kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig, branch linux-4.16.y

ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface

2018-05-30T06:17:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit fac37c628fd5d68fd7298d9b57ae8601ee1b4723 ] TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support. If it is built as a module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init. tpm_pcr_read() in IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually there is a TPM chip on the system. ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19) Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel and initializes before IMA. Signed-off-by: Jiandi An Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection

2017-06-21T18:37:12+00:00

IMA uses the hash algorithm too early to be able to use a module. Require the selected hash algorithm to be built-in. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option

2017-06-21T18:37:12+00:00

Permit enabling the different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from the boot command line. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list

2016-12-20T17:48:44+00:00

In preparation for serializing the binary_runtime_measurements, this patch maintains the amount of memory required. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-5-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Andreas Steffen Cc: Josh Sklar Cc: Dave Young Cc: Vivek Goyal Cc: Baoquan He Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Stewart Smith Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok

2016-04-11T21:49:15+00:00

Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY) that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the system trusted keyrings. EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned. If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain - provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings. The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING). Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy

2015-12-15T15:01:43+00:00

It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings

2015-12-15T15:01:43+00:00

This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot. IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times

2015-12-15T15:01:43+00:00

The new rules get appended to the original policy, forming a queue. The new rules are first added to a temporary list, which on error get released without disturbing the normal IMA operations. On success both lists (the current policy and the new rules) are spliced. IMA policy reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous compared to writes, the match code is RCU protected. The updater side also does list splice in RCU manner. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring

2015-11-23T19:30:02+00:00

Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring. This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring(). Changes in v3: * Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper. * Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Changes in v2: * Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option * Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

ima: /proc/keys is now mandatory

2015-02-02T02:19:48+00:00

/proc/keys is now mandatory and its config option no longer exists, so it doesn't need selecting. Reported-by: Paul Bolle Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: James Morris