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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/keys/internal.h, branch v4.14.85</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.85</id>
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<updated>2017-09-25T14:19:57+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings</title>
<updated>2017-09-25T14:19:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-18T18:37:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3</id>
<content type='text'>
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &amp;
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux</title>
<updated>2017-07-19T15:55:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-19T15:55:18+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e06fdaf40a5c021dd4a2ec797e8b724f07360070</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization</title>
<updated>2017-06-30T19:00:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-10-28T08:22:25+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3859a271a003aba01e45b85c9d8b355eb7bf25f9</id>
<content type='text'>
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/wait: Split out the wait_bit*() APIs from &lt;linux/wait.h&gt; into &lt;linux/wait_bit.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-06-20T10:19:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-20T10:19:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5dd43ce2f69d42a71dcacdb13d17d8c0ac1fe8f7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5dd43ce2f69d42a71dcacdb13d17d8c0ac1fe8f7</id>
<content type='text'>
The wait_bit*() types and APIs are mixed into wait.h, but they
are a pretty orthogonal extension of wait-queues.

Furthermore, only about 50 kernel files use these APIs, while
over 1000 use the regular wait-queue functionality.

So clean up the main wait.h by moving the wait-bit functionality
out of it, into a separate .h and .c file:

  include/linux/wait_bit.h  for types and APIs
  kernel/sched/wait_bit.c   for the implementation

Update all header dependencies.

This reduces the size of wait.h rather significantly, by about 30%.

Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:33:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-19T18:39:09+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f1c316a3ab9d24df6022682422fe897492f2c0c8</id>
<content type='text'>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.

The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.

As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.

The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:10:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mat Martineau</name>
<email>mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-02T00:44:09+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6563c91fd645556c7801748f15bc727c77fcd311</id>
<content type='text'>
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking.  This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.

With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.

To restrict a keyring, call:

  keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
         const char *restriction)

where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau &lt;mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and data</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:10:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mat Martineau</name>
<email>mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-31T23:05:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2b6aa412ff23a02ac777ad307249c60a839cfd25'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2b6aa412ff23a02ac777ad307249c60a839cfd25</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.

The garbage collector checks restrict_link-&gt;keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau &lt;mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security, keys: convert key_user.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t</title>
<updated>2017-04-03T00:49:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Elena Reshetova</name>
<email>elena.reshetova@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-31T12:20:49+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ddb99e118e37f324a4be65a411bb60ae62795cf9</id>
<content type='text'>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.

Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova &lt;elena.reshetova@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand &lt;ishkamiel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Windsor &lt;dwindsor@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched/headers: Prepare to remove &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; inclusion from &lt;linux/sched.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2017-03-02T07:42:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ingo Molnar</name>
<email>mingo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-02T16:54:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=5b825c3af1d8a0af4deb4a5eb349d0d0050c62e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b825c3af1d8a0af4deb4a5eb349d0d0050c62e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add #include &lt;linux/cred.h&gt; dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.

Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because &lt;linux/sched.h&gt; is included in over
2,200 files ...

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Add placeholder for KDF usage with DH</title>
<updated>2016-06-03T06:14:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephan Mueller</name>
<email>smueller@chronox.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-26T21:38:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=4693fc734d675c5518ea9bd4c9623db45bc37402'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4693fc734d675c5518ea9bd4c9623db45bc37402</id>
<content type='text'>
The values computed during Diffie-Hellman key exchange are often used
in combination with key derivation functions to create cryptographic
keys.  Add a placeholder for a later implementation to configure a
key derivation function that will transform the Diffie-Hellman
result returned by the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command.

[This patch was stripped down from a patch produced by Mat Martineau that
 had a bug in the compat code - so for the moment Stephan's patch simply
 requires that the placeholder argument must be NULL]

Original-signed-off-by: Mat Martineau &lt;mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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