<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/selinux/include, branch v4.9.134</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.134</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.9.134'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2016-08-19T00:01:15+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: drop SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX</title>
<updated>2016-08-19T00:01:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>William Roberts</name>
<email>william.c.roberts@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-15T19:42:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=348a0db9e69e4c214bf5d7677f17cb99cdc47db0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:348a0db9e69e4c214bf5d7677f17cb99cdc47db0</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove the SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX Kconfig option

Per: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/wiki/Kernel-Todo

This was only needed on Fedora 3 and 4 and just causes issues now,
so drop it.

The MAX and MIN should just be whatever the kernel can support.

Signed-off-by: William Roberts &lt;william.c.roberts@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netlabel: Pass a family parameter to netlbl_skbuff_err().</title>
<updated>2016-06-27T19:06:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Huw Davies</name>
<email>huw@codeweavers.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-27T19:06:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a04e71f631fa3d2fd2aa0404c11484739d1e9073'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a04e71f631fa3d2fd2aa0404c11484739d1e9073</id>
<content type='text'>
This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate
labelling engine.  CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO
when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a
CALIPSO error handler.

Signed-off-by: Huw Davies &lt;huw@codeweavers.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks</title>
<updated>2016-04-26T19:41:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-08T17:52:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f</id>
<content type='text'>
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated
with the init user namespace versus capability checks against
a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining
and using separate security classes for the latter.

This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces
for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also
exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.

Suggested-by: Dan Walsh &lt;dwalsh@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Change bool variable name to index.</title>
<updated>2016-04-14T15:24:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Prarit Bhargava</name>
<email>prarit@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-14T14:40:57+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0fd71a620be8648486a126fccadf9f7c2a818676</id>
<content type='text'>
security_get_bool_value(int bool) argument "bool" conflicts with
in-kernel macros such as BUILD_BUG().  This patch changes this to
index which isn't a type.

Cc: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Andrew Perepechko &lt;anserper@ya.ru&gt;
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: wrapped description for checkpatch.pl, use "selinux:..." as subj]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: restrict kernel module loading</title>
<updated>2016-04-05T20:11:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Vander Stoep</name>
<email>jeffv@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-05T20:06:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=61d612ea731e57dc510472fb746b55cdc017f371'/>
<id>urn:sha1:61d612ea731e57dc510472fb746b55cdc017f371</id>
<content type='text'>
Utilize existing kernel_read_file hook on kernel module load.
Add module_load permission to the system class.

Enforces restrictions on kernel module origin when calling the
finit_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has
permission module_load for the target type.
Example for finit_module:

allow foo bar_file:system module_load;

Similarly restrictions are enforced on kernel module loading when
calling the init_module syscall. The hook checks that source
type has permission module_load with itself as the target object
because the kernel module is sourced from the calling process.
Example for init_module:

allow foo foo:system module_load;

Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
[PM: fixed return value of selinux_kernel_read_file()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZED</title>
<updated>2016-04-05T20:10:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-28T19:16:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4b57d6bcd94034e2eb168bdec2474e3b2b848e44'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4b57d6bcd94034e2eb168bdec2474e3b2b848e44</id>
<content type='text'>
There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if
the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED.  Also adjust the
revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not
INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: export validatetrans decisions</title>
<updated>2015-12-24T16:09:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Perepechko</name>
<email>anserper@ya.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-24T16:09:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=f9df6458218f4fe8a1c3bf0af89c1fa9eaf0db39'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f9df6458218f4fe8a1c3bf0af89c1fa9eaf0db39</id>
<content type='text'>
Make validatetrans decisions available through selinuxfs.
"/validatetrans" is added to selinuxfs for this purpose.
This functionality is needed by file system servers
implemented in userspace or kernelspace without the VFS
layer.

Writing "$oldcontext $newcontext $tclass $taskcontext"
to /validatetrans is expected to return 0 if the transition
is allowed and -EPERM otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Perepechko &lt;anserper@ya.ru&gt;
CC: andrew.perepechko@seagate.com
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels</title>
<updated>2015-12-24T16:09:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andreas Gruenbacher</name>
<email>agruenba@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-24T16:09:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6f3be9f562e3027c77bc4482ccf2cea8600a7f74'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f3be9f562e3027c77bc4482ccf2cea8600a7f74</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached
information becomes invalid.

Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes
invalid.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher &lt;agruenba@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid</title>
<updated>2015-10-21T21:44:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rasmus Villemoes</name>
<email>linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-21T21:44:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=44be2f65d979291ffb2a47112449507ffe1f9726'/>
<id>urn:sha1:44be2f65d979291ffb2a47112449507ffe1f9726</id>
<content type='text'>
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len
parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or
not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the
expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test
for scontext_len being zero hint at that).

Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen()
call and fix all callers.

Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next</title>
<updated>2015-08-15T03:29:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-08-15T03:29:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3e5f206c00f73f535c914eedc8b91f424c5a14ab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e5f206c00f73f535c914eedc8b91f424c5a14ab</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
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