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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/selinux/include/classmap.h, branch v4.4.214</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.214</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.214'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2015-06-04T20:22:17+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Remove unused permission definitions</title>
<updated>2015-06-04T20:22:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-04T20:22:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=42a9699a9fa179c0054ea3cf5ad3cc67104a6162'/>
<id>urn:sha1:42a9699a9fa179c0054ea3cf5ad3cc67104a6162</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux.
Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline
versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0.  Some of them
were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks
that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and
fully removed in Linux 2.6.30.

Permissions never used in mainline Linux:
file swapon
filesystem transition
tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom }
node enforce_dest
unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom }

Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30:
socket { recv_msg send_msg }
node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: update netlink socket classes</title>
<updated>2015-06-04T20:22:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-04T20:22:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6c6d2e9bde1c1c87a7ead806f8f5e2181d41a652'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6c6d2e9bde1c1c87a7ead806f8f5e2181d41a652</id>
<content type='text'>
Update the set of SELinux netlink socket class definitions to match
the set of netlink protocols implemented by the kernel.  The
ip_queue implementation for the NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed in d16cf20e2f2f13411eece7f7fb72c17d141c4a84, so we can remove
the corresponding class definitions as this is dead code.  Add new
classes for NETLINK_ISCSI, NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP, NETLINK_CONNECTOR,
NETLINK_NETFILTER, NETLINK_GENERIC, NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT, NETLINK_RDMA,
and NETLINK_CRYPTO so that we can distinguish among sockets created
for each of these protocols.  This change does not define the finer-grained
nlsmsg_read/write permissions or map specific nlmsg_type values to those
permissions in the SELinux nlmsgtab; if finer-grained control of these
sockets is desired/required, that can be added as a follow-on change.
We do not define a SELinux class for NETLINK_ECRYPTFS as the implementation
was removed in 624ae5284516870657505103ada531c64dba2a9a.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.</title>
<updated>2015-01-25T17:17:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-21T15:54:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=79af73079d753b2d04e46f7445716d3b5f914dbd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79af73079d753b2d04e46f7445716d3b5f914dbd</id>
<content type='text'>
Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
controls over binder IPC.  The security hooks include support for
controlling what process can become the binder context manager
(binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).

These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.

(Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
to add inline documentation for the hooks).

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich &lt;nnk@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep &lt;jeffv@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: add netlink audit protocol bind to check capabilities on multicast join</title>
<updated>2014-04-23T01:42:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-23T01:31:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3a101b8de0d39403b2c7e5c23fd0b005668acf48'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3a101b8de0d39403b2c7e5c23fd0b005668acf48</id>
<content type='text'>
Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace
process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add the "attach_queue" permission to the "tun_socket" class</title>
<updated>2013-01-14T23:16:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>pmoore@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-01-14T07:12:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6f96c142f77c96a34ac377a3616ee7abcd77fb4d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f96c142f77c96a34ac377a3616ee7abcd77fb4d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a new permission to align with the new TUN multiqueue support,
"tun_socket:attach_queue".

The corresponding SELinux reference policy patch is show below:

 diff --git a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors
 index 28802c5..a0664a1 100644
 --- a/policy/flask/access_vectors
 +++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors
 @@ -827,6 +827,9 @@ class kernel_service

  class tun_socket
  inherits socket
 +{
 +       attach_queue
 +}

  class x_pointer
  inherits x_device

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jason Wang &lt;jasowang@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2012-07-18T20:42:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-18T20:42:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e2f3b78557ff11f58d836e016900c3210f4fb1c1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e2f3b78557ff11f58d836e016900c3210f4fb1c1</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull SELinux regression fixes from James Morris.

Andrew Morton has a box that hit that open perms problem.

I also renamed the "epollwakeup" selinux name for the new capability to
be "block_suspend", to match the rename done by commit d9914cf66181
("PM: Rename CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP to CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND").

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  SELinux: do not check open perms if they are not known to policy
  SELinux: include definition of new capabilities
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: include definition of new capabilities</title>
<updated>2012-07-16T01:40:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-06T18:13:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=64919e60915c5151b3dd4c8d2d9237a115ca990c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:64919e60915c5151b3dd4c8d2d9237a115ca990c</id>
<content type='text'>
The kernel has added CAP_WAKE_ALARM and CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP.  We need to
define these in SELinux so they can be mediated by policy.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class</title>
<updated>2011-03-03T20:19:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harry Ciao</name>
<email>qingtao.cao@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-02T05:46:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4bc6c2d5d8386800fde23a8e78cd4f04a0ade0ad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4bc6c2d5d8386800fde23a8e78cd4f04a0ade0ad</id>
<content type='text'>
The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based
on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined
in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by
"socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".

Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao &lt;qingtao.cao@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions</title>
<updated>2011-02-25T20:40:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-25T20:39:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=47ac19ea429aee561f66e9cd05b908e8ffbc498a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:47ac19ea429aee561f66e9cd05b908e8ffbc498a</id>
<content type='text'>
These permissions are not used and can be dropped in the kernel
definitions.

Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Define CAP_SYSLOG</title>
<updated>2010-11-28T21:35:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Serge E. Hallyn</name>
<email>serge@hallyn.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-25T17:11:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=ce6ada35bdf710d16582cc4869c26722547e6f11'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ce6ada35bdf710d16582cc4869c26722547e6f11</id>
<content type='text'>
Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  Split
this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away
from a container through the capability bounding set.

With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with
the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c).

Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm
Changelog: nov 22 2010:
	. port to new kernel
	. add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-By: Kees Cook &lt;kees.cook@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito" &lt;cpebenito@tresys.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
