<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/selinux/include, branch v5.10.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.5</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.10.5'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-09-15T18:36:28+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot</title>
<updated>2020-09-15T18:36:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lakshmi Ramasubramanian</name>
<email>nramas@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-14T17:31:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8861d0af642c646c8e148ce34c294bdef6f32f6a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8861d0af642c646c8e148ce34c294bdef6f32f6a</id>
<content type='text'>
checkreqprot data member in selinux_state struct is accessed directly by
SELinux functions to get and set. This could cause unexpected read or
write access to this data member due to compiler optimizations and/or
compiler's reordering of access to this field.

Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot data member in
selinux_state struct. These helper functions use READ_ONCE and
WRITE_ONCE macros to ensure atomic read or write of memory for
this data member.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: access policycaps with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE</title>
<updated>2020-09-11T14:08:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-10T14:28:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e8ba53d0023a76ba0f50e6ee3e6288c5442f9d33'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e8ba53d0023a76ba0f50e6ee3e6288c5442f9d33</id>
<content type='text'>
Use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE for all accesses to the
selinux_state.policycaps booleans to prevent compiler
mischief.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()</title>
<updated>2020-08-31T14:00:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-27T16:27:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=66ccd2560affc6e653ef7372ea36fb825743d186'/>
<id>urn:sha1:66ccd2560affc6e653ef7372ea36fb825743d186</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove the security_policydb_len() calls from sel_open_policy() and
instead update the inode size from the size returned from
security_read_policy().

Since after this change security_policydb_len() is only called from
security_load_policy(), remove it entirely and just open-code it there.

Also, since security_load_policy() is always called with policy_mutex
held, make it dereference the policy pointer directly and drop the
unnecessary RCU locking.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: move policy mutex to selinux_state, use in lockdep checks</title>
<updated>2020-08-27T13:52:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-26T17:28:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9ff9abc4c6be27ff27b6df625501a46711730520'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9ff9abc4c6be27ff27b6df625501a46711730520</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the mutex used to synchronize policy changes (reloads and setting
of booleans) from selinux_fs_info to selinux_state and use it in
lockdep checks for rcu_dereference_protected() calls in the security
server functions.  This makes the dependency on the mutex explicit
in the code rather than relying on comments.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU</title>
<updated>2020-08-25T12:34:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-19T19:45:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1b8b31a2e6120b7b2bc99137c0ba1ae3e45dbd7d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b8b31a2e6120b7b2bc99137c0ba1ae3e45dbd7d</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert the policy read-write lock to RCU.  This is significantly
simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate the policy data
structures and refactor the policy load and boolean setting logic.
Move the latest_granting sequence number into the selinux_policy
structure so that it can be updated atomically with the policy.
Since removing the policy rwlock and moving latest_granting reduces
the selinux_ss structure to nothing more than a wrapper around the
selinux_policy pointer, get rid of the extra layer of indirection.

At present this change merely passes a hardcoded 1 to
rcu_dereference_check() in the cases where we know we do not need to
take rcu_read_lock(), with the preceding comment explaining why.
Alternatively we could pass fsi-&gt;mutex down from selinuxfs and
apply a lockdep check on it instead.

Based in part on earlier attempts to convert the policy rwlock
to RCU by Kaigai Kohei [1] and by Peter Enderborg [2].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs</title>
<updated>2020-08-18T00:50:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-07T13:29:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=02a52c5c8c3b8cbad0f12009cde9f36dbefb6972'/>
<id>urn:sha1:02a52c5c8c3b8cbad0f12009cde9f36dbefb6972</id>
<content type='text'>
With the refactoring of the policy load logic in the security
server from the previous change, it is now possible to split out
the committing of the new policy from security_load_policy() and
perform it only after successful updating of selinuxfs.  Change
security_load_policy() to return the newly populated policy
data structures to the caller, export selinux_policy_commit()
for external callers, and introduce selinux_policy_cancel() to
provide a way to cancel the policy load in the event of an error
during updating of the selinuxfs directory tree.  Further, rework
the interfaces used by selinuxfs to get information from the policy
when creating the new directory tree to take and act upon the
new policy data structure rather than the current/active policy.
Update selinuxfs to use these updated and new interfaces.  While
we are here, stop re-creating the policy_capabilities directory
on each policy load since it does not depend on the policy, and
stop trying to create the booleans and classes directories during
the initial creation of selinuxfs since no information is available
until first policy load.

After this change, a failure while updating the booleans and class
directories will cause the entire policy load to be canceled, leaving
the original policy intact, and policy load notifications to userspace
will only happen after a successful completion of updating those
directories.  This does not (yet) provide full atomicity with respect
to the updating of the directory trees themselves.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scripts/selinux,selinux: update mdp to enable policy capabilities</title>
<updated>2020-08-18T00:42:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-06T18:34:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=339949be25863ac15e24659c2ab4b01185e1234a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:339949be25863ac15e24659c2ab4b01185e1234a</id>
<content type='text'>
Presently mdp does not enable any SELinux policy capabilities
in the dummy policy it generates. Thus, policies derived from
it will by default lack various features commonly used in modern
policies such as open permission, extended socket classes, network
peer controls, etc.  Split the policy capability definitions out into
their own headers so that we can include them into mdp without pulling in
other kernel headers and extend mdp generate policycap statements for the
policy capabilities known to the kernel.  Policy authors may wish to
selectively remove some of these from the generated policy.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE</title>
<updated>2020-07-19T18:14:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Adrian Reber</name>
<email>areber@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-19T10:04:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=124ea650d3072b005457faed69909221c2905a1f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:124ea650d3072b005457faed69909221c2905a1f</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
checkpoint/restore for non-root users.

Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has
been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a
process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.

The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID
of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system
call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have
increased due to the following use cases:
* Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a
  resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as
  non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and
  restore long running jobs.
* Container migration as non-root
* We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating
  CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These
  checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

We have seen the following workarounds:
* Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU:
  See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
* Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid.
  Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use
  with clone3, and is thus prone to races.
  See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached:
  This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s
  See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel
* Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide
  a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited
  use in typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is
  typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for
  hardening purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts
  (due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new
  PID namespaces limited as certain applications need access to /proc
  matching their PID namespace.

The introduced capability allows to:
* Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable
  for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
* Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
  CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for
  recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as
  deleted files, or memfd files.

See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3().

Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber &lt;areber@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot &lt;Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-2-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next</title>
<updated>2020-06-03T23:27:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-03T23:27:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cb8e59cc87201af93dfbb6c3dccc8fcad72a09c2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cb8e59cc87201af93dfbb6c3dccc8fcad72a09c2</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:

 1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
    Augusto von Dentz.

 2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.

 3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.

 4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
    device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.

 5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
    defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.

 6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.

 7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.

 8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.

 9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
    Horatiu Vultur.

10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.

11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
    Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.

12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
    Carvalho Chehab.

13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
    from Doug Berger.

14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
    Dmitry Yakunin.

15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
    userspace, from Johannes Berg.

16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.

17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
    a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
    Jesper Dangaard Brouer.

18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.

19) Correct the return type of the -&gt;ndo_start_xmit() method in several
    drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
    'int'. From Yunjian Wang.

20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
    Rempel.

21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.

22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
    Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
    facility.

23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.

24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
    Dangaard Brouer.

25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.

26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.

27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.

28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.

29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.

30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
    eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
  selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
  net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
  Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
  Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
  vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
  hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
  selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
  tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
  bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
  s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
  s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
  selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
  selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
  bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
  bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
  bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
  sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
  crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
  Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
  Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2020-06-03T00:16:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-03T00:16:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f41030a20b38552a2da3b3f6bc9e7a78637d6c23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f41030a20b38552a2da3b3f6bc9e7a78637d6c23</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "The highlights:

   - A number of improvements to various SELinux internal data
     structures to help improve performance. We move the role
     transitions into a hash table. In the content structure we shift
     from hashing the content string (aka SELinux label) to the
     structure itself, when it is valid. This last change not only
     offers a speedup, but it helps us simplify the code some as well.

   - Add a new SELinux policy version which allows for a more space
     efficient way of storing the filename transitions in the binary
     policy. Given the default Fedora SELinux policy with the unconfined
     module enabled, this change drops the policy size from ~7.6MB to
     ~3.3MB. The kernel policy load time dropped as well.

   - Some fixes to the error handling code in the policy parser to
     properly return error codes when things go wrong"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: netlabel: Remove unused inline function
  selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically
  selinux: fix return value on error in policydb_read()
  selinux: simplify range_write()
  selinux: fix error return code in policydb_read()
  selinux: don't produce incorrect filename_trans_count
  selinux: implement new format of filename transitions
  selinux: move context hashing under sidtab
  selinux: hash context structure directly
  selinux: store role transitions in a hash table
  selinux: drop unnecessary smp_load_acquire() call
  selinux: fix warning Comparison to bool
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
