kernel/linux.git/security/keys/trusted-keys, branch v6.18.21

keys/trusted_keys: fix handle passed to tpm_buf_append_name during unseal

2026-01-30T09:32:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6342969dafbc63597cfc221aa13c3b123c2800c5 ] TPM2_Unseal[1] expects the handle of a loaded data object, and not the handle of the parent key. But the tpm2_unseal_cmd provides the parent keyhandle instead of blob_handle for the session HMAC calculation. This causes unseal to fail. Fix this by passing blob_handle to tpm_buf_append_name(). References: [1] trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-3-Version-184_pub.pdf Fixes: 6e9722e9a7bf ("tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size") Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size

2026-01-02T11:57:11+00:00

commit 6e9722e9a7bfe1bbad649937c811076acf86e1fd upstream. 'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst. Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for unrecognized values. Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic. End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as the session state would be then by definition corrupted. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd

2026-01-02T11:57:05+00:00

commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream. 'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode' but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob into with a cleanup helper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header

2025-09-27T18:05:06+00:00

Move functionality used only by trusted_tpm1.c out of the public header . Specifically, change the exported functions into static functions, since they are not used outside trusted_tpm1.c, and move various other definitions and inline functions to trusted_tpm1.c. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash

2025-09-27T18:05:06+00:00

Use the SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1 library functions instead of crypto_shash. This is simpler and faster. Replace the selection of CRYPTO, CRYPTO_HMAC, and CRYPTO_SHA1 with CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 and CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS. The latter is needed for crypto_memneq() which was previously being pulled in via CRYPTO. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time

2025-09-27T18:05:06+00:00

To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). [For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.] Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix improper sg use with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y

2025-01-21T09:25:23+00:00

With vmalloc stack addresses enabled (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y) DCP trusted keys can crash during en- and decryption of the blob encryption key via the DCP crypto driver. This is caused by improperly using sg_init_one() with vmalloc'd stack buffers (plain_key_blob). Fix this by always using kmalloc() for buffers we give to the DCP crypto driver. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 0e28bf61a5f9 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key") Signed-off-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix NULL dereference in AEAD crypto operation

2024-11-04T19:24:24+00:00

When sealing or unsealing a key blob we currently do not wait for the AEAD cipher operation to finish and simply return after submitting the request. If there is some load on the system we can exit before the cipher operation is done and the buffer we read from/write to is already removed from the stack. This will e.g. result in NULL pointer dereference errors in the DCP driver during blob creation. Fix this by waiting for the AEAD cipher operation to finish before resuming the seal and unseal calls. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 0e28bf61a5f9 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key") Reported-by: Parthiban N Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/254d3bb1-6dbc-48b4-9c08-77df04baee2f@linumiz.com/ Signed-off-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h

2024-10-02T21:23:23+00:00

asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h; might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header. auto-generated by the following: for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i done for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i done git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h

KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key

2024-08-15T19:01:14+00:00

Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking the key via uninitialized memory. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 2e8a0f40a39c ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys") Signed-off-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen