<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/evm, branch v5.11.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.11.6</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v5.11.6'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2021-03-04T11:14:11+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix memleak in init_desc</title>
<updated>2021-03-04T11:14:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dinghao Liu</name>
<email>dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-10T08:02:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=b00582072debcd897bed00400fa4a803a9758069'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b00582072debcd897bed00400fa4a803a9758069</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37 ]

tmp_tfm is allocated, but not freed on subsequent kmalloc failure, which
leads to a memory leak.  Free tmp_tfm.

Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu &lt;dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: formatted/reworded patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Check size of security.evm before using it</title>
<updated>2020-09-15T17:47:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T09:23:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=455b6c9112eff8d249e32ba165742085678a80a4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:455b6c9112eff8d249e32ba165742085678a80a4</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T02:03:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bruno Meneguele</name>
<email>bmeneg@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T19:40:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=7fe2bb7e7e5cf91d03ff9c35b7b997d088916cbc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7fe2bb7e7e5cf91d03ff9c35b7b997d088916cbc</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't silently ignore unknown or invalid ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm
kernel boot command line options.

Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele &lt;bmeneg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2020-06-06T16:39:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-06T16:39:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3c0ad98c2eda5ff30d23777e30744be6f7b8f097'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3c0ad98c2eda5ff30d23777e30744be6f7b8f097</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The main changes are extending the TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank
  specific file hashes, calculating the "boot_aggregate" based on other
  TPM PCR banks, using the default IMA hash algorithm, instead of SHA1,
  as the basis for the cache hash table key, and preventing the mprotect
  syscall to circumvent an IMA mmap appraise policy rule.

   - In preparation for extending TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank specific
     digests, commit 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of
     tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") modified
     tpm_pcr_extend(). The original SHA1 file digests were
     padded/truncated, before being extended into the other TPM PCR
     banks. This pull request calculates and extends the TPM PCR banks
     with bank specific file hashes completing the above change.

   - The "boot_aggregate", the first IMA measurement list record, is the
     "trusted boot" link between the pre-boot environment and the
     running OS. With TPM 2.0, the "boot_aggregate" record is not
     limited to being based on the SHA1 TPM PCR bank, but can be
     calculated based on any enabled bank, assuming the hash algorithm
     is also enabled in the kernel.

  Other changes include the following and five other bug fixes/code
  clean up:

   - supporting both a SHA1 and a larger "boot_aggregate" digest in a
     custom template format containing both the the SHA1 ('d') and
     larger digests ('d-ng') fields.

   - Initial hash table key fix, but additional changes would be good"

* tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Directly free *entry in ima_alloc_init_template() if digests is NULL
  ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()
  ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules
  ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy
  evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()
  ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable
  ima: Remove redundant policy rule set in add_rules()
  ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation
  ima: Use ima_hash_algo for collision detection in the measurement list
  ima: Calculate and extend PCR with digests in ima_template_entry
  ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank
  ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests
  ima: Store template digest directly in ima_template_entry
  ima: Evaluate error in init_ima()
  ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()</title>
<updated>2020-05-14T23:55:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-12T13:19:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=8433856947217ebb5697a8ff9c4c9cad4639a2cf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8433856947217ebb5697a8ff9c4c9cad4639a2cf</id>
<content type='text'>
The IS_ERR_OR_NULL() function has two conditions and if we got really
unlucky we could hit a race where "ptr" started as an error pointer and
then was set to NULL.  Both conditions would be false even though the
pointer at the end was NULL.

This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that "*tfm" can only be NULL
or valid.  I have introduced a "tmp_tfm" variable to make that work.  I
also reversed a condition and pulled the code in one tab.

Reported-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Fixes: 53de3b080d5e ("evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()</title>
<updated>2020-05-08T03:36:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-14T08:01:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().

Fixes: 50b977481fce9 ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix RCU list related warnings</title>
<updated>2020-05-08T01:36:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Madhuparna Bhowmik</name>
<email>madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-30T16:02:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=770f60586d2af0590be263f55fd079226313922c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:770f60586d2af0590be263f55fd079226313922c</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes the following warning and few other instances of
traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:

[   32.848432] =============================
[   32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[   32.849308] -----------------------------
[   32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted, use
list_for_each_entry_lockless() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu for
traversing the list.  Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to
indicate this fact.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik &lt;madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt; (RCU viewpoint)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()</title>
<updated>2020-05-08T01:30:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T10:28:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=53de3b080d5eae31d0de219617155dcc34e7d698'/>
<id>urn:sha1:53de3b080d5eae31d0de219617155dcc34e7d698</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by
crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that
require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of
the following race condition:

Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() &lt;= error pointer
Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) &lt;= *tfm is not NULL, use it
Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) &lt;= panic
Task A: *tfm = NULL

This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new
crypto context must be created.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions</title>
<updated>2020-02-28T19:32:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tushar Sugandhi</name>
<email>tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-02-19T00:06:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=555d6d71d57c4a2e4ff750f6a41d2b7d7c861863'/>
<id>urn:sha1:555d6d71d57c4a2e4ff750f6a41d2b7d7c861863</id>
<content type='text'>
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the
files under security/integrity.

This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and
removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under
security/integrity.

With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed
with 'integrity'.

     security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
     security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
     security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
     security/integrity/iint.c

     e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n"

And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'.

     security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c

     e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n"

For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no
change in the message format.

Suggested-by: Shuah Khan &lt;skhan@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi &lt;tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"</title>
<updated>2019-07-11T01:43:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-11T01:43:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=028db3e290f15ac509084c0fc3b9d021f668f877'/>
<id>urn:sha1:028db3e290f15ac509084c0fc3b9d021f668f877</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits

   7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
   2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

that the merge brought in).

It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].

The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.

 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
