kernel/linux.git/security/keys/trusted-keys, branch v6.1.168

KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd

2026-01-11T14:18:50+00:00

commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream. 'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode' but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob into with a cleanup helper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time

2025-10-19T14:23:14+00:00

commit eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 upstream. To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). [For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.] Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: Do not use WARN when encode fails

2024-05-25T14:21:35+00:00

commit 050bf3c793a07f96bd1e2fd62e1447f731ed733b upstream. When asn1_encode_sequence() fails, WARN is not the correct solution. 1. asn1_encode_sequence() is not an internal function (located in lib/asn1_encode.c). 2. Location is known, which makes the stack trace useless. 3. Results a crash if panic_on_warn is set. It is also noteworthy that the use of WARN is undocumented, and it should be avoided unless there is a carefully considered rationale to use it. Replace WARN with pr_err, and print the return value instead, which is only useful piece of information. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_key_encode()

2024-05-25T14:21:30+00:00

commit ffcaa2172cc1a85ddb8b783de96d38ca8855e248 upstream. 'scratch' is never freed. Fix this by calling kfree() in the success, and in the error case. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # +v5.13 Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: Rollback init_trusted() consistently

2023-11-28T17:07:10+00:00

commit 31de287345f41bbfaec36a5c8cbdba035cf76442 upstream. Do bind neither static calls nor trusted_key_exit() before a successful init, in order to maintain a consistent state. In addition, depart the init_trusted() in the case of a real error (i.e. getting back something else than -ENODEV). Reported-by: Linus Torvalds Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAHk-=whOPoLaWM8S8GgoOPT7a2+nMH5h3TLKtn=R_3w4R1_Uvg@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: tee: Refactor register SHM usage

2023-11-28T17:07:10+00:00

commit c745cd1718b7825d69315fe7127e2e289e617598 upstream. The OP-TEE driver using the old SMC based ABI permits overlapping shared buffers, but with the new FF-A based ABI each physical page may only be registered once. As the key and blob buffer are allocated adjancently, there is no need for redundant register shared memory invocation. Also, it is incompatibile with FF-A based ABI limitation. So refactor register shared memory implementation to use only single invocation to register both key and blob buffers. [jarkko: Added cc to stable.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+ Fixes: 4615e5a34b95 ("optee: add FF-A support") Reported-by: Jens Wiklander Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Tested-by: Jens Wiklander Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage

2023-10-19T21:08:50+00:00

commit 01bbafc63b65689cb179ca537971286bc27f3b74 upstream. Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and __exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y. However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init() and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead. Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not. Reported-and-tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

security: keys: Modify mismatched function name

2023-07-27T06:50:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit 2a4152742025c5f21482e8cebc581702a0fa5b01 ] No functional modification involved. security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:203: warning: expecting prototype for tpm_buf_append_auth(). Prototype was for tpm2_buf_append_auth() instead. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: Abaci Robot Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=5524 Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong Reviewed-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Fix migratable logic

2022-06-08T11:12:13+00:00

When creating (sealing) a new trusted key, migratable trusted keys have the FIXED_TPM and FIXED_PARENT attributes set, and non-migratable keys don't. This is backwards, and also causes creation to fail when creating a migratable key under a migratable parent. (The TPM thinks you are trying to seal a non-migratable blob under a migratable parent.) The following simple patch fixes the logic, and has been tested for all four combinations of migratable and non-migratable trusted keys and parent storage keys. With this logic, you will get a proper failure if you try to create a non-migratable trusted key under a migratable parent storage key, and all other combinations work correctly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: e5fb5d2c5a03 ("security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable") Signed-off-by: David Safford Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys

2022-05-23T15:47:50+00:00

The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP. The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material. This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES encryption/decryption of user data. This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys. Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these, provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys. Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Tim Harvey Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Michael Walle # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen