<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/keys, branch v6.1.87</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.87</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v6.1.87'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2024-01-25T23:27:52+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"</title>
<updated>2024-01-25T23:27:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-24T19:21:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=17062a768c2e9f693c9278360bcb9fdb5f19d24c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:17062a768c2e9f693c9278360bcb9fdb5f19d24c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ed4b563100230ea68821a2b25a3d9f25388a3e6 upstream.

This reverts commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882.

New encrypted keys are created either from kernel-generated random
numbers or user-provided decrypted data.  Revert the change requiring
user-provided decrypted data.

Reported-by: Vishal Verma &lt;vishal.l.verma@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep</title>
<updated>2024-01-25T23:27:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chen Ni</name>
<email>nichen@iscas.ac.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-08T07:36:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=c25f1555e03ac877d09c05f3b6235ff8fe827ec1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c25f1555e03ac877d09c05f3b6235ff8fe827ec1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882 ]

Add check for strsep() in order to transfer the error.

Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
Signed-off-by: Chen Ni &lt;nichen@iscas.ac.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiry</title>
<updated>2024-01-01T12:38:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-09T00:41:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=791d5409cdb974c31a1bc7a903ea729ddc7d83df'/>
<id>urn:sha1:791d5409cdb974c31a1bc7a903ea729ddc7d83df</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 39299bdd2546688d92ed9db4948f6219ca1b9542 ]

If a key has an expiration time, then when that time passes, the key is
left around for a certain amount of time before being collected (5 mins by
default) so that EKEYEXPIRED can be returned instead of ENOKEY.  This is a
problem for DNS keys because we want to redo the DNS lookup immediately at
that point.

Fix this by allowing key types to be marked such that keys of that type
don't have this extra period, but are reclaimed as soon as they expire and
turn this on for dns_resolver-type keys.  To make this easier to handle,
key-&gt;expiry is changed to be permanent if TIME64_MAX rather than 0.

Furthermore, give such new-style negative DNS results a 1s default expiry
if no other expiry time is set rather than allowing it to stick around
indefinitely.  This shouldn't be zero as ls will follow a failing stat call
immediately with a second with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW added.

Fixes: 1a4240f4764a ("DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver code")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Markus Suvanto &lt;markus.suvanto@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Wang Lei &lt;wang840925@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
cc: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: Rollback init_trusted() consistently</title>
<updated>2023-11-28T17:07:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jarkko Sakkinen</name>
<email>jarkko@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-10T23:08:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=fe0b2a20f7804e4dbcbcfdb365993f7865f392a1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe0b2a20f7804e4dbcbcfdb365993f7865f392a1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 31de287345f41bbfaec36a5c8cbdba035cf76442 upstream.

Do bind neither static calls nor trusted_key_exit() before a successful
init, in order to maintain a consistent state. In addition, depart the
init_trusted() in the case of a real error (i.e. getting back something
else than -ENODEV).

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAHk-=whOPoLaWM8S8GgoOPT7a2+nMH5h3TLKtn=R_3w4R1_Uvg@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: tee: Refactor register SHM usage</title>
<updated>2023-11-28T17:07:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sumit Garg</name>
<email>sumit.garg@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-22T11:29:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=454ad98f31f0d16571c7e2158c279cbe954f7e80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:454ad98f31f0d16571c7e2158c279cbe954f7e80</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c745cd1718b7825d69315fe7127e2e289e617598 upstream.

The OP-TEE driver using the old SMC based ABI permits overlapping shared
buffers, but with the new FF-A based ABI each physical page may only
be registered once.

As the key and blob buffer are allocated adjancently, there is no need
for redundant register shared memory invocation. Also, it is incompatibile
with FF-A based ABI limitation. So refactor register shared memory
implementation to use only single invocation to register both key and blob
buffers.

[jarkko: Added cc to stable.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+
Fixes: 4615e5a34b95 ("optee: add FF-A support")
Reported-by: Jens Wiklander &lt;jens.wiklander@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg &lt;sumit.garg@linaro.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jens Wiklander &lt;jens.wiklander@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander &lt;jens.wiklander@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage</title>
<updated>2023-10-19T21:08:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sumit Garg</name>
<email>sumit.garg@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-06T05:18:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3746b878efdef99e8f018ca3fefe0a72529874ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3746b878efdef99e8f018ca3fefe0a72529874ce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 01bbafc63b65689cb179ca537971286bc27f3b74 upstream.

Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and
__exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led
to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.

However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init()
and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or
security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead.

Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately
the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its
future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not.

