kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/ima, branch v5.10.53

ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value

2021-05-14T07:50:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7990ccafaa37dc6d8bb095d4d7cd997e8903fd10 ] In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value. Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32 before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value. Fixes: 47fdee60b47f ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers") Signed-off-by: Li Huafei Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion

2021-03-04T10:37:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4993e1f9479a4161fd7d93e2b8b30b438f00cb0f ] KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag. KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it. Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc(). We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually. Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed. Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring") Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Mickaël Salaün cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall

2021-03-04T10:37:50+00:00

[ Upstream commit f31e3386a4e92ba6eda7328cb508462956c94c64 ] IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call, in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak. Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list. Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on error

2021-03-04T10:37:50+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6d14c6517885fa68524238787420511b87d671df ] IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call, in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. In error code paths this memory is not freed resulting in memory leak. Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly

2020-12-30T10:54:17+00:00

commit 207cdd565dfc95a0a5185263a567817b7ebf5467 upstream. Commit a408e4a86b36b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges to open a new one. Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor. Cc: # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8ec0 ima: Set file->f_mode Fixes: 2fe5d6def1672 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member

2020-10-29T22:22:59+00:00

There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.9-rc1/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

2020-10-15T22:58:18+00:00

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and NULL pointer checking)" * tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash evm: Check size of security.evm before using it ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size() ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update() ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback ima: add check for enforced appraise option integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message() ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule

fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads

2020-10-05T11:37:04+00:00

To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset" argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call. Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

IMA: Add support for file reads without contents

2020-10-05T11:37:04+00:00

When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead of forcing a double read here. Signed-off-by: Scott Branden Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-13-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook

2020-10-05T11:37:03+00:00

As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls. For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents, it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all existing LSMs to retain existing behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman