kernel/linux.git/security/selinux/include, branch v4.14.205

selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp

2019-05-04T07:15:17+00:00

commit dfbd199a7cfe3e3cd8531e1353cdbd7175bfbc5e upstream. When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the following error happens: In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18: ./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New address family defined, please update secclass_map. #error New address family defined, please update secclass_map. ^~~~~ make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107: scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2 make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2 make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in classmap.h to have PF_MAX. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

2017-11-02T10:10:55+00:00

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

2017-09-12T20:21:00+00:00

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three having any substantive changes. These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file explosion in the diffstat). Everything passes the selinux-testsuite" [ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ] * tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: constify nf_hook_ops selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs lsm_audit: update my email address selinux: update my email address MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS credits: update Paul Moore's info selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.

selinux: update my email address

2017-08-17T19:32:55+00:00

Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists. MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions

2017-08-02T20:36:04+00:00

As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services, it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=, SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=, PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=, MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5) man page. The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for that service provides the same protections in all cases. commit 7b0d0b40cd78 ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However, defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants (e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file, then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...). SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections and least privilege. We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs in security. Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid) between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of its children. With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream. SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate. NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use with care. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

xfrm: remove flow cache

2017-07-18T18:13:41+00:00

After rcu conversions performance degradation in forward tests isn't that noticeable anymore. See next patch for some numbers. A followup patcg could then also remove genid from the policies as we do not cache bundles anymore. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs

2017-05-23T16:28:12+00:00

It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to store PKey SIDs. This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept originally developed by James Morris and Paul Moore (see security/selinux/netif.c and security/selinux/netport.c for more information) Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens Acked-by: Doug Ledford Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: Add IB Port SMP access vector

2017-05-23T16:28:02+00:00

Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the given name and port. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Doug Ledford Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: Implement Infiniband PKey "Access" access vector

2017-05-23T16:27:50+00:00

Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Doug Ledford Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: Allocate and free infiniband security hooks

2017-05-23T16:27:41+00:00

Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object security structures. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Doug Ledford Signed-off-by: Paul Moore