Reported-and-tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo &lt;42.hyeyoo@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg &lt;sumit.garg@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operations</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Göttsche</name>
<email>cgzones@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-11T12:32:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=896e9e57784cc48b9869d0574bd2c2be6cc1eaa8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:896e9e57784cc48b9869d0574bd2c2be6cc1eaa8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2d7f105edbb3b2be5ffa4d833abbf9b6965e9ce7 ]

If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via
`capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message.
Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author
granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them.

Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is
actually privileged.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche &lt;cgzones@googlemail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: keys: Modify mismatched function name</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T06:50:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiapeng Chong</name>
<email>jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-14T02:18:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0f56bfe19aa64b09d19d76ce56971f330a0d67dd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0f56bfe19aa64b09d19d76ce56971f330a0d67dd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2a4152742025c5f21482e8cebc581702a0fa5b01 ]

No functional modification involved.

security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:203: warning: expecting prototype for tpm_buf_append_auth(). Prototype was for tpm2_buf_append_auth() instead.

Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: Abaci Robot &lt;abaci@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=5524
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong &lt;jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Fix linking a duplicate key to a keyring's assoc_array</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T06:50:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Pavlu</name>
<email>petr.pavlu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-23T13:04:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=00edfa6d4fe022942e2f2e6f3294ff13ef78b15c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:00edfa6d4fe022942e2f2e6f3294ff13ef78b15c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d55901522f96082a43b9842d34867363c0cdbac5 upstream.

When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request
code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the
assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by
a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in
a crash.

Example report:
[2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652!
[2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3
[2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
[2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs]
[2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40
[2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f
[2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005
[2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000
[2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28
[2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740
[2158499.700585] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[2158499.700610] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[2158499.700702] Call Trace:
[2158499.700741]  ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0
[2158499.700768]  ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700790]  __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700814]  request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730
[2158499.700847]  ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver]
[2158499.700873]  ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[2158499.700898]  request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0
[2158499.700926]  dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver]
[2158499.701127]  dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs]
[2158499.701164]  ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90
[2158499.701190]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[2158499.701211]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[2158499.701405]  reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs]
[2158499.701603]  cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs]
[2158499.701632]  process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0
[2158499.701658]  worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0
[2158499.701682]  ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0
[2158499.701703]  kthread+0x10d/0x130
[2158499.701723]  ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[2158499.701746]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40

The situation occurs as follows:
* Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for
  example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver
  cache as current-&gt;cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to
  request_key_net() -&gt; request_key_tag() -&gt; request_key_and_link().
* Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context
  object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to
  type-&gt;match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to
  dns_resolver_cmp().
* Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes
  search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not
  found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() -&gt;
  construct_alloc_key().
* Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for
  "abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache.
* Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs
  __key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to
  insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is,
  using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is
  not yet present in the destination keyring.
* Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key is
  already present on some keyring by again calling
  search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using
  dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key
  "abcdef.".
* The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling
  __key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit
  operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates
  a duplicity because the same index key is already present.

Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in
construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into
the destination keyring is determined.

[jarkko@kernel.org: added a fixes tag and cc to stable]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Fixes: df593ee23e05 ("keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()")
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu &lt;petr.pavlu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joey Lee &lt;jlee@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Do not cache key in task struct if key is requested from kernel thread</title>
<updated>2023-03-30T10:49:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-14T15:15:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=32c2b3f157d8bce308274188f72c1d1f44a22028'/>
<id>urn:sha1:32c2b3f157d8bce308274188f72c1d1f44a22028</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 47f9e4c924025c5be87959d3335e66fcbb7f6b5c ]

The key which gets cached in task structure from a kernel thread does not
get invalidated even after expiry.  Due to which, a new key request from
kernel thread will be served with the cached key if it's present in task
struct irrespective of the key validity.  The change is to not cache key in
task_struct when key requested from kernel thread so that kernel thread
gets a valid key on every key request.

The problem has been seen with the cifs module doing DNS lookups from a
kernel thread and the results getting pinned by being attached to that
kernel thread's cache - and thus not something that can be easily got rid
of.  The cache would ordinarily be cleared by notify-resume, but kernel
threads don't do that.

This isn't seen with AFS because AFS is doing request_key() within the
kernel half of a user thread - which will do notify-resume.

Fixes: 7743c48e54ee ("keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct")
Signed-off-by: Bharath SM &lt;bharathsm@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
cc: Shyam Prasad N &lt;nspmangalore@gmail.com&gt;
cc: Steve French &lt;smfrench@gmail.com&gt;
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAGypqWw951d=zYRbdgNR4snUDvJhWL=q3=WOyh7HhSJupjz2vA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
