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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/integrity.h, branch v5.18.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.18.16</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.18.16'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2022-03-22T03:44:37+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2022-03-22T03:44:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T03:44:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7f313ff0acdecf0926ab127533a2a93948a2f547'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7f313ff0acdecf0926ab127533a2a93948a2f547</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Except for extending the 'encrypted' key type to support user provided
  data, the rest is code cleanup, __setup() usage bug fix, and a trivial
  change"

* tag 'integrity-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  MAINTAINERS: add missing security/integrity/platform_certs
  EVM: fix the evm= __setup handler return value
  KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data
  ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variable
  ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS
  ima: Return error code obtained from securityfs functions
  MAINTAINERS: add missing "security/integrity" directory
  ima: Fix trivial typos in the comments
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true</title>
<updated>2022-03-08T11:55:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-26T02:58:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3d6ae1a5d0c2019d274284859f556dcb64aa98a7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3d6ae1a5d0c2019d274284859f556dcb64aa98a7</id>
<content type='text'>
With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end-
user wants to trust the machine keyring as trusted keys.  If they have
chosen to trust the machine keyring, load the qualifying keys into it
during boot, then link it to the secondary keyring .  If the user has not
chosen to trust the machine keyring, it will be empty and not linked to
the secondary keyring.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine</title>
<updated>2022-03-08T11:55:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-26T02:58:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d19967764ba876f5c82dabaa28f983b21eb642a2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d19967764ba876f5c82dabaa28f983b21eb642a2</id>
<content type='text'>
Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim.  The UEFI shim provides
what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure
Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain.  The
MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys.  These keys can
be used to sign an end-users development kernel build.  When Linux
boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux
.platform keyring.

Define a new Linux keyring called machine.  This keyring shall contain just
MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new
machine keyring will be used in follow on patches.  Unlike keys in the
platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted
within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variable</title>
<updated>2022-02-15T16:52:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-24T19:26:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8c54135e2e6da677291012813a26a5f1b2c8a90a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8c54135e2e6da677291012813a26a5f1b2c8a90a</id>
<content type='text'>
To support larger hash digests in the 'iint' cache, instead of defining
the 'digest' field as the maximum digest size, the 'digest' field was
defined as a flexible array variable.  The "ima_digest_data" struct was
wrapped inside a local structure with the maximum digest size.  But
before adding the record to the iint cache, memory for the exact digest
size was dynamically allocated.

The original reason for defining the 'digest' field as a flexible array
variable is still valid for the 'iint' cache use case.  Instead of
wrapping the 'ima_digest_data' struct in a local structure define
'ima_max_digest_data' struct.

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS</title>
<updated>2022-02-15T16:21:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-28T14:53:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=aae6ccbd826d26730a6fd9bc01884f0a0a9cbb25'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aae6ccbd826d26730a6fd9bc01884f0a0a9cbb25</id>
<content type='text'>
Simple policy rule options, such as fowner, uid, or euid, can be checked
immediately, while other policy rule options, such as requiring a file
signature, need to be deferred.

The 'flags' field in the integrity_iint_cache struct contains the policy
action', 'subaction', and non action/subaction.

action: measure/measured, appraise/appraised, (collect)/collected,
        audit/audited
subaction: appraise status for each hook (e.g. file, mmap, bprm, read,
        creds)
non action/subaction: deferred policy rule options and state

Rename the IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS.

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: sha - split sha.h into sha1.h and sha2.h</title>
<updated>2020-11-20T03:45:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-13T05:20:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a24d22b225ce158651378869a6b88105c4bdb887'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a24d22b225ce158651378869a6b88105c4bdb887</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently &lt;crypto/sha.h&gt; contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and &lt;crypto/sha3.h&gt; contains declarations for SHA-3.

This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure.  So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.

Therefore, split &lt;crypto/sha.h&gt; into two headers &lt;crypto/sha1.h&gt; and
&lt;crypto/sha2.h&gt;, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.

This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1.  It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Add errno field in audit message</title>
<updated>2020-07-17T01:48:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lakshmi Ramasubramanian</name>
<email>nramas@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-18T21:10:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2f845882ecd2f6808f87f387dfa9b03d71a68e01'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2f845882ecd2f6808f87f387dfa9b03d71a68e01</id>
<content type='text'>
Error code is not included in the audit messages logged by
the integrity subsystem.

Define a new function integrity_audit_message() that takes error code
in the "errno" parameter. Add "errno" field in the audit messages logged
by the integrity subsystem and set the value passed in the "errno"
parameter.

[    6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12

[    7.987647] audit: type=1802 audit(1592506283.312:9): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=policy_update cause=completed comm="systemd" res=1 errno=0

[    8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array</title>
<updated>2020-06-16T04:08:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavoars@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-28T14:35:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=eb492c627a61b5630d5e6d9f6cfecbcd60611e05'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eb492c627a61b5630d5e6d9f6cfecbcd60611e05</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T19:32:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tushar Sugandhi</name>
<email>tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-19T00:06:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=555d6d71d57c4a2e4ff750f6a41d2b7d7c861863'/>
<id>urn:sha1:555d6d71d57c4a2e4ff750f6a41d2b7d7c861863</id>
<content type='text'>
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the
files under security/integrity.

This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and
removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under
security/integrity.

With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed
with 'integrity'.

     security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
     security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
     security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
     security/integrity/iint.c

     e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n"

And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'.

     security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c

     e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n"

For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no
change in the message format.

Suggested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi &lt;tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T01:25:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-31T03:31:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=273df864cf7466fb170b8dcc1abd672cd08ad8d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:273df864cf7466fb170b8dcc1abd672cd08ad8d3</id>
<content type='text'>
Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel
currently supports checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the
public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will
automatically fail signature verification. Blacklisting the public key
is not fine enough granularity, as we might want to only blacklist a
particular file.

This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of
the file, without the appended signature, based on the IMA policy. It
defines a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist".

In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware
"dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted
binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following
example shows how to blacklist a specific kernel module hash.

  $ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko
  77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
  kernel/kheaders.ko

  $ grep BLACKLIST .config
  CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y
  CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list"

  $ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list
  "bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3"

Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy
rules (/etc/ima-policy):

  measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
  appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
  appraise_type=imasig|modsig

After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel:

   545660333 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ blacklist:
  bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3

  measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
  appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
  appraise_type=imasig|modsig

  modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied

  10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig
  sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
  2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko

  10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig
  sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
  2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko  sha256:77fa889b3
  5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
  3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648
  016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264....

  10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf
  sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132
  b blacklisted-hash
  77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
