<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/ima, branch v3.18.100</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.100</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.100'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2017-12-09T17:29:48+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix hash algorithm initialization</title>
<updated>2017-12-09T17:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Boshi Wang</name>
<email>wangboshi@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-20T08:01:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=d51a980a967748e889815c304e7bdcb4d6c37fd3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d51a980a967748e889815c304e7bdcb4d6c37fd3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ebe7c0a7be92bbd34c6ff5b55810546a0ee05bee ]

The hash_setup function always sets the hash_setup_done flag, even
when the hash algorithm is invalid.  This prevents the default hash
algorithm defined as CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH from being used.

This patch sets hash_setup_done flag only for valid hash algorithms.

Fixes: e7a2ad7eb6f4 "ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms"
Signed-off-by: Boshi Wang &lt;wangboshi@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS</title>
<updated>2017-11-24T07:30:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-07T10:37:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=72df596704b8ce5448e92dea14851e767a9ae592'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72df596704b8ce5448e92dea14851e767a9ae592</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 020aae3ee58c1af0e7ffc4e2cc9fe4dc630338cb upstream.

Commit b65a9cfc2c38 ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters")
moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a
point where the file descriptor is already opened.

This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed
belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The
consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good
values, regardless of the current appraisal status.

For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after
opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file
will be allowed afterwards.

Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating
security.ima.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE</title>
<updated>2017-05-25T12:17:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Glöckner</name>
<email>dg@emlix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T14:05:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9681c72067a9523fa36219e12fa1ee17da769551'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9681c72067a9523fa36219e12fa1ee17da769551</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ac202e978e18f045006d75bd549612620c6ec3a upstream.

Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset
the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created,
is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed,
verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written
yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file
already existed.

With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to
open testfile:

$ rm -f testfile
$ ( echo test &gt;&amp;3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3&gt;testfile

A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital
signature demanded by the policy.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner &lt;dg@emlix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: extend "mask" policy matching support</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:53:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=36ac1d14682122e3d792c66c8ae8d6d1bd093547'/>
<id>urn:sha1:36ac1d14682122e3d792c66c8ae8d6d1bd093547</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 747cadeb108665b0474624a374aa9e13f12c9274 ]

commit 4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974 upstream.

The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:48:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=9a957a6622ab900a78a256d8c9d941b618135980'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9a957a6622ab900a78a256d8c9d941b618135980</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 ]

The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()</title>
<updated>2015-07-04T03:02:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-11T15:54:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=cdbbbe19dd7dde385233508367aeec020e089c25'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cdbbbe19dd7dde385233508367aeec020e089c25</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 45b26133b97871896b8c5241d59f4ff7839db7b2 ]

This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".

Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;rsassu@suse.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into for-linus</title>
<updated>2014-10-29T04:03:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-29T04:03:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6c880ad51b829006c5387df88967954c0e874993'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6c880ad51b829006c5387df88967954c0e874993</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: check xattr value length and type in the ima_inode_setxattr()</title>
<updated>2014-10-28T14:03:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-28T11:31:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=a48fda9de94500a3152a56b723d0a64ae236547c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a48fda9de94500a3152a56b723d0a64ae236547c</id>
<content type='text'>
ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* for stable reverted "allow setting hash only in fix or log mode"
  It will be a separate patch.

Changes in v2:
* testing validity of xattr type
* allow setting hash only in fix or log mode (Mimi)

[  261.562522] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[  261.564109] IP: [&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109] PGD 3112f067 PUD 42965067 PMD 0
[  261.564109] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  261.564109] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[  261.564109] CPU: 0 PID: 3299 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2924
[  261.564109] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  261.564109] task: ffff8800428c2430 ti: ffff880042be0000 task.ti: ffff880042be0000
[  261.564109] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109] RSP: 0018:ffff880042be3d50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  261.564109] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000015
[  261.564109] RDX: 0000001500000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800375cc600
[  261.564109] RBP: ffff880042be3d68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004d6256
[  261.564109] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88002149ba00
[  261.564109] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  261.564109] FS:  00007f6c1e219740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  261.564109] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003b35a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  261.564109] Stack:
[  261.564109]  ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000 ffff880042be3d98
[  261.564109]  ffffffff812a101b ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000
[  261.564109]  0000000000000000 ffff880042be3de0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff880042be3dc8
[  261.564109] Call Trace:
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff812a101b&gt;] security_inode_setxattr+0x48/0x6a
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d08a&gt;] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d1e0&gt;] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8114d011&gt;] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff811687c0&gt;] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d3e6&gt;] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff81529da9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  261.564109] Code: 48 89 f7 48 c7 c6 58 36 81 81 53 31 db e8 73 27 04 00 85 c0 75 28 bf 15 00 00 00 e8 8a a5 d9 ff 84 c0 75 05 83 cb ff eb 15 31 f6 &lt;41&gt; 80 7d 00 03 49 8b 7c 24 68 40 0f 94 c6 e8 e1 f9 ff ff 89 d8
[  261.564109] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109]  RSP &lt;ffff880042be3d50&gt;
[  261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000
[  261.599998] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security, crypto: LLVMLinux: Remove VLAIS from ima_crypto.c</title>
<updated>2014-10-14T08:51:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Behan Webster</name>
<email>behanw@converseincode.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-04T21:18:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=357aabed626fe3fc753a99ef1d652f4e2d82ba26'/>
<id>urn:sha1:357aabed626fe3fc753a99ef1d652f4e2d82ba26</id>
<content type='text'>
Replaced the use of a Variable Length Array In Struct (VLAIS) with a C99
compliant equivalent. This patch allocates the appropriate amount of memory
using a char array using the SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK macro.

The new code can be compiled with both gcc and clang.

Signed-off-by: Behan Webster &lt;behanw@converseincode.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Charlebois &lt;charlebm@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Möller &lt;dl9pf@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: detect violations for mmaped files</title>
<updated>2014-09-18T14:04:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@polito.it</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-12T17:35:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=1b68bdf9cded82d37e443a20c5ed47bbb084d5dc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b68bdf9cded82d37e443a20c5ed47bbb084d5dc</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes the detection of the 'open_writers' violation for mmaped
files.

before) an 'open_writers' violation is detected if the policy contains
        a rule with the criteria: func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ

after) an 'open_writers' violation is detected if the current event
       matches one of the policy rules.

With the old behaviour, the 'open_writers' violation is not detected
in the following case:

policy:
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC

steps:
1) open a shared library for writing
2) execute a binary that links that shared library
3) during the binary execution, modify the shared library and save
   the change

result:
the 'open_writers' violation measurement is not present in the IMA list.

Only binaries executed are protected from writes. For libraries mapped
in memory there is the flag MAP_DENYWRITE for this purpose, but according
to the output of 'man mmap', the mmap flag is ignored.

Since ima_rdwr_violation_check() is now called by process_measurement()
the information about if the inode must be measured is already provided
by ima_get_action(). Thus the unnecessary function ima_must_measure()
has been removed.

Changes in v3 (Dmitry Kasatkin):
- Violation for MMAP_CHECK function are verified since this patch
- Changed patch description a bit

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
