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<title>kernel/linux.git/security/integrity/evm, branch v4.19.265</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree (mirror)</subtitle>
<id>https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.265</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.265'/>
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<updated>2021-11-26T10:36:01+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>evm: mark evm_fixmode as __ro_after_init</title>
<updated>2021-11-26T10:36:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Austin Kim</name>
<email>austin.kim@lge.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-28T11:26:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=e3c5b28c28960afe708e40dbf66e2117a2c3e8ae'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e3c5b28c28960afe708e40dbf66e2117a2c3e8ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32ba540f3c2a7ef61ed5a577ce25069a3d714fc9 upstream.

The evm_fixmode is only configurable by command-line option and it is never
modified outside initcalls, so declaring it with __ro_after_init is better.

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim &lt;austin.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix writing &lt;securityfs&gt;/evm overflow</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:15:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T22:13:45+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8657d0d57d6df9d6d04277c18889da2804164ca3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ]

EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete.  Define and read an unsigned
int.

Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:15:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=77c94b2a1deea733e2796a2da7b637c1afd0cdb8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:77c94b2a1deea733e2796a2da7b637c1afd0cdb8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c upstream.

EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.

Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.

Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:15:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=2c6b7016754559b1ead8d61e8ac67728d960fbbd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2c6b7016754559b1ead8d61e8ac67728d960fbbd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9eea2904292c2d8fa98df141d3bf7c41ec9dc1b5 upstream.

evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a
key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as
public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.

Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a
possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to
switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should
have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.

More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the
kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a
legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error
when no HMAC key has been loaded.

This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with
a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.

Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Check size of security.evm before using it</title>
<updated>2020-11-05T10:08:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T09:23:30+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:05f703b07727c0eb81f487143b583d5f8561d900</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 455b6c9112eff8d249e32ba165742085678a80a4 upstream.

This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:05:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-14T08:01:31+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3815f6508d90a7e7c86719a0009fd4bb6b89ad2b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f upstream.

Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().

Fixes: 50b977481fce9 ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix RCU list related warnings</title>
<updated>2020-06-07T11:17:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Madhuparna Bhowmik</name>
<email>madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-30T16:02:05+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a0006477c6af2b0b9b59beb6695d469ebb48f9b2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 770f60586d2af0590be263f55fd079226313922c ]

This patch fixes the following warning and few other instances of
traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:

[   32.848432] =============================
[   32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[   32.849308] -----------------------------
[   32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted, use
list_for_each_entry_lockless() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu for
traversing the list.  Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to
indicate this fact.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik &lt;madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt; (RCU viewpoint)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()</title>
<updated>2020-05-27T15:37:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T10:28:56+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4c7a2e76ae93577628a022d2d2adf5e0d8a89147</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 53de3b080d5eae31d0de219617155dcc34e7d698 ]

This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by
crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that
require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of
the following race condition:

Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() &lt;= error pointer
Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) &lt;= *tfm is not NULL, use it
Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) &lt;= panic
Task A: *tfm = NULL

This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new
crypto context must be created.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()</title>
<updated>2019-06-09T07:17:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T13:30:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=6e322a9e42cd9099121e786b326bc840ac28b5e0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6e322a9e42cd9099121e786b326bc840ac28b5e0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 221be106d75c1b511973301542f47d6000d0b63e upstream.

This patch prevents memory access beyond the evm_tfm array by checking the
validity of the index (hash algorithm) passed to init_desc(). The hash
algorithm can be arbitrarily set if the security.ima xattr type is not
EVM_XATTR_HMAC.

Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()</title>
<updated>2018-07-22T18:49:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>weiyongjun1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-11T13:28:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.radix-linux.su/kernel/linux.git/commit/?id=3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b</id>
<content type='text'>
In case of error, the function audit_log_start() returns NULL pointer
not ERR_PTR(). The IS_ERR() test in the return value check should be
replaced with NULL test.

Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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