kernel/linux.git/security/selinux/include/classmap.h, branch v3.18.15

audit: add netlink audit protocol bind to check capabilities on multicast join

2014-04-23T01:42:27+00:00

Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

selinux: add the "attach_queue" permission to the "tun_socket" class

2013-01-14T23:16:59+00:00

Add a new permission to align with the new TUN multiqueue support, "tun_socket:attach_queue". The corresponding SELinux reference policy patch is show below: diff --git a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors index 28802c5..a0664a1 100644 --- a/policy/flask/access_vectors +++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors @@ -827,6 +827,9 @@ class kernel_service class tun_socket inherits socket +{ + attach_queue +} class x_pointer inherits x_device Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Eric Paris Tested-by: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2012-07-18T20:42:44+00:00

Pull SELinux regression fixes from James Morris. Andrew Morton has a box that hit that open perms problem. I also renamed the "epollwakeup" selinux name for the new capability to be "block_suspend", to match the rename done by commit d9914cf66181 ("PM: Rename CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP to CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND"). * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: SELinux: do not check open perms if they are not known to policy SELinux: include definition of new capabilities

SELinux: include definition of new capabilities

2012-07-16T01:40:31+00:00

The kernel has added CAP_WAKE_ALARM and CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP. We need to define these in SELinux so they can be mediated by policy. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris

SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class

2011-03-03T20:19:43+00:00

The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket". Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley

selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions

2011-02-25T20:40:00+00:00

These permissions are not used and can be dropped in the kernel definitions. Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley

security: Define CAP_SYSLOG

2010-11-28T21:35:12+00:00

Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away from a container through the capability bounding set. With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c). Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm Changelog: nov 22 2010: . port to new kernel . add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan Acked-By: Kees Cook Cc: James Morris Cc: Michael Kerrisk Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito" Cc: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris

SELinux: allow userspace to read policy back out of the kernel

2010-10-20T23:12:58+00:00

There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file /selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris

SELinux: Move execmod to the common perms

2010-08-02T05:35:09+00:00

execmod "could" show up on non regular files and non chr files. The current implementation would actually make these checks against non-existant bits since the code assumes the execmod permission is same for all file types. To make this line up for chr files we had to define execute_no_trans and entrypoint permissions. These permissions are unreachable and only existed to to make FILE__EXECMOD and CHR_FILE__EXECMOD the same. This patch drops those needless perms as well. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris

selinux: place open in the common file perms

2010-08-02T05:35:08+00:00

kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open in the common file perms. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris