<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/selinux/hooks.c, branch linux-4.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.4.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.4.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2022-01-05T11:30:27+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: initialize proto variable in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()</title>
<updated>2022-01-05T11:30:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
<email>trix@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-24T15:07:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7c573f3229096fed04472fb26c904863b7e61a79'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7c573f3229096fed04472fb26c904863b7e61a79</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 732bc2ff080c447f8524f40c970c481f5da6eed3 upstream.

Clang static analysis reports this warning

hooks.c:5765:6: warning: 4th function call argument is an uninitialized
                value
        if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec-&gt;sid, skb, &amp;ad, proto))
            ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

selinux_parse_skb() can return ok without setting proto.  The later call
to selinux_xfrm_postroute_last() does an early check of proto and can
return ok if the garbage proto value matches.  So initialize proto.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eef9b41622f2 ("selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
[PM: typo/spelling and checkpatch.pl description fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T10:58:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Todd Kjos</name>
<email>tkjos@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-12T16:56:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=31cbf806d22e9751fd5a8135113fde2987f3bdf6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:31cbf806d22e9751fd5a8135113fde2987f3bdf6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe upstream.

Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed
'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc
to represent the source and target of transactions.
The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook
implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions
which can result in an incorrect security context being used.

Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass
it to the selinux subsystem.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables)
Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.")
Suggested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos &lt;tkjos@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()</title>
<updated>2020-05-05T17:13:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T13:59:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=92b5848736395f4ea56738895acdd09cdc2a93da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:92b5848736395f4ea56738895acdd09cdc2a93da</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream.

Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
SELinux access control.  Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
the first message in the sk_buff.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-21T20:18:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=08794d181ff6843cf22720197668c304c8b781f2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:08794d181ff6843cf22720197668c304c8b781f2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream.

In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling
files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The
'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when
the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS.

While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit
and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new
SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic.

Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: do not check open permission on sockets</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T17:50:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-12T16:41:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=60c26da547da81cfe9ea1e7d65d514cc89deb82e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:60c26da547da81cfe9ea1e7d65d514cc89deb82e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ccb544781d34afdb73a9a73ae53035d824d193bf ]

open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel
(COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of
an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will
generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to
the same permission bit in socket vs file classes.

open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless
and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and
can thus produce these odd/misleading denials.  Omit the open check when
operating on a socket.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Remove redundant check for unknown labeling behavior</title>
<updated>2018-04-08T09:51:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthias Kaehlcke</name>
<email>mka@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-19T17:09:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=eca9e0aff522167860b8ef1aee4cc416d7b13dbd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eca9e0aff522167860b8ef1aee4cc416d7b13dbd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 270e8573145a26de924e2dc644596332d400445b upstream.

The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is
loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when
building with clang:

security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors'
    is not needed and will not be emitted
    [-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]

Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke &lt;mka@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
[natechancellor: inode_doinit_with_dentry still present]
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: check for address length in selinux_socket_bind()</title>
<updated>2018-03-22T08:23:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Potapenko</name>
<email>glider@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-06T18:46:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=89aadbc66e41aee339979f5b86c8bd6354c6ceac'/>
<id>urn:sha1:89aadbc66e41aee339979f5b86c8bd6354c6ceac</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e2f586bd83177d22072b275edd4b8b872daba924 ]

KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in selinux_socket_bind():

==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
inter: 0
CPU: 3 PID: 1074 Comm: packet2 Tainted: G    B           4.8.0-rc6+ #1916
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 0000000000000000 ffff8800882ffb08 ffffffff825759c8 ffff8800882ffa48
 ffffffff818bf551 ffffffff85bab870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85bab550
 0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000bb0009bb 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff825759c8&gt;] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
 [&lt;ffffffff818bdee6&gt;] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1008
 [&lt;ffffffff818bf0fb&gt;] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
 [&lt;ffffffff822dae71&gt;] selinux_socket_bind+0xf41/0x1080 security/selinux/hooks.c:4288
 [&lt;ffffffff8229357c&gt;] security_socket_bind+0x1ec/0x240 security/security.c:1240
 [&lt;ffffffff84265d98&gt;] SYSC_bind+0x358/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1366
 [&lt;ffffffff84265a22&gt;] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
 [&lt;ffffffff81005678&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
 [&lt;ffffffff8518217c&gt;] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000ba6009bb
 [&lt;ffffffff810bb7a7&gt;] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337
 [&lt;ffffffff818bd2b8&gt;] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:530
 [&lt;ffffffff818bf033&gt;] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
 [&lt;ffffffff84265b69&gt;] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
 [&lt;ffffffff84265a22&gt;] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
 [&lt;ffffffff81005678&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
 [&lt;ffffffff8518217c&gt;] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000b8c00900)
==================================================================

(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists upstream)

, when I run the following program as root:

=======================================================
  #include &lt;string.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;
  #include &lt;netinet/in.h&gt;

  int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    struct sockaddr addr;
    int size = 0;
    if (argc &gt; 1) {
      size = atoi(argv[1]);
    }
    memset(&amp;addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
    int fd = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP);
    bind(fd, &amp;addr, size);
    return 0;
  }
=======================================================

(for different values of |size| other error reports are printed).

This happens because bind() unconditionally copies |size| bytes of
|addr| to the kernel, leaving the rest uninitialized. Then
security_socket_bind() reads the IP address bytes, including the
uninitialized ones, to determine the port, or e.g. pass them further to
sel_netnode_find(), which uses them to calculate a hash.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
[PM: fixed some whitespace damage]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: general protection fault in sock_has_perm</title>
<updated>2018-02-03T16:04:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Salyzyn</name>
<email>salyzyn@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-01T15:37:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d489d1e03ca2a1dc39028726974658714cbb6aca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d489d1e03ca2a1dc39028726974658714cbb6aca</id>
<content type='text'>
In the absence of commit a4298e4522d6 ("net: add SOCK_RCU_FREE socket
flag") and all the associated infrastructure changes to take advantage
of a RCU grace period before freeing, there is a heightened
possibility that a security check is performed while an ill-timed
setsockopt call races in from user space.  It then is prudent to null
check sk_security, and if the case, reject the permissions.

Because of the nature of this problem, hard to duplicate, no clear
path, this patch is a simplified band-aid for stable trees lacking the
infrastructure for the series of commits leading up to providing a
suitable RCU grace period.  This adjustment is orthogonal to
infrastructure improvements that may nullify the needed check, but
could be added as good code hygiene in all trees.

general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 14233 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.4.112-g5f6325b #28
task: ffff8801d1095f00 task.stack: ffff8800b5950000
RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff81b69b7e&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff81b69b7e&gt;] sock_has_perm+0x1fe/0x3e0 security/selinux/hooks.c:4069
RSP: 0018:ffff8800b5957ce0  EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff10016b2af9f RCX: ffffffff81b69b51
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: ffff8800b5957de0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 1ffff10016b2af68 R12: ffff8800b5957db8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800b7259f40 R15: 00000000000000d7
FS:  00007f72f5ae2700(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000a2fa38 CR3: 00000001d7980000 CR4: 0000000000160670
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Stack:
 ffffffff81b69a1f ffff8800b5957d58 00008000b5957d30 0000000041b58ab3
 ffffffff83fc82f2 ffffffff81b69980 0000000000000246 ffff8801d1096770
 ffff8801d3165668 ffffffff8157844b ffff8801d1095f00
 ffff880000000001
Call Trace:
[&lt;ffffffff81b6a19d&gt;] selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x4d/0x80 security/selinux/hooks.c:4338
[&lt;ffffffff81b4873d&gt;] security_socket_setsockopt+0x7d/0xb0 security/security.c:1257
[&lt;ffffffff82df1ac8&gt;] SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1757 [inline]
[&lt;ffffffff82df1ac8&gt;] SyS_setsockopt+0xe8/0x250 net/socket.c:1746
[&lt;ffffffff83776499&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x92
Code: c2 42 9b b6 81 be 01 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 a0 cb 2b 84 e8
f7 2f 6d ff 49 8d 7d 10 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89
fa 48 c1 ea 03 &lt;0f&gt; b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 83 01 00
00 41 8b 75 10 31
RIP  [&lt;ffffffff81b69b7e&gt;] sock_has_perm+0x1fe/0x3e0 security/selinux/hooks.c:4069
RSP &lt;ffff8800b5957ce0&gt;
---[ end trace 7b5aaf788fef6174 ]---

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn &lt;salyzyn@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr</title>
<updated>2017-02-14T23:22:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-31T16:54:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e72c13d93e9ed2b131ceb9a290ab056ce0dd41ab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e72c13d93e9ed2b131ceb9a290ab056ce0dd41ab</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125 upstream.

SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute.  However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()").  Fix the off-by-one error.

Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 &gt; /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" &gt; /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate

Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.

There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.

UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug.  This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net</title>
<updated>2015-11-11T02:11:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-11T02:11:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2df4ee78d042ee3d17cbebd51e31b300286549dc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2df4ee78d042ee3d17cbebd51e31b300286549dc</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet.

 2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK
    packets, most spots got this ok but some were not.  Whilst covering
    the remaining cases, create a helper to do this.  From Eric Dumazet.

 3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code,
    from Rasmus Villemoes.

 4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich.

 5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard.

 6) Fix race on dst-&gt;flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet.

 7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver.  From Arnd
    Bergmann.

 8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong.

 9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak.

10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6
    counter state.  From Sabrina Dubroca.

11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from
    Francesco Ruggeri.

12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes,
    from Jarod Wilson.

13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other
    userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
  Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled"
  bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS
  qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE
  net: fix a race in dst_release()
  net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free.
  net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes
  macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read()
  mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency
  net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev
  net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA
  drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode
  netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper
  net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()
  bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT
  dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put"
  bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure
  ...
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
