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP); bind(fd, &addr, size); return 0; } ======================================================= (for different values of |size| other error reports are printed). This happens because bind() unconditionally copies |size| bytes of |addr| to the kernel, leaving the rest uninitialized. Then security_socket_bind() reads the IP address bytes, including the uninitialized ones, to determine the port, or e.g. pass them further to sel_netnode_find(), which uses them to calculate a hash. Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko Acked-by: Eric Dumazet [PM: fixed some whitespace damage] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loaded

2018-02-25T10:03:36+00:00

commit 4b14752ec4e0d87126e636384cf37c8dd9df157c upstream. We can't do anything reasonable in security_bounded_transition() if we don't have a policy loaded, and in fact we could run into problems with some of the code inside expecting a policy. Fix these problems like we do many others in security/selinux/ss/services.c by checking to see if the policy is loaded (ss_initialized) and returning quickly if it isn't. Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Reviewed-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman