<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/selinux/ss, branch linux-4.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.4.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.4.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-06-30T00:07:55+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix double free</title>
<updated>2020-06-30T00:07:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
<email>trix@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-10T21:57:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=13f03f2bb77717ba7fcab132284b1e9e0fb847fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:13f03f2bb77717ba7fcab132284b1e9e0fb847fa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream.

Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors.

security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
                        kfree(bnames[i]);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(bvalues);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables
and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()</title>
<updated>2019-08-06T16:28:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-25T10:52:43+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b65cc16ce2a77793aab81b6fc29f6caf4ee3728a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream.

Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy</title>
<updated>2019-01-26T08:42:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-09T15:55:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9ef38b24344ebb0befdff8d4d427f6581fc24d32'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ef38b24344ebb0befdff8d4d427f6581fc24d32</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream.

levdatum-&gt;level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it.  Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.

Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity</title>
<updated>2018-06-06T14:46:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sachin Grover</name>
<email>sgrover@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-25T08:31:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ca100fbc48b4e61fb0e6c3a2c81ad4fc4c185bae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca100fbc48b4e61fb0e6c3a2c81ad4fc4c185bae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit efe3de79e0b52ca281ef6691480c8c68c82a4657 upstream.

Call trace:
 [&lt;ffffff9203a8d7a8&gt;] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428
 [&lt;ffffff9203a8dbf8&gt;] show_stack+0x28/0x38
 [&lt;ffffff920409bfb8&gt;] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124
 [&lt;ffffff9203d187e8&gt;] print_address_description+0x68/0x258
 [&lt;ffffff9203d18c00&gt;] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0
 [&lt;ffffff9203d1927c&gt;] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70
 [&lt;ffffff9203d1776c&gt;] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0
 [&lt;ffffff9203d17cdc&gt;] memcpy+0x34/0x68
 [&lt;ffffff9203d75348&gt;] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160
 [&lt;ffffff9203d75490&gt;] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120
 [&lt;ffffff9203d75d68&gt;] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8
 [&lt;ffffff9203d76fb4&gt;] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0
 [&lt;ffffff9203a83f70&gt;] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28

If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an
embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr()
on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string,
it would result in a panic.

To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context
instead of the length passed by the userspace process.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover &lt;sgrover@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Remove unnecessary check of array base in selinux_set_mapping()</title>
<updated>2018-04-08T09:51:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthias Kaehlcke</name>
<email>mka@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-16T22:26:52+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:76fa23e7de139b47f4eb34c3d7338890ac671a3b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 342e91578eb6909529bc7095964cd44b9c057c4e upstream.

'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array
of u32 values.

This fixes the following warning when building with clang:

security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array
'p_in-&gt;perms' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
                while (p_in-&gt;perms &amp;&amp; p_in-&gt;perms[k]) {

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loaded</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-05T22:17:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=002924ab7b023d16d3291d5ae600c49cebed1c59'/>
<id>urn:sha1:002924ab7b023d16d3291d5ae600c49cebed1c59</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4b14752ec4e0d87126e636384cf37c8dd9df157c upstream.

We can't do anything reasonable in security_bounded_transition() if we
don't have a policy loaded, and in fact we could run into problems
with some of the code inside expecting a policy.  Fix these problems
like we do many others in security/selinux/ss/services.c by checking
to see if the policy is loaded (ss_initialized) and returning quickly
if it isn't.

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core()</title>
<updated>2018-02-25T10:03:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-28T23:51:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d6233121d5ed6c7ff250b146666b73f29d5c0a1c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d6233121d5ed6c7ff250b146666b73f29d5c0a1c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ef28df55ac27e1e5cd122e19fa311d886d47a756 upstream.

The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in
security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the
SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without
NUL terminators into the strcmp() function.

We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux
policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and
explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end.  The patch extends this
protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context
copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core().

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-By: William Roberts &lt;william.c.roberts@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix bug in conditional rules handling</title>
<updated>2015-11-24T18:44:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-23T21:07:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f3bef67992e8698897b584616535803887c4a73e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f3bef67992e8698897b584616535803887c4a73e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the
processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended
permissions (xperms) structure.  Access checks from userspace using
/sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that
interface does not presently expose extended permission information.
As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace
access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by
conditional rules in the policy.  Fix the bug by only skipping
computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire
conditional rules processing.

Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville &lt;bigon@debian.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: fixed long lines in patch description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: use sprintf return value</title>
<updated>2015-10-21T21:44:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-21T21:44:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9529c7886c0741847eeb85cf2b0e0730eebe4fa5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9529c7886c0741847eeb85cf2b0e0730eebe4fa5</id>
<content type='text'>
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so
we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()</title>
<updated>2015-10-21T21:44:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-21T21:44:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=21b76f199e25d32b0a7ed3833ca9204898262c24'/>
<id>urn:sha1:21b76f199e25d32b0a7ed3833ca9204898262c24</id>
<content type='text'>
This is much simpler.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
